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Editors’ Note

We, the executive staff of Criterion, are excited to present the Winter 2021
issue of Criterion to our readers and would like to take this opportunity to
express gratitude to our editing staff, published authors, and contributors.
Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism is a student-run journal associated
with the English Department at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.
As a journal, we give our volunteers hands-on editing, proofreading, and
design experience throughout the publication process. Our editing staff is
composed entirely of student volunteers; without them, publishing quality
articles for our readers would be impossible. Although the social distancing
guidelines in effect at Brigham Young University mandated that we work
together remotely, their diligent efforts and dependability throughout the
extensive editing process allowed us to produce this issue. We are proud to
share this issue with our readers, made possible by their uncompromising
commitment.
The papers in this journal were chosen from dozens of submissions
because of their engaging themes and thought-provoking arguments. Three
of those published (starting on pages 69, 91, and 123 respectively) respond
to a forum prompt written by Nicole Waligora-Davis, a professor in the
Department of English at Rice University, that invited authors to examine
how Black literature addresses the most urgent questions of our time. We
give thanks to all of the authors in this journal, who shared their unique
insights in their articles and allowed us to publish their work. We are
especially grateful for the time they spent revising their papers with our
editors; without their commitment to creating the best possible papers for
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our readers, success would not have been possible. Thanks to their tireless
engagement and valuable ideas, we are able to present a collection of critical
thought ranging from spiritual experiences evoked by World War I poetry to
domestic violence as seen in the works of Shakespeare.
We would also like to thank our faculty advisor, Billy Hall, a professor
in the English Department at Brigham Young University. Without his advice
and guidance, we would not have been able to produce such a quality issue.

Lastly, we express gratitude for Brigham Young University and the BYU
English Department for their continued support of the journal. We sincerely
hope you enjoy this issue of Criterion.

Rachel Teixeira
Ethan McGinty
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“Joy—Joy—Strange
Joy”
Spiritual Experience in World War One
Poetry

Ryder Seamons

The

academic study of spirituality does not

belong to just religious studies. The fields of psychology, biology, neuroscience,
art, and literature recognize the salience of human spirituality both inside
and outside the confines of religious tradition and theological belief. Each
field utilizes varying definitions and attitudes in their academic pursuit
to understand spirituality and spiritual experience. As a result, the word
“spirituality” often evades a singular definition. Scholar and theologian Sandra
M. Schneiders claims that the term is “unavoidably ambiguous, referring to (1)
a fundamental dimension of the human being, (2) the lived experience which
actualizes that dimension, and (3) the academic discipline which studies that
experience” (678). American psychologist William James, who attempted to
approach the study of spirituality as a pseudoscience, claimed that part of the
difficulty of understanding mystical and spiritual experience lies in the fact that
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“it defies expression . . . its quality must be directly experienced” and “cannot
be imparted or transferred to others” (515). The difficulty and ambiguity of
spirituality for scholars is thus twofold: defining the phenomenon itself
and explaining how the phenomenon manifests itself in the most unspoken,
personal depths of the human psyche. These lived manifestations of spirituality
we will refer to as spiritual experiences.
The studies of spirituality and spiritual experience conjure a number

of different academic responses, ranging from zealous fanaticism to skeptic
disapproval. While some scholars recognize the validity of spiritual experiences
as deeply meaningful, psychological experiences beyond the scope of scientific
understanding, others might argue that such experiences are simply the fruits
of a disturbed mind. Scholars like Wesley J. Wildman recognize the compelling
nature of spiritual experiences not only as a means of confirming religious
feelings of ultimate truth and social identity but also as a fundamental aspect
of the human condition (Wildman). And even though research on spirituality
in the past has favored traditional Christian paradigms, the academic field has
grown more expansive to include an understanding of other religious traditions,
including an understanding of spirituality that is divorced from religious
belief altogether. Wildman writes that “there has been an average increase in
sophistication” in the academic study of spiritual experience “as researchers
gradually became aware of and subsequently tried to overcome simplistic
assumptions about [religious and spiritual experiences] deriving from theistic
and usually Christian religious and theological frameworks” (53). This allencompassing understanding of human spirituality and the universality of
spiritual experience will more properly suit our purposes in this study.
There is likewise no sole definition of what constitutes a spiritual
experience. However, in literary studies spiritual experience can be described
as a spontaneous swelling of the emotions, a momentary euphoria, a perfect
union of the body and mind, or an epiphanic sense of ultimate meaning. For my
purposes, I will focus on how spiritual experience is expressed and interpreted
through poetry. Poetry presents a thoughtful medium to explore the inner
workings of the human spirit, as it seeks to articulate aspects of the human
experience that are unseen and hold ultimate meaning. The poetry of World
War I in particular presents a fascinating portrait of human spirituality. To
imagine a spiritual experience occurring amid the trench warfare, mustard gas
bombings, and ecological destruction fundamentally characteristic of World
War I seems almost paradoxical. Yet, British soldier-poets Isaac Rosenberg
2
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and Edward Thomas, who both wrote poetry as soldiers and were killed in
battle, portrayed wartime spiritual experiences in their works. The depiction
of spiritual experiences in their poetry, on one hand, captures the Romantic
glorification of a sublime spiritual experience and its fruits of joy and deeper
understanding. On the other hand, the spiritual experience simultaneously
reflects the twisted depravity of World War I and the increasing secularization
of the modern era. This literary tension led these soldier-poets to portray

spiritual experience in nuanced and contradictory ways.
In order to understand the spirituality found in the poetry of Rosenberg
and Thomas, I invoke Schneider’s assessment that the study of spirituality
must have “an understanding of the discipline which is not necessarily
theological” but includes “non-Christian and even nonreligious spiritual
experiences” (687). Rosenberg and Thomas present provocative notions of
spirituality that are strikingly similar, despite their theological differences.
Rosenberg, an Orthodox Jew, and Thomas, a disenchanted Christian, both
tether their depictions of spiritual experience not to a concept of religion,
theology, or even divinity (“Isaac,” Longley). They portray wartime spiritual
experience anthropologically, as a universal feature of the human condition
accessible to all people in all places—even the darkest of trenches. This
type of spirituality is detached from theological meaning and carries the
potential to be shared universally. By avoiding religious framing in which
to interpret their respective spiritual experiences, Rosenberg and Thomas
suggest that the transcendence of their spiritual experiences tethers them to
their humanity and to the natural world. Yet, the poets also suggest that the
horrors of the War are so terrible that it prevents them from fully basking in
the magnificence or higher meaning of their spiritual experiences.
To Rosenberg and Thomas, spiritual experience entails a sensory and
emotional awakening from the dull and numbed life of a soldier. These
experiences are depicted as an approach to a transcendent sense of ultimacy
or broader reality that occurs through communion with nature. I argue that
Rosenberg and Thomas—who belonged to the Georgian poetic movement—
both hearken back to the Romantic poetic tradition that preceded them,
particularly by linking the spiritual experiences in their poems to birdsong.
In these poems, birdsong creates a spiritual experience that is reminiscent of
the Romantic sublime, in that the key to spiritual awakening is a spontaneous
interaction with the unseen beauties of the natural world, which leads to an
enhanced acuteness of one’s place in time and space. The Romantic elements
3

Criterion

in Rosenberg and Thomas’s poetry are also brought into dialogue with
modernist angst—a typical feature of English poetry during and after World
War I. I argue that the psychological trauma caused by the War and the
existential stress of modernity leads these poets to interpret their spiritual
experiences as life-threatening and dangerous rather than life-sustaining
and fulfilling. Thus, spiritual experiences in these poems are portrayed as a
transcendent moment of beauty or existential clarity, but they are interpreted

by the poets as an unwanted distraction from the dangerous reality of
imminent death at wartime. Finally, because the spiritual experiences
themselves pose a threat to survival for these soldier-poets, I reason that
Rosenberg and Thomas find spiritual solace in the formal elements of poetry
itself instead of in their lived spiritual experiences. The act of writing poetry
becomes a spiritual exercise whereby Rosenberg and Thomas can capture
a fleeting, threatening moment through language, and—within the formal
elements of the poem—grapple with existential stress, imminent death, and
the spiritually numbing life of a soldier.
Both Rosenberg and Thomas were far from the typical British soldier.
After returning from a stay in South Africa in December 1915, Isaac Rosenberg
enlisted in the British army to fight in France. Only twenty-four years old,
Rosenberg enlisted not out of duty or desire for glory, but to financially
support his impoverished family. He determined as a young school boy
to establish himself as a literary visionary of great imagination and depth,
and he had already published several poems before enlisting. Although his
Orthodox Jewish heritage discouraged engagement with art and English
literature, Rosenberg exhibited a gift in writing from an early age and was
encouraged by mentors to study English poetry vocationally. He became a
student of many Romantic poets and felt a “strong affinity” for the Romantic
painter-poet William Blake (Maccoby 14). He continued to write poetry
on scraps of paper in the muddy trenches of France and had a few poems
published while serving. On April 1, 1918, Rosenberg was killed in manto-man combat. His family engraved words upon his headstone which, for
Rosenberg, would have been “the highest title which a human being can
bear: . . . ‘Artist and Poet’” (Maccoby 124).
Edward Thomas was many years older than Rosenberg by the time
Britain declared war in August 1914. At this point in his life, Thomas already
had a family and a well-established writing career. However, it is apparent
that the conflict abroad quickly consumed all of Thomas’s thoughts, for it
4
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soon became the primary subject of his letters and writings. That same year,
Thomas’s closest friend, the American poet Robert Frost, had encouraged
him to utilize his writing talents to compose poetry. Thomas lacked a
substantial education in English literature, but, like Frost, he held a deeply
emotional connection with landscape, and his poems paint idyllic portraits
of pastoral England. Echoing the views of Romantic poets that preceded him
by a century, Thomas’s poems revere the beauty and simplicity of the natural

world and the psychological relationship between nature and man. While
considering for months the possibility of enlisting, Thomas made World
War I the focus of most of his poems. Thomas’s indecisiveness became the
subject of Frost’s poem that would one day become one of his most famous:
“The Road Not Taken.” Thomas’s internal battle of whether or not to join
the War so consumed him that it became a spiritual matter, taking place
“in his spiritual world,” as his wife later wrote (Hollis). “Frankly I do not
want to go . . . but hardly a day passes without my thinking I should,” he
wrote to Frost (Hollis). At age thirty-seven, he enlisted with the Artists Rifles,
and like Rosenberg, continued to write poetry during his military service.
Thomas was killed less than two years later in the Battle of Arras when his
body was obliterated by an enemy shell. Though Rosenberg and Thomas
came from different religious backgrounds, both soldier-poets were acutely
aware of the impact World War I had on human spirituality. In Rosenberg’s
poem “Returning, We Hear the Larks,” and Thomas’s poems “The Owl” and
“Adlestrop,” we find spiritual experiences—stripped of any trace of theology
and existing wholly within the realm of nature—whose beauty and simplicity
are manipulated by the brutal horrors of the War and the collective angst of
the secularized modern world.
The works of many great soldier-poets from the early twentieth century
often avoid literary categorization, since they neither entirely adhere to
the Georgian or Romantic influences that preceded them, nor do they fully
embrace the modernist attitudes that were largely born out of the terror and
uncertainty of World War I. The Georgian poetic movement, which was “in
vogue when war broke out,” resembled the poetry of the Romantic period
nearly a century earlier, as it focused on the tranquility and majesty of
the natural world and the cultivation of the human spirit (“Voices” 2017).
Georgian poetry “represented an attempt to wall in the garden of English
poetry against the disruptive forces of modern civilization” (“Voices” 2017).
Hoping to avoid the controversies surrounding the precise art of dating and
5

Criterion

defining different literary movements, my mentions of Modernism refer to
the literary movement that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century
that was largely defined by feelings of alienation, angst, and an increased focus
on the inner world of the human psyche. The modernist literary movement
also included a shift towards secularization and a growing disdain for all
things spiritual, religious, or mystical. In essence, “the unsettling forces
of modernity profoundly challenged traditional ways of structuring and

making sense of the human experience” (“Introduction” 1889). Though both
Rosenberg and Thomas exhibit Romantic aptitudes and interests in their
poetry, the trauma of their wartime experience allows modernist angst to
seep in, creating a more unusual depiction of human spirituality.
Rosenberg ties his depiction of spiritual experience to humankind’s
relationship with nature in his poem “Returning, We Hear the Larks.”
Written in 1917—one of Rosenberg’s final poems before his death in
April 1918—“Returning, We Hear the Larks” portrays a battered group of
soldiers returning to camp, seeking a moment of safety and sleep.
Sombre the night is.
And though we have our lives, we know
What sinister threat lurks there.

Dragging these anguished limbs, we only know
This poison-blasted track opens on our camp—
On a little safe sleep.

But hark! joy—joy—strange joy.
Lo! heights of night ringing with unseen larks.
Music showering on our upturned list’ning faces.

Death could drop from the dark
As easily as song—
But song only dropped,
Like a blind man’s dreams on the sand

6
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By dangerous tides,
Like a girl’s dark hair for she dreams no ruin lies there,
Or her kisses where a serpent hides. (Rosenburg 15)

He begins the poem with the phrase “Sombre the night is,” establishing a
blatantly solemn tone. This group of soldiers seems to be on the brink of
death. An additional day of survival is no cause for celebration, for “though
we have our lives, we know / What sinister threat lurks there.” The threat is
shrouded in mystery but is imminent. The soldiers’ pessimism is warranted;
the ambiguous, sinister threat belongs to the night and thus the darkness.
Rosenberg continues this tone in the second stanza by employing synecdoche,
using dismembered “anguished limbs” to describe the surviving troops.
For a soldier to drag his own anguished limbs suggests a total disconnect
between body and mind. This constant anxiety of combat results in his
dehumanization. The visualization of dismembered and “anguished” limbs
also implies the physical toll of horrifying trench warfare. Echoing the first
stanza, Rosenberg again writes, “we . . . know.” In the first stanza, the men
know that a “sinister threat” lurks in the night; in the second stanza, they
know that “this poison-blasted track opens on our camp.” Rosenberg plays
with the surety of the word “know,” as if to touch on the inevitability of a
brutal death. Though unspoken, he and his fellow soldiers “know” it, and not
even a “little safe sleep” can remedy the existential stress they consequently
suffer.
With the sombre tone and physical and emotional numbness firmly
established thus far, Rosenberg begins his third stanza with a phrase that
indicates both a change in tone and a shift towards the spiritual—“But hark!”
The third stanza begins as something akin to the announcement of a heavenly
visitor: “But hark! joy—joy—strange joy.” Joy repeated three times also carries
subtle Biblical precedence, as a repetition of three often creates a superlative
in Hebrew rhetoric. Fellow Jewish poet and World War I soldier Siegfried
Sassoon wrote of Rosenberg’s poetry as having a “biblical and prophetic”
scriptural quality that linked back to Rosenberg’s Jewish heritage (Sassoon IX).
A devout and believing Jew, Rosenberg’s use of Biblical language points his
readers to something of spiritual significance. However, the word “strange”
hangs eerily, as if waiting to taint the pure spiritual experience soon to be
enjoyed collectively by Rosenberg and his comrades.

7
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The next line clarifies what Rosenberg and his peers hearken to—“Lo!

heights of night ringing with unseen larks.” The birdsong of larks in the night

awakens spiritual sensitivities and brings an unexpected joy in a moment of

pain and trauma. The larks provide the soldiers with a repose that contrasts

directly with their sombre emotional state and “anguished” physical state.

This spontaneous overflowing of emotion recalls the concept of the sublime in

Romantic British poetry. The sublime indicates a spiritual state of “grandeur,
power, and awe that may be inherent in or produced by undomesticated
nature” (Glossary 1075). According to philosophers like Edmund Burke, a

necessary element of the sublime is the presence of potential danger or terror;

the escape from which produces intense emotions of joy and relief.

More importantly, the presence of larks in the poem carries a literary

history in the tradition of British poetry that points to the spiritual significance

of these birds. For many British poets, larks and their songs convey mystical
and spiritual properties. In Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “To a Skylark” and William

Wordsworth’s poem published five years later of the same name, the lark

“represents divine inspiration” (Hendry 68). The lark’s song acts as a spiritual
muse that speaks truths of ultimate value. Specifically, Rosenberg’s poem

engages intertextually with Shelley’s “To a Skylark,” which was published

in 1820. Rosenberg and Shelley both refer to the skylark as “unseen,” which

points to an aspect of spirituality that has heretofore gone unmentioned:
its immateriality. The fact that both Rosenberg and Shelley’s larks remain

formless and immaterial throughout their poems expresses the concept
that the larks exist in a spiritual, unseen realm, and therefore they inspire a

spiritual reaction from humans that transcends the material universe. Further,
both poets describe the lark’s melodious song as a showering rain. In both

poems, the immaterial larks appear as a grace, providing spontaneous and
unwarranted repose from the gloom and darkness of life. Rosenberg’s use

of intertextuality thus further implies the spiritual significance of the lark’s

song and the transcendent awakening it inspires among the soldiers. His
spirituality appears in the third stanza as a moment of pristine ecstasy—the
shadow of a Romantic sublime cast into the twentieth century. He and his

soldiers experience momentary stillness and spiritual solace in unexpected

communion with nature by means of unseen songbirds.

Rosenberg’s final stanza, consisting of seven lines, cuts the emerging

spiritual experience to an abrupt end by directly asserting what has been
8
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implied from the very beginning: “Death could drop from the dark.” This
poem ends by returning to its beginning. Death, danger, and ruin are still
imminent. The poem encapsulates a sublime spiritual experience of three
lines between two three-lined stanzas at the beginning and a final seven-lined
stanza of sombre reality. Not even a spiritual experience shared collectively
can awaken us to a greater transcendent meaning behind the War and its
bloody conflict. This implication is further established in the formal elements

of Rosenberg’s poem. The first two tercets that serve to establish a sombre
reality, as well as the final seven-line stanza, are written in free verse without
apparent rhythm or rhyme. The third “sublime” stanza, however, adheres
to a more traditional poetic structure. Its lines appear orderly, and the meter
resembles iambic pentameter. The stanza is also united by meaningful
rhymes: “hark” rhymes with that which the soldiers hearken to, “lark”;
and “heights” rhymes with “night.” The third stanza thus presents itself
as a more formal poetic whole, surrounded between two halves of chaotic,
unstructured language, as if Rosenberg is suggesting that the peace and
wholeness of his sublime spiritual experience is but a tiny, fleeting moment,
tainted by the chaos and confusion caused by World War I.
Thomas touches on a parallel spirituality in his poem “The Owl,” in
which a weary and insensate soldier is stirred by the call of a nocturnal bird.
Published after Thomas’s death in 1917, this poem was originally composed
in February 1915—a few short months before he would voluntarily enlist in
World War I (Hollis). Though not based on his own experiences in combat,
this poem exhibits Thomas’s keen mindfulness of World War I and those
suffering at its hand.

Downhill I came, hungry, and yet not starved;
Cold, yet had heat within me that was proof
Against the North wind; tired, yet so that rest
Had seemed the sweetest thing under a roof.

Then at the inn I had food, fire, and rest,
Knowing how hungry, cold, and tired was I.
All of the night was quite barred out except
An owl’s cry, a most melancholy cry

9
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Shaken out long and clear upon the hill,
No merry note, nor cause of merriment,
But one telling me plain what I escaped
And others could not, that night as in I went.

And salted was my food, and my repose,
Salted and sobered, too, by the bird’s voice
Speaking for all who lay under the stars,
Soldiers and poor, unable to rejoice. (Thomas 10)

The poem begins much like Rosenberg’s. The narrator has narrowly escaped
the dangers of another day of battle and seeks shelter as night falls. In the
first quatrain, it is apparent that the narrator’s sole motive is to extend his
survival one more night. He desires only the necessities of life—warmth,
food, and rest—and he finds them at a nearby inn, “knowing how hungry,
cold, and tired was I.” He invites the reader into this moment of silence,
writing “all of the night was quite barred out,” but the silence is broken by
“an owl’s cry.” In this second quatrain, Thomas rhymes “I” in the second line
with “cry” in the fourth. This rhetorical strategy links the narrator’s sense
of self with the sound of the owl. It is important to note that, despite the
poem’s title, “The Owl,” the emphasis here is placed on the owl’s cry and
not the bird itself. In fact, the bird remains immaterial and is never seen nor
depicted in the poem—another noteworthy parallel to Rosenberg’s “unseen
larks,” which present themselves as formless spiritual emissaries.
The experience spawned by the owl’s cry awakens the narrator to a
transcendent understanding of his exact place in time and space. In the third
quatrain, we read that the owl’s cry was “shaken out long and clear upon
the hill.” The phrase “shaken out,” paired with “long and clear,” seems
somewhat oxymoronic. A sound that is "shaken out” suggests it is choppy
or halting—not a particularly apt description of a typical owl’s call. Though
there is the possibility of catachresis here, there are also other explanations
for this description that contribute to the poem’s meaning. To “shake
out” a “long and clear” call perhaps suggests that the noise was repeated
continuously as if each long and clear cry was shaken out one after the next.
Considering the narrator’s resonance with the cry, as shown by the rhymed
10
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pair of “I” and “cry,” one could also argue that the “shaken out” cry implies
a narrator that is psychologically or spiritually “shaken” by the violence
he barely escaped. The owl’s cry does not stir up an ecstatic jubilance like
the larks in Rosenberg’s poem but produces a subtler effect. The narrator
experiences a moment of enhanced mental and emotional clarity as a result
of the hooting song. The owl’s spiritual call is instructive; it is “no merry
note, nor cause of merriment,” but is a call “telling me plain what I escaped

/ And others could not.” Something about the owl’s call communicates a
comprehensive message to the narrator. Herein lies the spiritual experience;
the penetrating call of the owl unlocks the narrator’s spiritual capacity for a
transcendent understanding of human suffering. The narrator is awakened
to an enhanced awareness of his place in time and space and to the boundless
suffering around him. The narrator came “downhill” to the inn at the
beginning of the poem, and he hears the owl’s call coming from “upon the
hill.” The call anchors him to an understanding of what he escaped “upon
the hill” and what “others could not, that night.”
The owl’s sobering call and the subtle depiction of spiritual experience
points to the narrator’s sense of ultimate value and meaning. Initially, the
narrator only aspires to secure that which is necessary for his own survival—
much like an animal. However, the “bird’s voice” “salted and sobered” the
narrator’s food and repose. The sound that is initially described in the second
and third stanzas as a singular “cry” and “note,” suggesting a musical, onedimensional quality, is described as a “voice” that is “speaking” in the final
stanza. This rhetorical shift indicates the narrator’s act of interpretation as
the bird’s cry begins to carry significant spiritual meaning. The voice carries
a distinct message of ultimate value, explained to him in a “plain” manner, as
if the owl uses human language to articulate it. The bird’s melancholy song,
or voice, awakens the narrator to the melancholy reality of human suffering,
but it also adds flavor and meaning to the narrator’s meal and rest, as if to
indicate that ultimate value is found in something beyond just daily survival.
The poem celebrates the owl as a champion of the human spirit—its song
speaks “for all who lay under the stars, / Soldiers and poor, unable to rejoice.”
The owl’s call points to the idea that the human spirit requires more than
just the necessities of life to thrive; there is something innately spiritual that
allows humans to transcend from an animalistic mindset that aspires only
to live another day. This spiritual experience fits well with what Wildman
describes as an experience of ultimacy, which involves “engagement with an
11
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ultimate reality” that imbues one’s life with renewed purpose (85). The owl’s
melancholy cry laments the spiritually stifled—soldiers facing impending
doom, poverty-stricken individuals without hope. The spiritual experience
allows the narrator to cognitively approach a sense of ultimate value and
grasp the reality of the human spirit, but also allows him to comprehend the
depth and horror of human suffering both within and without the War.
As we examine the similar portraits of spiritual experience in both

“Returning” and “The Owl,” the influence of Romanticism is most evident in
the form of spiritual communion with nature. In both poems, the narrators
are awakened from a spiritually catatonic state by an unexpected communion
with the natural world. The songs of unseen birds provide a fleeting moment
of clarity, joy, and transcendence reminiscent of a Romantic sublime. In
“Returning, We Hear the Larks,” the narrator and his comrades pose with
“upturned list’ning faces” in what appears to be a state of momentary ecstasy
upon hearing a chorus of immaterial larks. Rosenberg describes the music as
“showering” down upon their faces like rain, suggesting that the music takes
on a metaphorically physical form; the senses are all engaged as the music is
both heard and felt. The spiritual experience spawned by birdsong in “The
Owl” is characterized less by joy and more by clarity; an enhancement not
of physical senses but of emotional perceptions. The owl’s call brings the
narrator closer to discovering a sense of ultimate meaning and purpose
amidst arbitrary violence and horror. However, both poems end with a
return to a bleak reality. The Romantic elements of these poems clash with a
modernist attitude as both narrators are unable to bask in the mystical joy or
clarity of their respective spiritual experiences. The true focus of these poems
becomes not the budding human spirituality but the horrors of the War and
the existential stress of surviving modern battle.
The clash between Romantic elements and modernist nuances, particularly
evident in the narrators’ inability to relish the Romantic sublime, suggests that,
for these writers, spiritual experience during wartime is life-threatening rather
than life-saving. The authors succeed in creating a shadow of the sublime as
the narrators connect with nature through birdsong, but the fleeting spiritual
experience, in the end, serves not to inspire or protect. Spiritual experience
during wartime creates a distraction from focusing on the imminent threats
all around. In “Returning, We Hear the Larks,” Rosenberg’s “strange joy”
lasts only for a short three-lined stanza before the narrator’s focus returns to
the threats of the night. Robert C. Evans writes that the “romantic impulses”
12
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within this poem “are in dialogue with impulses that are non- or even

anti-Romantic” (132). Death has been momentarily replaced by beautiful
birdsong, but the spiritual awakening that consequently follows feels more

“like a blind man’s dreams on the sand / By dangerous tides.” The spiritual

experience of enjoying the lark’s chorus initially activates sensitivities and

stirs the narrator from a dulled state; and yet, the narrator correlates the “joy”

with blindness—a sensory deficit. Rosenberg’s poetry before the War seems

obsessed with exploring man’s relationship with the divine. Participation in
the War did not change this obsession, but rather warped it: “in the trenches

the growing search for the God-idea disappears; instead God is only apparent
by His absence” (Maccoby 153). The spiritual experience for Rosenberg is a

pleasing mirage that provides ephemeral joy but ultimately distracts him and
his comrades from their most pressing task: survival. Their communion with

an otherworldly, spiritual realm does not satisfy the human soul but deprives
it of its much-needed sensory awareness.

The birdsong in “The Owl” indicates that human life transcends basic

animalistic survival and that ultimate meaning and growth can only be

obtained on a spiritual level. In the poem, the narrator discovers that the

human spirit is constricted and degraded when all of its faculties are focused

only on survival. But during times of war, in the face of imminent death and
existential fear, survival must become one’s sole mission. Thus, the poem

puts the desire to awaken spiritually at odds with the absolute necessity of
surviving the danger of war.

Both Rosenberg and Thomas create spiritual experiences that distract

and endanger rather than fulfill or enrich. Wildman touches on a similar
argument in his study “Religious and Spiritual Experiences” when he

writes, “[Religious Spiritual Experience]s are not only beautiful and valuable,
but also potentially dangerous” (26). Wildman claims that all spiritual

experiences are subject to personal interpretation and that the danger arises

when that interpretation leads one to harbor beliefs that advocate violence

and oppression, as has been the case historically (26). However, the danger

of Rosenberg and Thomas’s spiritual experience differs in two ways. First,
the danger lies not just in the interpretation but in the experience itself. It is

in the very moment of experiencing something beautiful and transcendent

that the narrators find themselves at risk. Second, the experience ironically
threatens only the experiencer.
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To feel that one’s life is put at risk by a transcendent moment of joy and
mental clarity suggests the true extent of depravity that World War I soldiers
were subject to. For Rosenberg, Thomas, and many others, World War I
functions as a symbolic embodiment of the great spiritual dullness of the
modern era. Deborah Maccoby wrote that “to Rosenberg, the First World
War was something uncanny, weird, sinister, breaking out from the hidden,
subterranean levels of human consciousness” (154). Though in Britain the

War was overly glamorized and soldier’s efforts were often glorified, the
soldier-poets engaging in actual battle in mainland Europe “soon realized the
full horror of war, and this realization affected both their imaginations and
their poetic techniques” (“Voices” 2017). For these poets, the Great War and
the technological advancement of the modern era represented an irreversible
turn from the simplicity of the past. World War I and Modernism presented
themselves as the bastard children of an advanced society that placed too
much emphasis on progression and too little emphasis on the fragility of the
human spirit.
Thomas’s poem “Adlestrop” encompasses the conceptual difficulty of
reconciling the rapid shifts of modernity with the stillness of nature. This
poem was written in January 1915, one month before he wrote “The Owl”
and several months after the War began in mainland Europe. It also presents
a spiritual impression, generated by the song of a bird, that pairs nicely
with “Returning” and “The Owl.” The piece describes a personal experience
from June 1914 when Thomas took the train to visit Robert Frost. Though
the poem does not depict or even reference war, “Adlestrop” can be found
in most anthologies of World War I poetry, since it thoughtfully captures
the peace lost during wartime. Composed a few months after Britain’s entry
into the War, Thomas writes about an unexpected stop at the platform in
Adlestrop en route to visit a friend. “The steam hissed. Someone cleared his
throat. / No one left and no one came / On the bare platform” (Thomas,
Adlestrop). The train rests at the Adlestrop station for only one minute, but
“for that minute a blackbird sang / Close by.” There is no further movement
in the poem, nor action nor event. The climax of the poem is the bird’s song.
The poem speaks to some final moments of calm before the destruction
of World War I, but one could also read “Adlestrop” as a comment on the
increasingly uncomfortable trajectory of the modern era. Thomas indicates
tension in the poem between movement and stillness. The noise and rattle of
the moving train are contrasted with the song of the blackbird, only audible
14

Winter 2021

once the train has stopped completely on the platform. The train, symbolic
of industrialization that ushered in twentieth-century modernization, is
contrasted with the sweet music of nature. Only when the train stops and
passengers become silent does Thomas realize that “all the birds / Of
Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire” are singing. A character in Ian McEwan’s
novel Sweet Tooth marvels at the spiritual power of the poem “Adlestrop”
and remarks on “the sense of pure existence, of being suspended in space

and time, a time before a cataclysmic war” that the piece inspires (169). The
poem reads like a spiritual reflection on man’s once intimate and sensory
relationship with the natural world—a reflection of Romanticism cast into
a modernist mold. This tension between Romanticism and Modernism and
their respective attitudes toward spirituality plays a role in both Rosenberg
and Thomas’s poems and reveals their perception of human spirituality
during wartime.
Since spirituality is unable to be savored as a beautiful, enriching experience
in these poetic moments, I assert that the act of writing poetry becomes a
spiritual exercise for these poets that allows them to explore complex concepts
of human spirituality. The act of composing poetry creates a literary safehaven; the poems themselves become a source of solace as the poets capture
fleeting spiritual experiences. In “Returning” and “The Owl,” the narrators
seek temporary safety and solace by returning to protected abodes—the camp
or the inn. They seek both physical safety from the foe’s bullets and shells,
as well as spiritual safety from the numbing and psychologically-damaging
stress of facing impending death. Ironically, both narrators secure physical
safety by the end of the poem, and they both also describe transcendent
spiritual experiences. However, by the end of both poems, neither narrator
feels secure, and instead the poems end with a lingering sense of doom and
despair. The poetry, then, with its meticulous construction of lines and stanzas,
creates a sense of order amongst the chaos of the outside world that the poets
fail to obtain in either their physical abodes or their lived spiritual experiences.
The poem becomes the one place where the narrator is able to navigate the
complexities of the human condition and the vast depths of human existence,
all within the bounds of a structured rhythm and meter, because to do so
during the fighting would create a distraction that would in turn become
life-threatening. The beauty these poets experience in poetry can be enjoyed
without leaving them feeling endangered, unlike the spiritual experience that
occurs spontaneously during wartime. Thus, poetry creates a proxy spiritual
15
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experience for these authors. Rosenberg and Thomas help demonstrate the
spiritual potential of poetry by assessing its formal capacity to immortalize
moments of transcendence, clarity, and sublimity during confusing and
chaotic war. This function of poetry closely reflects the purpose of studying
spirituality academically, according to Philip Sheldrake: to navigate “the broad
understandings of the numinous (sometimes embodied in nature or in the arts),
the undefined depths of human existence or . . . the boundless mysteries of the

cosmos” (3). This is perhaps why many soldier-poets, particularly Rosenberg
and Thomas, chose not to use poetry as a means to describe the horrors and
death they witnessed fighting abroad, but instead as a medium to explore how
these horrors impacted their psyche and spiritual development. They chose to
depict not the violence of battle but the aftermath of battle; they chose to depict
not the trench warfare but the trenches themselves. The form of poetry itself
provides a structural security—a spiritual solace from the dangers of war and
the stress of modernity.
Even during times of mass death and destruction, Rosenberg and
Thomas still entertain spiritual experience in their war poetry. For these
writers, human spirituality is a living force that awakens sensory capacities
and provides peace, clarity, and transcendence. The Romantic feelings of
spiritual union with nature cause tension in the poem as it grapples with
the modernist uncertainty so commonly found in World War I poetry. And
though Rosenberg and Thomas recognize the potential beauty of spiritual
experience, in these poems we find a rare form of modernist animosity
towards spirituality as the authors admit the reality of spiritual experience
but deny its function of enriching human life. Finally, these poems provide
a fascinating study of spirituality that is not theologically grounded but
is born out of an anthropological paradigm. Rosenberg and Thomas’s
writings suggest that spiritual experience is not dependent on proximity to
the divine or consciousness of religious beliefs. Spiritual experience is an
anthropological element of the human condition, accessible to all people at
all times regardless of religious belief or practice. Yet, the horrors of war and
the uncertainty of modernity restricts the development of human spirituality
and distorts one’s perception of the beauty of spiritual experience.
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Surrender to Pity in
King Lear
Garrett Maxwell

Shakespeare’s recasting of The True Chronicle

History of King Leir into King Lear omits a fundamental ordering principle
of the original: “providential order and interventionist deity that reinforce
a final sense of justice and divine order” (Loewenstein 169). In fact, there
is “no sense that providence, even in the guise of pre-Christian gods, has
played any role whatsoever in the devastating tragedy” (Loewenstein 170).
In the absence of the gods, and even the mildest form of natural evil, the
agents in the world of King Lear and their moral evils are left as the sole
objects of scrutiny. However, the model for moral judgment that affirms the
direct relationship between moral responsibility and personal autonomy is
also nowhere to be found.
The play is fraught with instances of compromised human autonomy
which constitutes the main culprit of interpersonal volatility. Lear, for
example, is described in both first and third person as a victim of alien
forces interfering with his psyche and abusing his nature, while Cornwall
relinquishes responsibility to that “wrath which men may blame but not
control” (3.7.26¬7). The dialectic in the play surrounding autonomy, which
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will merit further attention in this study, is remarkably presentient of the
quandaries of modern neurobiology that have begun to posit that “our
beliefs, moods, desires, motivations . . . are all features of our brains; that
these features were caused by prior events over which we have no control”
(Sternberg 11). Thus, in this paper, the early modern dialectic of free will
and determinism will be posited as coextensive with the modern debates
surrounding neurobiological determinism.

If moral evil is the only spectacle in King Lear, then it risks being collapsed
entirely under the weight of this dialectic, reverting back into a world of
purely natural evil. While my concern will not be whether Shakespeare takes
a side in the interminable debate of free will and determinism, which I believe
is left intentionally opaque, I see two principal normative symmetries clearly
broken in the world of Lear to make space for an alternative worldview. In
the first—symmetry between intent and action—the possibility of complete
and continuous autonomy is refuted by the apparent dyadic discontinuity.
The second—symmetry between action and consequence—is dismantled in
the closing scenes when the abused Lear loses everything directly following
Edmund’s paradoxically graceful exit.
Contrary to the natural human aversion to the idea of compromised
personal autonomy exemplified in Edmund’s famous speech; “We make
guilty of our disasters the sun / The moon and the stars as if we were villains
on / Necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves / . . . and all
that we are evil in by a / divine thrusting on (1.2.120–6), I will argue that
King Lear refutes the possibility of complete autonomy and instead offers a
sublime solution to the problem of navigating a world of fellow fragmented
agents that is rooted, not in stoic avoidance of passion and its side effects,
but rather in the embrace of a positive form of autonomical surrender—
surrender to the power of pity.
Though it suits practical concerns and affirms some of humanity’s deepest
desires, complete human autonomy is a myth. Reductionist tendencies
champion both ends of the spectrum, from radical freedom to sheer material
determinism, but phenomenological data suggests an alternative view. King
Lear is one such fictive repository of this data. Oxford philosopher A.E.
Denham notes that “ordinary human agency is neither seamlessly integrated
nor perfectly coherent” (Denham 145) and observes that “human experience
is not merely punctuated by episodic interferences from external causal
determinants; it is largely shaped by them” (Denham 147). This boundary
20
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between what can be called the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of causal
forces is collapsed in King Lear in the absence of the divine, yet the ‘external’ is
precisely what Edmund is concerned with in his decrying of “fools by heavenly
compulsion.” To investigate this matter, it will be necessary to extrapolate the
phenomenological data found in the characters’ own confessions, because
as Sean A. Spence points out, “no account of human action (and therefore
human moral responsibility) is ever complete in the absence of a subjective

report, a ‘view from within,’ provided by the agent” (Spence 236). This proves
to be a fruitful undertaking in a play bustling with characters quick to chide
one another for their opaque actions.
Edmund’s decrial finds its sounding board in the dialogue surrounding
Lear when Goneril’s response to Lear in Act I Scene iv puts a finger on the
pulse: “These dispositions, which of late transport you / From what you
rightly are” (1.4.213–4). The infringing force is named as “disposition,” a
word frequently employed in astrological contexts, linking Goneril’s polemic
to Edmund’s “fool by heavenly compulsion.” This compulsion, having
thwarted his rightful disposition, assumes an autonomy of its own, allowing
for a blame transfer from the transported to the force of transportation. Even
Lear himself is convinced, wondering “Why, this is not Lear” (1.4.217). In
conversation with Gloucester his growing awareness shows: “We are not
ourselves / When nature, being oppressed, commands the mind / To suffer
with the body. I’ll forbear / And am fallen out with my more headier will”
(2.2.296–8). The idea that nature can ‘command the mind’ and form the
duplicity of wills with which he struggles implies a compromised autonomy,
in this case, a madness that derails him until it is rectified by his beloved
daughter’s pity.
However commonplace Edmund’s identification of the heavens as the
primary mover is, King Lear complicates this assumption with a relocation
of the causal forces, shrinking the cosmic distance inherent in blaming the
heavens to the interior of the human skull. What results from this relocation
is a more intrapersonal and psychosomatic rupture than would be possible
inside the constraints of the man versus nature trope. A remarkable example
with parallels in modern neurological literature is found when Lear gives his
‘view from within’ in Act II Scene ii: “O how this mother swells up toward
my heart / Hysterica passio, down, thou climbing sorrow.” A modern
Schizophrenic patient in an experiment to produce feedback about the
mechanisms of control, commented that “I felt like an automaton, guided by
21
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a female spirit who had entered me” (Spence 232). We are here met with the
strange notion that internal forces are somehow experienced as being external:
“thy tender-hafted nature shall not give / Thee o’er to harshness” (2.2. 360–61).
This phenomenon is loosely termed ‘interference.’ Spence, in relating modern
accounts, describes it as “a sense of separation, alienation, from their most
intimate agentic experiences . . . the person is no longer the author of their
own thoughts and deeds . . . there is ‘interference’” (Spence 228).

The portrayal of interference in Lear takes on multiple forms, one being
a dual of passions assuming distinct identities and vying for control, as in
Gloucester’s comment about Lear: “When misery could beguile the tyrant’s
rage / And frustrate his proud will” (4.6.63–4). Misery must beguile the
current steward of Lear, rage, to take over, and Lear is not named amongst
those vying for control. These anthropomorphic descriptions are advanced
in Act IV when speaking of Cordelia: “It seem'd she was a queen / Over her
passion, who, most rebel-like / Sought to be king o'er her” (4.3.13–14). The
forces are so distinct that gender is inverted. What the language in these
examples makes clear is that the forces at work are distinct from the agent
itself, meriting various names taken from the menagerie of passions and
even gender assumptions. This phenomenon is framed by Denham thusly:
“Even though the efficacious powers lie within our own natures, they are
experienced as something visited on us from without, making our own
actions rationally opaque—or even not actions at all” (Denham 145). This
notion finds vigorous support in the small sample of phenomenological data
explored above.
If profession of intent can be seen as a proof of autonomy, then the glass
through which we see darkens further. In King Lear’s view of autonomy,
deontological evaluation fails simply because “intention itself is a product
of forces that undermine . . . autonomy” (Denham 148). Furthermore, as
if Spence had King Lear in mind while writing, “just because behaviours
may ‘appear’ purposeful does not mean that they are. Some quite complex
behaviours can emerge without their conduit’s ‘consent’” (Spence 236). The
case of Edmund, the apparently radically free agent, provides a rich case
study for testing the limits of these ideas. His solicitation to Gloucester in
Act I scene ii to “suspend your indignation against my brother till / you
can derive from him better testimony of his intent,” given the nature of his
deceit, takes on a secondary appeal—to the audience, in reference to himself.
Sean Benson, citing Hegel and Stanley Cavell, offers that “these characters
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are radically and continuously free, operating under their own power, at
every moment choosing their destruction” (Benson 321). This stance is lent
credibility by Edmund’s professions such as, “Let me, if not by birth, have
lands by wit / All with me’s meet that I can fashion fit” (1.2.181–2). Edmund,
out of apparent necessity, can acquire what he wills and exercise his demiurgic
powers to shape his presently contracted existential possibilities. By virtue
of wit, he attempts to escape being a “fool by heavenly compulsion.” What

Benson overlooks, in cases other than Edmund’s, is the ‘view from within.’
If Spence is taken seriously in insisting that “our provisional understanding
is always contingent upon what the subject actually ‘says’ (even if we do not
believe them)” (Spence 331), then Benson’s claim of intentional self-destruction
does not hold water. Though Edmund insists on self-determination, the forged
letter scene reveals a self-reflexive sympathy for its dissolution. Gloucester
recoils from the forged letter attributed to Edgar: “had he a hand to write
this? / A heart and brain to breed it in?” (1.2.56–57). Edmund, responding to
the rhetoric of breeding (a separate organism) says, “It is his hand, my lord;
but I hope his heart is / not in the contents,” (1.2.67–8) in language referring
to a disconnect between heart and hand, or in other words, the volitional
center and the appendage of activity. This figuratively resembles the very first
patient described in neurological literature as having suffered from an ‘alien
hand’ whose words were “those are two very different people, the arm and
I” (Spence 209). In his feigned solicitation of Gloucester clemency Edmund
appeals to a distinction between heart and hand.
Edgar’s later confrontation with his illegitimate brother displays similar
rhetoric that compartmentalizes moving parts instead of portraying a simple
movement as seamlessly integrated—“This sword, this arm, and my best
spirits are bent / To prove upon thy heart, whereto I speak/ Thou liest”
(5.3.137–9). It is as if the moving parts themselves must first reach a collective
democratic agreement before proceeding. King Lear is not content with only
deconstructing the psychological aspect of agency and intentional continuity;
it goes further to scrutinize the mechanisms of physiological follow through
and finds them wanting.
Edmund’s pledge to ‘nature’ complicates the picture, presenting a scenario
of simultaneous subduction and manifestation of willpower. Denham’s
assessment of Agamemnon, by way of comparison, identifies this more subtle
movement: “He was in a bad spot, to be sure, but in the event he chooses to
set his reasoned deliberations aside and resign his agential authority to a less
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ambivalent, more resolute motivational system” (Denham 146). Cornwall
offers an analysis of Edmund’s fictionally contrived Edgar, which can be
redirected to Edmund himself: “I now perceive, it was not altogether your/
brother’s evil disposition made him seek his death; but / a provoking merit,
set a-work by a reprovable badness / in himself” (3.5.5–8). At this point, it is
anything except the agent’s name that functions as the receptacle of blame.
‘Evil disposition’ and ‘reprovable badness’ as well as ‘provoking merit’ are

pitted against each other in a contest of ‘language of intimations.’
Catherine Martin, in a study entitled “The ‘Reason’ of Radical Evil:
Shakespeare, Milton, and the Ethical Philosophers,” identifies the mechanisms
at work as “the avoidance of rational negotiation and choice . . . [which]
in its monological simplicity seems highly attractive . . . yielding to every
suggestion that comes along and to every current of imitation” (Martin 196).
This uninterrupted yielding to ‘nature’ is to yield to the primal suggestion
that the one with “more composition and fierce quality” (1.2.12) ought to
“top the legitimate” (1.2.21), a play on the fratricidal trope of Cain in Genesis.
As moral philosopher Sarah Buss puts it, “a person can have authoritative
status with respect to her motives without having any real power over them”
(Denham 148). However, this subtle reading of Edmund escapes the general
audience, which has implications I will discuss later. Suffice it to say here,
Edmund represents the radically free agent whilst the contrarian notion is
suspended until its appearance in his dying words.
The contrast between the respective demises of Lear and Edmund,
understood in this context, reveals the frustration of expectation that
confounds the audience’s simplistic model of moral judgment based on
the two symmetries mentioned above. Marco de Marinis elaborates on this
theatrical strategy, explaining that “in order to attract and direct the spectator’s
attention, the performance must first manage to surprise or amaze” or in
other words “disruptive or manipulative strategies which will unsettle the
spectator’s expectations . . . in particular, his/her perceptive habits” (Marinis
109). The expectation elicited in the audience is that Lear will be met with more
moral leniency, being at least partially excused by his obviously compromised
autonomy, whereas Edmund will rightly receive his comeuppance. As Spence
argues, “responsibility requires some form of symmetry . . . if behavior emerges
unintended . . . then we as a community seem to suspend moral judgment”
(223). Cordelia pleas likewise, “O you kind gods! / Cure this great breach in
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his abused nature” (4.7.14–15). But the gods, as has been the case throughout,
remain silent.
Notably, Lear comes to himself in a rhetorical display of pure, authentic
intent upon reunion with Cordelia: “Come let's away to prison” (5.3.8). In this
tender moment, the vexing forces are conspicuously absent. Stripped down
to bare man, Lear enacts what he really wants—to spend the remainder of
his days in bliss born of authentic intent. However, the surprise comes in the

form of one of the more tragic stage directions to ever see print, [Enter LEAR
with CORDELIA in his arms] (5.3). The void gaping between Lear and personal
autonomy eventuates in his intimate proximity to its consequences—literally
carried in his arms.
Lear’s natural frame is put to death by grief, directly following Edmund’s
renunciation of his pledge to nature as he dies: “I pant for life. Some good
I mean to do / despite of mine own nature” (5.3.40–1). His fate is not so
gruesome. Derek Cohen describes Edmund’s last moments, or ‘conversion,’
as “grotesque, and its source of violence is a hideous and nihilistic mockery,”
but in the same breath, “Edmund’s conversion can be made to fit the template
of a moral structure . . . there is no ignoring his evident last-minute desire to
do good in a world he has helped to damage and suddenly wishes to save”
(Cohen 385). Furthermore, Edmund dies with the one assurance he lacked
in life, observing “yet Edmund was beloved” (5.3.240) while gazing fondly
upon the corpses of Regan and Goneril. In the play’s microcosm, Edmund
receives a graceful exit, frustrating expectations of just retribution, as Cohen
points out, “not even punished with knowing that he has saved no one and
nothing” (Cohen 377). Antithetical to Lear, his intimate proximity to personal
autonomy eventuates in a void gaping between him and the consequences—
[Edmund is carried off] (5.3).
It may appear, thus far, that I consider King Lear to be a deterministic
nightmare. However, mitigation of moral evil by means of neurobiological
determinism is inadequate because this “information does not necessarily, or
entirely, explain ‘what has happened,’ nor does it assist that much in specifying
what should happen next” (Spence 334). Instead, I claim that Shakespeare
offers a solution to those willing to accept his refutation of seamless autonomy.
The absence of providence and the gods, I argue, is intended to create a
vacuum in which another force is proposed in place of justice, the “much
more transformative force” of pity (St. Hilaire 492). With an irony easily lost
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amidst much more ‘negative passions’ that are blamed for every evil, this new
answer also demonstrates an ability to compromise autonomy.
The aversion to this classically feminine emotion was preached by the
early modern Stoic revival, speaking of “a kind of feminine passionate pitie,
which proceedeth from too great a tenderness and weakness of the minde,”
in line with basic stoic principle that “one should be free of compassion
and avoid any surrender to deep sympathy” (Aggeler 323). The stoics are
adamant that one should not ‘surrender’ to this pity, again implying a
compromise of autonomy in the pitier. Seneca’s assertion that “we ought to
avoid both pity and cruelty” loses its traction in a play wherein the villains
that commit cruelty “maintain a veneer of rationalism that enables them to
serve their appetites without any emotional impediments, such as guilt or
pity” (Aggeler 325). So, while the anonymous gentleman cries on behalf of
the stoics, “Let pity be not believed!” (4.3.30), it appears as the only force
for any good.
It is Lear’s sudden pity for the pitiful Edgar that prompts Lear's
anagnorisis “that prepares him to receive Cordelia’s regenerating love and
forgiveness” (Aggeler 322). On the macrocosmic scale, Regan’s haunting
complaint to Oswald about letting Gloucester live, “Where he arrives he
moves / All hearts against us” (4.5.11–2) reveals that pity undermines those
who direct “their power of empathy toward the ‘ruthless displacement
and absorption of the other’” (James 372). Here, the pity Gloucester would
induce has the power to move ‘all hearts,’ rhetoric mirroring Cornwall’s
description of wrath as a force that can carry out its effect unhindered. Edgar,
the virtuous survivor, does so “pregnant with good pity” (4.6.218) that
enabled him to exorcise his father’s demons and allows his heart to “burst
smilingly” (5.3.198). Edmund professes pity: “This speech of yours hath
mov'd me/And shall perchance do good” (5.3.198–9), and Cordelia’s deep
pity for Lear allows him a quasi-redemption before his abused frame gives
up the ghost. It is only in the relinquishment of complete autonomy that pity
induces, that the cycle of violence can be broken. Retribution falters and fails
under the aegis of pity.
Even if the fates of Lear and Edmund deny any sense of justice or
symmetry, what they do accomplish is a potent solicitation for pity from the
audience, as befitting the tragic genre. Ironically, as Heather James points
out, “the theater . . . with its passionate speeches and dire spectacles, inspires
sympathy to the point of interference with the playgoers’ deliberate exercise
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of will” (James 363). If it is true that the play presents problems of “power,
hierarchy, and social injustice” then it follows that “pity disrupts attempts to
critique these forces by troubling the pitier’s ability to make moral and ethical
judgments” (St. Hilaire 482). This, I argue, is the effect King Lear angles for. Of
note, is the peculiar language with which this force of pity is portrayed. The
description of its effect as “the contagious solicitation of consent that moves
from actors to the audience and out to the social world” (St. Hilaire 505),

implies an element—contagion—that lies outside of the agent's control, but
in this case, is beneficial when embraced by characters within and audience
without. The dynamic hinted at within, is extended by way of invitation to
those without.
To paraphrase Sean Spence, even if consciousness does not cause action
in the short term, its quality certainly affects the course of long-term cycles of
acts (Spence 391). If this is the case, then by virtue of our inherently interactive
world, conscious awareness of one another is potentially redemptive (Spence
395). Human responsibility for a consciousness augmented by pity is forcibly
foregrounded in King Lear and points to a more human response to a world of
fragmented agents who clearly do not have all of their marbles by recognizing
that neither does one’s self. When it comes down to it, the inevitable question
seems to be not if one has been moved, but rather “what hath moved you”
(1.4.266). The spectrum of moving forces proposed by King Lear is one ranging
from pity, to its opposite, cruelty. And its only resolution, I argue, is that to see
one another ‘feelingly,’ even if it means embracing ‘being moved,’ is better
than calling for retributive justice that is inevitably bound up in ‘hierarchies of
violence,’ and denies grace to the other that is much more like one’s self than
one would like to think.
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Christ the Father
Mr. Ramsay as an Ironic Christ-figure in
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse

Devon Thomas

To her son these words—‘Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow’—conveyed an
extraordinary joy. 			
			

—Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse

Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse narrates the

life of the Ramsay family—primarily Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay and their
relationship with each other and with their children—as they live in their
vacation house near the sea. From the beginning of the novel, we follow
their attempts to make it to the nearby lighthouse, which holds particular
importance to the young James Ramsay, but not to his father. Most readers
of the novel come to disdain Mr. Ramsay’s insecure, self-minded character,
even considering the consensus that he is a portrait of Leslie Stephen, Woolf’s
father. Indeed, much of Mr. Ramsay’s characterization paints a man who selfimposes and seeks intellectual, emotional recognition; in “A Sketch of the
Past,” Woolf herself records, “How often I was enraged by [my] father” (105).
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Thus, I believe these are correct interpretations of Mr. Ramsay—they are
just not the whole. Instead, I suggest reading Mr. Ramsay as a metaphorical
Christ-figure who reconstructs our understanding of his and Leslie Stephen’s
paternal roles.
Much of our existing scholarship views the novel as a means for Woolf to
flesh out her religious beliefs; as Mark Gaipa wrote, To the Lighthouse functions
as “an agnostic’s apology,” a verbatim reference to Leslie Stephen’s book,

An Agnostic’s Apology (3). It is well-documented that Woolf, exacerbated by
her father’s heavy agnosticism, deeply struggled with her religious beliefs.
Martin Corner argues that within the text, though, Mr. Ramsay works
as an “explicit declaration of atheism,” an “unwavering witness to the
nonhumanity of the world” (415, 417). For Corner, the novel does not explore
agnosticism, but atheism—a certainty that there is no divinity. And, while
there are characters within the text who subscribe to atheism (particularly Mr.
Tansley), Tina Barr contends that there is religiosity in the novel, specifically
contained in reference to Greek mythology. Barr asserts that the text conflates
Mr. Ramsay with “the Lord of the Underworld . . . a ‘king in exile’” (139).
Simply, for most existing scholars, Mr. Ramsay either affirms agnosticism,
atheism, or hell itself. And while I certainly agree that Mr. Ramsay appears
as a negative religious symbol, I believe that if reconsidered, Mr. Ramsay
acts as an ironic, metaphorical Christ-figure—a different “king in exile”—the
King of Israel, exiled from Nazareth (The Authorized King James Bible, John
1.49, 12.13; Luke 4.28–9; Woolf, Lighthouse 148). So, in this paper, I will explore
reading Mr. Ramsay in this attitude to revisit our perception of his—and
Leslie Stephen’s—fatherhood.
Understanding Mr. Ramsay’s ties with Christ comes by first understanding
Woolf’s own ties with Christianity. While most agree that Woolf held a nuanced
relationship with religion—often leaning more bitter than positive—it is
important to note that her beliefs were often dichotomous and influenced by
close friends. Perhaps the most influential individual was Violet Dickinson, a
family friend of the Stephens. Woolf and Dickinson primarily communicated
through letters in the beginning of their relationship. In the letters, Woolf
emulated Dickinson’s religious verbosity, writing sentences like, “I think of
you and your holy life on the mount,” thus echoing Peter’s recount of Christ’s
transfiguration on the Mount of Olives (Woolf, Flight 58; 2 Pet. 1.18).
Woolf’s biblical language gives us a glimpse of her significant exploration
of Christian ideals. In her biographical exploration of Woolf’s religiosity, Virginia
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Woolf and Christian Culture, Jane De Gay argues Woolf’s letters to Dickinson
provided “a particularly important forum for Woolf to speculate about the

nature of God” (60). Woolf’s correspondence and relationship with Dickinson

allowed her to frankly explore beyond Leslie Stephen’s firm agnosticism; hence,
it is not surprising that in the early twentieth century, Woolf’s relationship with

Christianity, though often “tongue-in-cheek,” also demonstrated a willingness
to consider God as both real and involved (De Gay 60).

Despite her early religious curiosity, after World War I, Woolf’s

bitterness toward Christianity returned as her take on God stemmed from

local churches’ beliefs and practices. Though her diaries occasionally used

biblical terms, several entries described feelings of intolerance and anger—

feelings quite different from the playful banter with Dickinson in 1902. Yet,

on 4 November 1917, Woolf wrote, “Writing has the advantage of making a

weekday out of the Sabbath, in spite of the clamour & blare of military music

& church bells which always takes place at about 11—a noise which the other
people have no right to inflict” (Woolf, “Diary” 71 qtd. in De Gay 65). The em

dash preceding Woolf’s rebuke emphasizes her conviction: anything tied to

God “inflict[s].” Her specific disdain for Sundays and church bells recurs in
her diaries; they make God inescapable, ever-demanding. Indeed, just weeks

later on 26 November 1917, Woolf stated, “I don’t like Sunday; the best thing
is to make it a work day, & to unravel [Rupert] Brooke’s mind to the sound

of church bells was suitable enough” (Woolf, “Diary” 82). In both accounts,

Woolf distracts herself from recognizing Sunday—the Sabbath—and its
implications; despite her efforts, however, Woolf could not ignore God.

Further, it is important to understand that Woolf’s detestation of male

clergy and deity also affected her view of religion and God. As De Gay
notes, Woolf ironically explicated the abhorrent sexism present in religion

in the early twentieth century: “The clergymen in Woolf’s novels are mostly
ineffectual, opinionated and ignorant” (222). Thus, in reading Mr. Ramsay

as a Christ-figure—Christ representing the ultimate clergyman—we see the

“opinionated and ignorant” clergyman repeatedly. The very first dialogue

we hear from Mr. Ramsay establishes him as insensitive and self-serving, in
direct juxtaposition to his tender wife:

“Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow,” said Mrs. Ramsay.

“But,” said his father, stopping in front of the drawing-room window, “it

won’t be fine.” (Woolf, Lighthouse 3–4)
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Even without his interiority, we easily imagine six-year-old James’
disappointment, his anger toward his father; but, when we review his interiority,
we understand Mr. Ramsay’s dismissal as irrevocable.
To [James] these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if it were settled,
the expedition were bound to take place, and the wonder to which he had
looked forward, for years it seemed, was, after a night’s darkness and a day’s
sail, within touch . . . his mother spoke, with heavenly bliss. (Woolf, Lighthouse 3)

Mr. Ramsay, entirely ignorant to his child’s needs and desires, dashes
them to oblivion in a passing sentence; in other words, Mr. Ramsay’s
austerity functions only to preserve his frail arrogance. Thus, Woolf portrays
male deity ironically, unaware of their own hypocrisy and cruelty.
As my brief exploration of Woolf’s religious experience concludes, I
want to note that notwithstanding her aversion to the idea of God, Woolf
carried “surprising moments of sympathy or empathy with people of faith,”
as well as “much thought” to religion (De Gay 83; Yünlü and Memmedova
191). Ultimately, while Woolf “engages with [Violet’s] understanding that
there is a God,” she “challenges [Violet] that if such a being is omnipotent it
must also be cruel. Woolf makes . . . Mrs[.] Ramsay the focus of this debate
too, and [Mrs. Ramsay] come[s] to a view that there cannot be a god for this
very reason” (De Gay 83). Indeed, Mrs. Ramsay adopts Woolf’s aversion to
God and thinks, “How could any Lord have made this world? . . . With her
mind she had always seized the fact that there is no reason, order, justice:
but suffering, death, the poor. There was no treachery too base for the world
to commit; she knew that. No happiness lasted; she knew that” (Woolf,
Lighthouse 64). Essentially, Mrs. Ramsay not only believes that such a being
must be cruel, but recognizes that same cruelty in her husband. Her denial
of a benevolent “Lord,” then, can be understood; her view of Mr. Ramsay
as a Christ-figure comes because of his omnipotence, callousness—he is,
therefore, an embodiment of God (64).
Mr. Ramsay’s ironic characterization as God begins as he parallels God’s
chastisement toward Adam and Eve in a scene that echoes their fall in the
Garden of Eden (Gen. 3; Poresky 137–8). As Lily Briscoe paints in the Ramsays’
backyard, she “kept a feeler on her surroundings lest some one should creep up,
and suddenly she should find her picture looked at”—much like the realized
nakedness Adam and Eve experience after partaking of the forbidden fruit (Gen.
3.1–7; Woolf, Lighthouse 17). The specific diction—“lest someone should creep
up,” “find her picture looked at”—denotes Lily’s fear of violation, her need for
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privacy; yet, with Mr. Bankes, she feels comfortable amid her exposure. Lily
and Mr. Bankes’ vulnerability, though, becomes problematic when, like Adam
and Eve, “they hear God’s voice,” Mr. Ramsay’s voice, “as he walks through
the garden”: “Some one had blundered” (Gen. 3.9, 13–4; Poresky 137–8; Woolf,
Lighthouse 18). These scenes, while quite similar, differ on a critical point: in
Genesis, Adam and Eve disobey God and are thus punished; in To the Lighthouse,
Mr. Ramsay—the stand-in for God—“blunders in his awkward appeals for

sympathy and in his thoughtless pronouncements that the family will not
visit the lighthouse” (Poresky 138). God justly judges and punishes Adam and
Eve; His perfection and omniscience allow Him to be the angry, vengeful God
of the Old Testament. Yet, Mr. Ramsay unjustly judges and punishes Lily and
Mr. Bankes; his glaring imperfection transforms his retribution into irony, as
ultimately “he judges himself” (Poresky 138). Truly, as Louise A. Poresky argues,
Mr. Ramsay believes the “delusion that he is God, the angry God of the Old
Testament,” and thus excuses himself of all consequences (Poresky 138). Simply,
through this self-deification, Mr. Ramsay both justifies his moral condescension
and avoids the repercussions for it.
Mr. Ramsay’s characterization as an ironic Christ-figure continues primarily
through Mrs. Ramsay. When Mrs. Ramsay protests that the weather “often
changed” and could permit a trip to the lighthouse the next day, Mr. Ramsay
spits “Damn you” in response (Woolf, Lighthouse 31–2). In turn, Mrs. Ramsay
scrutinizes his “astonishing lack of consideration for other people’s feelings,”
and “dazed and blinded, she bent her head as if to let the pelt of jagged hail,
the drench of dirty water, bespatter her unrebuked” (32). Interestingly, though,
her anger transitions as she bows her head, submits her will to her husband’s,
and thinks, “There was nobody whom she reverenced as she reverenced him”
(John 6.38; Woolf, Lighthouse 32). Truly, Mrs. Ramsay’s submission deifies Mr.
Ramsay through the repeated affirmation of her “reverence” for him. Specifically,
the Oxford English Dictionary distinguishes “reverence” as an approach of
“veneration as having a divine or sacred character; (more generally) to worship”
(“reverence, v.”). Ostensibly, Mrs. Ramsay views Mr. Ramsay as a God. And,
while the novel does not connote insincerity in Mrs. Ramsay’s actions, Woolf’s
approach to God does paint Mr. Ramsay as an ironic, unworthy Christ-figure.
We can almost hear Woolf scathe: “What a terrible grip Xtianity still has—[Mrs.
Ramsay] became rigid . . . at once, as if God himself had her in his grasp. That
I believe is still the chief enemy—the fear of God” (Woolf, Diary 165). Indeed,
for Woolf, Mr. Ramsay fits his role as a God-figure; God holds Mrs. Ramsay
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“in his grasp,” and perpetuates the cruelty that, for Woolf, hallmarks deity. So,
while Zehra Yünlü and Beture Memmedova argue that “the Ramsay household
survives handily without benefit of a God,” I believe Woolf asserts that the
Ramsays suffer because of the presence of a God (190).
Shortly after Mr. Ramsay’s outburst and Mrs. Ramsay’s submission, our
perception of Mr. Ramsay as a Christ-figure starts to become ambivalent, just
as Woolf’s own view of God was often inconsistent and clashing. While Mr.

Ramsay ruled as the oppressive God in the garden and in the exchange with
his wife, his characterization starts to ameliorate; Mrs. Ramsay’s continued
devotion shifts their relationship from coercion to discipleship. Moments
after the first time she considers her reverence toward him, she thinks, “There
was nobody she reverenced more. She was not good enough to tie his shoe
strings, she felt” (Woolf, Lighthouse 32). On a superficial level, we understand
her piety; yet, her deification of Mr. Ramsay becomes clear when we align
it with John the Baptist’s (almost verbatim) prophecy about Christ: “He it
is, who coming after me is preferred before me, whose shoe’s latchet I am
not worthy to unloose” (John 1.27). Biblical narratives, particularly John 1,
denote John’s complete submission to Christ, the recognition of His divinity,
and their kinship. When John is beheaded, Matthew 14 records Jesus’ grief
over the loss of His friend, His disciple: “When Jesus heard of it, he departed
thence by ship into a desert place apart” (Matt. 14.13). Simply, Christ and John
the Baptist were friends; however, most renowned was John’s discipleship
and faithfulness. The same can be said of Mrs. Ramsay’s self-imposed role
as disciple of Mr. Ramsay—hence her almost verbatim echo of John’s words:
she proclaims her loyalty.
Though Mrs. Ramsay acts as chief disciple, Mr. Tansley and Mr. Bankes
also consider Mr. Ramsay in worshipful terms. Again, however, the
characters’ perceptions of him continue in ambivalence; while at one moment
Mrs. Ramsay “brace[s] herself” against Mr. Ramsay’s presence, she shortly
joins Mr. Tansley and Mr. Bankes in their awe toward her husband (Woolf,
Lighthouse 37). As Mr. Ramsay walks out to the shore alone, we learn:
It was his power, his gift, to shed all superfluities, to shrink and diminish

so that he looked barer and felt sparer, even physically, yet lost none of the

intensity of his mind . . . it was in this guise that he inspired William Bankes

(intermittently) and in Charles Tansley (obsequiously) and in his wife now

. . . reverence, and pity, and gratitude too, as a stake driven into the bed

of a channel upon which gulls perch and the waves beat inspires in merry
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boat-loads a feeling of gratitude for the duty it is taking upon itself marking

the channel out there in the floods alone. (44)

This scene clearly echoes the suffering and crucifixion of Christ, as recorded
in John 19 and Luke 23. The crucifix imagery of Mr. Ramsay appearing as a

“stake driven into the bed of a channel” parallels Christ’s own declaration:
“They pierced my hands and my feet” (Ps. 22.16). So, though Mr. Ramsay’s

suffering remains emotional instead of physical, the narration conflates

him with the cross, a symbol of Christ and His redemption. Thus, just as

Christ’s followers “bewailed and lamented” the crucifixion of Christ, so too

do Mr. Ramsay’s disciples feel “reverence, and pity, and gratitude too” for
his sacrifice (Luke 23.27).

While this passage strengthens Mr. Ramsay as a Christ-figure, the

introduction of him as one willing to “shed all superfluities” and atone for

others seems unfounded; certainly, we can follow the biblical narrative that

Christ willingly, as part of His sacrifice, endured scourges and blows (John

19.1–3). But a sacrificial Mr. Ramsay—particularly one conflated with a
God—seems intensely ironic.

Even years later, just before the trip to the lighthouse, Mr. Ramsay continues

to paint himself a God. While waiting for Cam and James to get ready, Mr.

Ramsay approaches Lily as she paints, for “this was one of those moments when

an enormous need urged him . . . to [get] what he wanted: sympathy” (Woolf,

Lighthouse 150–1). Mr. Ramsay’s insatiable need for sympathy and outside

reassurance occurs throughout the novel, just as Leslie Stephen often required

it. However, this unfolding scene marks itself significant for several reasons.

Consider that Mr. Ramsay again approaches someone in the name of a selfproclaimed “grand” sacrifice. “Such expeditions,” Mr. Ramsay tells Lily, “are very
painful. . . . They are very exhausting” (151–2). So, while Mr. Ramsay proclaims

the trip to the lighthouse—“such [an expedition]”—a sacrifice, Lily only thinks,

“This great man was dramatising himself,” affirming Poresky’s assertion of Mr.
Ramsay’s “delusion that he is God” (Poresky 138; Woolf, Lighthouse 152). Woolf

illustrates this “delusion” when she shortly portrays him as “a lion seeking

whom we could devour”; and, while Mr. Ramsay almost certainly construes

himself as Christ—often symbolized as a lion—it becomes clear Woolf uses the

Bible ironically (Gen. 49.9; Woolf, Lighthouse 156). Though Christ is known as

the Lion of Judah, Woolf’s phrasing mirrors nearly verbatim a New Testament

description of the devil: “as a roaring lion, [he] walketh about, seeking whom
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he may devour” (1 Pet. 5.8). Woolf thus extrapolates biblical language to affirm
that the deification of Mr. Ramsay is fueled by himself. Further, in “A Sketch
of the Past,” Woolf writes that her father “was the pacing, dangerous, morose
lion; a lion who was sulky and angry and injured; and suddenly ferocious, and
then very humble, and then majestic; and then lying dusty and fly pestered in
a corner of the cage” (116). Simply, Woolf’s biblical language again affirms the
ironic divinity of Mr. Ramsay.

Yet, despite Lily’s criticism of Mr. Ramsay’s self-deification, she later
thinks, “there was that sudden revivification, that sudden flare . . . when it
seemed as if he had shed worries and ambitions, and the hope of sympathy
and the desire for praise, had entered some other region” (Woolf, Lighthouse
156). Truly, it seems, to brand both Mr. Ramsay and Leslie in pure negativity is
inaccurate, for when Lily does, it “made her ashamed of her own irritability”
(156). And, while Woolf paints a fairly critical picture of her father, she also
notes “He had a godlike, yet childlike, standing in the family” (111). Thus,
Mr. Ramsay’s characterization does not remain entirely critical, as seen at
the novel’s close.
Mr. Ramsay’s trip to the lighthouse with Cam and James has generated
much scholarly debate, as it should; the novel itself takes its title from this
journey, and the dialogue, interiority, and actions of the characters offer many
possible understandings. Specifically, Corner argued the eventual landing at
the lighthouse as “an explicit declaration of atheism” within Mr. Ramsay, an
opportunity for Woolf to declare it as “something toward which his whole life
has been a preparation” (417). However, I do not believe this really explicates
Mr. Ramsay’s purpose, particularly in his affiliation with theology. And,
while De Gay believes Mr. Ramsay “redeems himself” through the trip to the
lighthouse, I believe he really redeems the Ramsay family (210).
So, while Mr. Ramsay’s earlier declaration of self-sacrifice appears
pompous and assumptive, interpreting the journey as an atonement changes
that. Consistent with all of her writing,
[Woolf’s] characters’ most heightened and ineffable experiences are

moments of profound, if fleeting, spiritual connection—between self and

other, self and the circumambient world. These interstices form the site of
the mysterious in much of Woolf’s work. (Groover 218)

Indeed, even before the redemption fully begins, Woolf indicates its certainty
through a single, bracketed section—an everyday moment: “[Macalister’s
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boy took one of the fish and cut a square out of its side to bait his hook

with. The mutilated body (it was alive still) was thrown back into the

sea]” (Woolf, Lighthouse 180). Though short, these sentences communicate

profound information. Even its format—bracketed text, separated from other
paragraphs by intentional spacing—denotes its importance. As in Jacob’s

Room, Vara Neverow summates, Woolf “emphasizes” an everyday moment
through the brackets and “the work shifts in significance” (203). Woolf not

only “emphasizes” this everyday moment, but uses it to signal the start of
Mr. Ramsay’s atonement for his family; simply, the bracketed blip signals

the “[shift] in significance,” because it is through the excerpt that we receive

an initial indication of Mr. Ramsay’s atonement, his self-sacrifice of pride, on
behalf of his children.

I believe we understand the excerpt’s role as we consider its biblical

origins and implications. Within the account in Matthew 13, Jesus shares

several parables with His apostles; speaking parabolically on “the kingdom

of heaven,” He compares it to “a net, that was cast into the sea, and gathered
of every kind: Which, when it was full, [the fishermen] drew to shore, and sat

down, and gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad away” (Matt. 13.47–8).
Essentially, Macalister’s boy acts out the parable: he casts, catches, and uses

the fish—the good, beneficial part—and “cast[s] the bad away.” The parabolic

link becomes fully pointed as we finish the parable: “So shall it be at the end

of the world: the angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among
the just” (Matt. 13.49). And, so shall it be to the lighthouse: Mr. Ramsay will

“cast the bad away” and “[gather] the good into vessels”—“vessels,” then,
referring to Mr. Ramsay, Cam and James, and the boat itself (“recipient, n.
and adj.”). In other words, Woolf isn’t merely alluding to the parable; she is

recreating it, through Mr. Ramsay.

Truly, Mr. Ramsay’s metaphorical atonement redeems his family through

everyday actions. The trip begins as James watches his father, and thinks he

“looked very old . . . as if he had become physically what was always at the

back of both of their minds—that loneliness which was for both of them

the truth about things” (Woolf, Lighthouse 202–3). James’s harsh observations

peak and thus revive his boyish tendency to patricidal rage; however, when
he sees the lighthouse from the boat, he finds it “satisfied him” (203). James’s

observation that the lighthouse contented him—although it is a decade late,

with his father instead of his mother—demonstrates the start of his ten-year
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“grudge [being] exorcised with the completion of the much-anticipated
journey” (Tneh Cheng Eng 100). Simply, the redemptive healing begins.
While the Ramsays continue toward the lighthouse, Lily stays behind
to resume her ten-year-old painting. As she does, she ponders the nature
of redemption, of clarity. Ultimately, she decides, “The great revelation had
never come. The great revelation perhaps never did come. Instead there were
little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark”
(Woolf, Lighthouse 161). Lily’s revelation, woven into the Ramsays’ journey,
becomes significant as we see that the Ramsays’ redemption comes through
“little daily miracles” in a wholly unexpected way.
The lulled silence back on the boat becomes pierced with Mr. Ramsay’s

invitation:

“Come now,” said Mr. Ramsay, suddenly shutting his book.
“Come where?” Cam wonders. “To what extraordinary adventure? . . .

To land somewhere, to climb somewhere? Where was he leading them?” For
after his immense silence the words startled them.

“There’s the lighthouse. We’re almost there.” (204)

Of course, Mr. Ramsay’s sudden invitation startles his children; he’s read
in silence the entirety of the boat ride. However, I believe the surprise Cam
and James feel comes from the abrupt break from Mr. Ramsay’s lifelong
“immense silence” as their father.
Yet, James’s hope lives only a moment before the father he knows returns.
When Macalister remarks to Mr. Ramsay that James navigates the boat “very
steady,” James thinks, “But his father never praised him,” and his bitterness
toward his father resurfaces (Woolf, Lighthouse 204). But, Cam perpetuates
her hope: “‘This is right, this is it,’ Cam kept feeling as she peeled her hardboiled egg” (205). Though Cam never expounds what “it” is, we glimpse the
implication as she thinks, “It was very exciting—it seemed as if they were
doing two things at once; they were eating their lunch here in the sun and
they were also making for safety in a great storm after a shipwreck” (205). Of
course, they are not literally “making for safety” after a disaster—the family
is merely spending time together, connecting. Cam, then, reaffirms Kristina
Groover’s assertion that Woolf’s characters find healing in everyday events
(218): in this moment, eating a hard-boiled egg and a sandwich.
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Cam’s perception of her father continues to ameliorate through Mr.

Ramsay’s engaged parenting. When Cam goes to dump the remainder of
her sandwich into the sea, Mr. Ramsay “told her, as if he were thinking of

the fisherman and how they lived, that if she did not want it she should

put it back in the parcel. . . . He said so wisely, as if he knew so well all the

things that happened in the world” (Woolf, Lighthouse 205). Again, though an
everyday event, Mr. Ramsay’s gentle instruction affects Cam profoundly, so

“that she put it back at once,” thus giving way for them to connect; “he gave

her, from his own parcel, a gingerbread nut . . . He was shabby, and simple,

eating bread and cheese; and yet he was leading them on a great expedition”

(205). Interestingly, while Woolf, through Mr. Ramsay, has conflated Christ—
and thus, her father—with cruelty and selfishness, this depiction differs: Mr.

Ramsay is now patient, selfless, generous, humble, exemplary. Further, this

interaction mirrors that of Jesus’ with His disciples, post-resurrection, at the

Sea of Tiberias. In the narrative from John 21, Christ stands on the shore and

invites His disciples to “Come and dine,” and as He eats bread and fish, He

“taketh bread, and giveth them, and fish likewise” (John 21.12). Mr. Ramsay’s
nonverbal invitation for Cam to “Come and dine,” alongside his humble

food and generosity, makes him appear like the God of the New Testament—
not the Old.

Mr. Ramsay’s shift from the God of the Old Testament to that of the

New solidifies as he heals his relationship with James. “Estranged from his

father since he was six years old,” James’s bitterness only makes sense (Tneh

Cheng Eng 100). Though the lack of his father’s praise at his steering causes

a surging rage, Mr. Ramsay again surprises his children when “at last he said

triumphantly: ‘Well done!’ James had steered them like a born sailor” (Woolf,

Lighthouse 206). “At last,” like the master in the Parable of the Talents, he
praises, “Well done, thou good and faithful servant” (Matt. 25.21). And, like

the servant, James then “enter[s] . . . into the joy of [his] lord” (Matt. 25.21).

On this, Cam notes,

“You’ve got it at last.” For she knew that this was what James had been

wanting, and she knew that now he had got it he was so pleased that he

would not look at her or his father or any one. . . . He was so pleased that he

was not going to let anybody share a grain of his pleasure. His father had
praised him. (Woolf, Lighthouse 206)
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“His father had praised him;” Mr. Ramsay redeemed their family, “shed
worries and ambitions, and the hope of sympathy and the desire for praise,”
and thus completed his atonement (156). David Tneh Cheng Eng summates,
“[Lily] could visualize how Mr. Ramsay has finally reached the island and
James received the so much needed affirmation from his father”; thus, she
concludes, “It is finished,” a verbatim repetition of Christ’s last words as He
hung on the cross (John 19.30; Tneh Cheng Eng 102; Woolf, Lighthouse 208).
Thus, it is with this declaration that Mr. Ramsay finalizes his role as the God
of the New Testament; in other words, his character becomes changed. He is
now the God that hangs on the tree in Calvary, who sacrifices for His people,
rather than Himself; this phrase—“It is finished”—thus comments both on
Mr. Ramsay’s redemption of his family and, consequently, of his fatherhood.
I do, however, want to establish that to argue Mr. Ramsay merely shifts
from an ironic Christ-figure to a positive Christ-figure misconstrues Woolf’s
views; to say so would be an oversimplification and an error. De Gay articulates,
It is inaccurate to describe Woolf as atheist: she speculates far too

often about the existence and nature of God for us to say that she had a
thoroughgoing and consistent conviction that God did not exist. It is

inaccurate to describe her as irreligious: she shows far too much empathy

with believers and far too much curiosity about religion for this. It is also
inaccurate to describe her as consistently anti-religious, although she

certainly voiced anti-religious sentiments at times. Equally, it would be

disingenuous to suggest that Woolf had leanings towards Christianity: for
all the fascination she shows towards its cultural expressions, her responses
are always tempered with resistance and a sense of dissatisfaction with its
answers on matters of key importance. (220)

In essence, I have tried to demonstrate what De Gay asserts: Woolf’s
beliefs on Christianity were multifaceted and were primarily influenced
by her personal experiences. Still, it is clear from Woolf’s letters, diaries,
and novels that, while uncertain, she often held God in disdain. So, the
portrayal of Mr. Ramsay as an ironic, metaphorical Christ-figure makes
sense, as we know that Woolf often struggled with her father. Ultimately,
I suggest Mr. Ramsay’s characterization as a Christ-figure—first negative,
then positive—demonstrates Woolf’s view on the complexity of the human
character, particularly within her father. And, though some scholars feel the
novel’s ending “sound[s] a hollow, anticlimactic note,” I contend the closing
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provides sincere, new insight into Mr. Ramsay and Leslie Stephen as fathers
(Ludwigs 1). Marina Ludwigs, in particular, argues the novel ends “almost
too perfect in the way . . . narrative strands come together and reinforce
each other in their mutual culmination” (1). I believe Ludwigs is right if we
only consider that the strands achieve resolution; when we heed the details,
however, there are still imperfections within the resolutions. I believe these
imperfections actually establish the conclusion of the novel, like the rest, as

authentic.
Consider, for example, despite Mr. Ramsay’s miraculous and metaphorical
transformation from the Old Testament God to the New Testament God, he
still falls short as a father. Particularly, though he stops Cam from throwing
the remnants of her sandwich into the sea, moments later, “he sprinkled the
crumbs from his sandwich paper over [the water]” (Woolf, Lighthouse 206). He
is hypocritical: he breaks a rule he had just set with Cam. These imperfections
within the characters and plot demonstrate the humanity and authenticity of
To the Lighthouse: Mr. Ramsay did redeem his family, but even afterward, he still
made mistakes.
This representation of humanity, in spite of Mr. Ramsay’s and Leslie
Stephen’s link with deity, helps us appreciate their efforts. Though the
beginning of the novel paints him as cruel and self-serving, Mr. Ramsay
earns paternal redemption through his atonement for his family. Mr. Ramsay
gains a final opportunity to heal his family, to praise James, to gently coursecorrect Cam; Leslie gained that opportunity in time.
Revealingly, Woolf frequently thought of Leslie in religious, deific terms.
It seems this ironic portrayal of Mr. Ramsay—and thus, of Leslie Stephen—
arose from a lens Woolf viewed him through: in “A Sketch of the Past,” Woolf
records that Leslie was “Christian; but shed his Christianity—with such
anguish, [a friend of Leslie’s] once hinted . . . that he thought of suicide”
(108). Through her characterization of Mr. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, then,
Woolf ironically manipulates Leslie’s ambivalence toward Christianity—and
thus shows her own uncertainty toward Christianity and her father. Woolf
demonstrates this as she later recalls in “A Sketch of the Past”:
There was a Leslie Stephen who played his part normally, without any

oddity or outburst . . . Still, I cannot conceive my father . . . hearing everything

that was said, and making jokes . . . I remember my amazement, my envy,

when the Booths said their father took them to dances. How astonished I
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felt when Charles Booth said something humorous about ‘shepherding my

flock.’ (114)

Simply, for Woolf, her father embodied everything she felt about God: he
was sometimes engaged, but prone to rage, and often absent in her life.
Woolf’s “amazement, [her] envy” comes because neither her father nor
the Good Shepherd seem to want to herd their sheep (John 10.11, 14). Mr.
Ramsay’s characterization demonstrates this nuance: he is curious about
his children, but simultaneously belittles their dreams. Again, though, his
characterization is not simple, nor is it persistently negative. We truly cannot
discount the great transformation that takes place in Mr. Ramsay; to ignore
the change in Mr. Ramsay’s role as a Christ-figure and father is to ignore his
and Leslie’s paternal redemption (220).
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Tragedy and Resolution
Domestic Violence in Othello and The
Taming of the Shrew

Cassidy Crosby

For

years, critics have discussed domestic

violence in Othello—violence so obvious and explicit that sometimes, critics
do not feel the need to dissect it (Schawb; Smith 388–404; Deats 79–94). Much
of the scholarship surrounding Othello deals instead with the troubling racial
implications present in the play, or with other aspects of the play’s plot and
language. There is especially very little scholarship specifically about Emilia,
despite the significant, albeit sometimes passive, role she plays in several
pivotal points of the play (Schawb). Emilia is the one, after all, who takes
Desdemona’s handkerchief and gives it to Iago, allowing him to convince
Othello once and for all of Desdemona’s infidelity. She is the one, too, who
ultimately foils her husband’s plot, explaining Iago’s subterfuge to Othello
and giving Othello reason to doubt. She is the one in whose name Iago’s plot
is carried out: Iago’s proffered justification for hating Othello is his conviction
that Emilia had an affair with him. Despite Emilia’s arguably central role in
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Othello’s plot developments, she does not appear on stage or speak often,
and so she is, perhaps, doomed to a lack of scholarly interest.
Katherine in The Taming of the Shrew certainly does not suffer from a lack
of scholarship; her struggle is different. Unlike Othello, where the existence
of domestic violence (by definition, violence between two members of the
same household) can never be in question, lively debates surround The
Taming of the Shrew and the relationship between Katherine and Petruchio—
specifically, whether or not this relationship can be considered an example of
domestic violence (Detmer 273–93; Daniell 71–83; Deer 63–78). Upon careful
examination of the play’s language, audiences today generally feel some
discomfort with Katherine and Petruchio’s relationship; some may assert
that the relationship is indeed an abusive one because Petruchio frequently
commits (albeit indirectly) violence against Katherine. However, the
argument usually revolves around the play’s historical context, and whether
one can truly consider the relationship abusive if, in early modern England,
perceptions of spousal abuse, or spousal violence, outside the physical did
not yet exist.
Although there are conversations about domestic violence in both Othello
and The Taming of the Shrew, scholars have largely neglected to consider them in
tandem and further consider them in conversation with each other. However,
doing so can provide valuable insight as one considers the difference in the
portrayals of domestic violence. In Othello, domestic violence is an obvious
vehicle of tragedy: Iago’s toxic relationship with Emilia arguably sets the
stage for the plot as a whole, and the tragedy is ultimately carried out through
domestic violence. This representation of domestic violence is preceded by
the more farcical representation present in The Taming of the Shrew. These two
plays, written nearly a decade apart, illustrate an evolution in Shakespeare’s
treatment of themes of domestic violence. The evolution in the treatment and
portrayal of domestic violence in Shakespeare—from a simple plot device to
the terror that it truly is—exposes our flawed attempts to historicize domestic
violence in Shakespeare’s work.
Although some critics argue that Petruchio and Katherine’s relationship
cannot be considered violent because Shakespearean conceptions of domestic
violence were different than modern conceptions, this argument illustrates a
misconception about early modern ideas of domestic violence. Literary critic
Emily Detmer points out that during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, when The Taming of the Shrew was written, English attitudes about
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spousal relationships shifted. Husbands were still expected to control their
wives, but physical violence was a less acceptable method of control, and
there was an emphasis on other methods of controlling “unruly” wives (279).
In accordance with this, Petruchio never physically abuses Katherine in his
attempts to gain control over her. This lack of physical violence provides
evidence, for some scholars, that their relationship cannot be considered
violent through a historical lens.

Nevertheless, this argument ultimately rests upon the idea that early
modern people did not recognize violence outside of physical violence, which
is simply untrue. Historian Susan Amussen argues that in early modern
England, “violence” described behavior society considered inappropriate
or illegitimate (“Punishment” 3). It is true that not everything a modern
audience defines as domestic violence would also have been defined as
violence in early modern England; people accepted some level of physical
“correction” directed from husbands to wives (“Punishment” 13). There were,
however, important caveats to this acceptance: correction should parallel the
offense, that is, the punishment should fit the crime; and any violence should
be in response to some transgression. Punishment without a transgression
and excessive punishment, for early modern English people, crossed the
line from acceptable husband-wife relations to violence (“Punishment” 14).
Community policing played a vital role in preventing and limiting domestic
violence; neighbors frequently eavesdropped on each other and would
often attempt to mediate in cases of domestic violence (“Unquietness” 78).
Removing one’s wife from the community, therefore, bordered on violence,
particularly where the husband already demonstrated a predisposition
towards such, since it kept the community from playing its role in limiting
violence (“Unquietness” 81). Additionally, the community played an
important role in defining when some particular action crossed into violence;
usually, if an action disturbed public peace or disrupted the community’s
social life, it was classified as violence (“Unquietness” 77). Since providing
for his wife was an important husbandly duty, the failure to provide could
also be considered violence. Failure to provide was defined as denying a wife
access to the reasonable physical comfort she had a right to expect based upon
her husband’s situation. In certain cases, courts considered failure to provide
reason enough to grant a petitioning wife legal separation (“Punishment”
13). Denying a wife food, thus, also could be considered domestic violence,
because it fell under the category of failing to provide.
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It is, therefore, obvious that early modern audiences understood domestic
violence existed outside of physical abuse, but in order to attempt to parse
domestic violence’s existence in The Taming of the Shrew, we must consider
whether Petruchio’s actions cross the line from “correcting” Kate to acting
violently against her. The play’s events themselves may support reading
Petruchio as violent: Petruchio’s actions at the wedding disrupt social order as
he proceeds to take Katherine away from the community and isolate her, and

then deprive her of the physical wellness he is able to provide by denying her
food and sleep and ruining her clothing. Disrupting social order as Petruchio
did at the wedding and isolating Kate thereafter may have made an early
modern audience uncomfortable, but in order to decide whether these and
his other actions could have been perceived as violent, we still must consider
whether these actions were either unwarranted, or an exaggerated response
to Kate’s perceived offense. At the beginning of their relationship, his actions
may seem quite reasonable to an early modern audience: Katherine is
shrewish, and her husband must correct her. However, on the road to Padua,
Katherine seems quite sufficiently tamed, agreeing with Petruchio over the
evidence of her own eyes that it is night, then day, as Petruchio wills. Still,
Petruchio continues to make Katherine prove her taming, telling her to greet
the old man as a young virgin; else, the implicit threat hangs over her head,
they will return to Petruchio’s house, and not to her father’s house after all.
Perhaps for some in an early modern English audience, this crossed a line;
it disrupted the social order by involving someone outside their household.
This public humiliation punished Kate for a crime she had not committed
as well as the idea of Petruchio isolating Kate—through threats—may not
have sat well with some members of that audience. Indeed, Susan Amussen
says explicitly that “Petruchio’s behavior is similar to behavior that women
cite when complaining of a violent spouse . . . so [an early modern audience]
would not have found the behavior appropriate” (“Re: Domestic Violence”).
However, the play downplays Petruchio’s potentially violent actions
because those actions are central to the plot and genre requirements of The
Taming of the Shrew. The play is a comedy, and comedies as a genre usually
involve presenting a challenge to the community that is then resolved,
typically through marriage. In The Taming of the Shrew, the challenge to the
community is Katherine’s refusal to get married. When Petruchio says he
plans to marry Kate, Tranio responds that he will be grateful if Petruchio
breaks “the ice, and do this feat,/ Achieve the elder, set the younger free/
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For our access” (1.4.257–259). The issue for the community is that Katherine
will not marry, thus Bianca cannot marry. As a result, the whole social system
grinds to a halt. Not only will Katherine not marry, but her behavior makes
it so that no one really wants to marry her. Her behavior, which is also a
social problem—as demonstrated through her treatment of her father—
must therefore also be solved (Detmer 278). Petruchio’s violence towards
Katherine is what allows the story to achieve resolution: Katherine is no

longer a shrew at the end of the play, and Bianca is free to marry. This has
two consequences: first, domestic violence is clearly used as a plot device
to resolve the challenge Katherine presents; and it is therefore necessary
for the audience to accept Petruchio’s behavior in order for the play to be
a comedy, and for the audience to feel content with its resolution. Without
such resolution, the play cannot be a true comedy.
Though, as Dr. Amussen points out, an early modern audience could
very possibly have read Petruchio’s behavior as violent, that is not the only
potential reading for audiences then, or for audiences now. For today’s
audiences, who often try to view The Taming of the Shrew in what they perceive
as its historical context, the way the actors and directors choose to stage the
play is paramount to whether the audience interprets the play as comedy or
tragedy (in the way these terms are popularly used today). The 1981 New
York Shakespeare in the Park’s production of The Taming of the Shrew starring
Meryl Streep and Raul Julia is perhaps the most effective at translating the
play into a comedy for a twentieth- or twenty-first-century audience. The
production transforms Katherine’s speech at the end of the play, which is
often very disquieting to modern readers, into a tender, almost romantic
scene. Streep’s Katherine bows herself down to the ground, holding out her
hand and inviting her husband to step on it, if he so chooses. Julia’s Petruchio
kneels down beside her, takes her hand, and kisses it before he raises her to
her feet alongside him. He proceeds to brag to his friends about his shrewtaming abilities—but as he does so, his Katherine tugs on his hand, eager to
spend time alone with her husband, and clearly still unafraid to exhibit her
indomitable spirit. These acting choices give the audience a sense that this
couple truly cares about each other, and that Petruchio did not break Kate’s
spirit, but rather, only softened it. However, not every production portrays
their relationship this way. The 2012 Globe production, starring Samantha
Spiro and Simon Paisley Day depicts a far more threatening Petruchio, and
a far more worn and wearied Katherine. When Day’s Petruchio tells Spiro’s
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Kate, “Will you, nill you, I will marry you” (2.1.262–63), he moves atop Kate,

who is lying on her back, pinning her in place. The threat and his disregard
for Katherine’s feelings are clear. By the time Katherine gives her infamous

speech, she is tired and beaten. She says the words listlessly, without much

real emotion. For audiences today, who so frequently attempt to historicize

the play and excuse Petruchio’s textual behavior based on that attempt, the

play’s interpretation depends on the actors. Given the very real possibility
an early modern audience could have seen Petruchio as violent, it is only

logical that this could have held true for them as well. Whether The Taming
of the Shrew is an effective comedy therefore relies heavily upon acting and

directing choices.

Domestic violence in Othello, on the other hand, exhibits itself with

almost startling explicitness, and therefore functions as a plot device quite

differently than it does in The Taming of the Shrew. There is no need for anyone
to wonder whether an early modern audience would have found Othello’s

behavior leading up to Desdemona’s murder violent. Desdemona commits

no error to prompt his “correction,” if I may term it as such; and his behavior

exceeds punishment that would fit the crime—quite uncomfortably so.

Even though Othello remains unaware of Desdemona’s innocence for the

majority of the play, his actions are still violent because murder was never

an acceptable action for a husband to take (“Unquietness” 79). For early

modern and current audiences, Othello fits the role of an abuser. Nonetheless,
scholars do not frequently examine Iago through this same lens, though his
behavior toward Emilia clearly qualifies as abuse as well. As critic Roxane

Schwab points out, Iago certainly abuses Emilia mentally and emotionally

before he murders her. Furthermore, Schwab analyzes Iago’s behavior, and

concludes that he possesses many characteristics common to abusers. It

should not surprise the audience that Iago’s first words to his wife in the play

are cruel, aimed at “publicly humiliating, and thus controlling, her.” Emilia’s

monologue when she discovers Desdemona’s handkerchief further supports

Iago as abusive. She calls him “wayward” (3.3.300), perhaps indicating
that Iago’s moods are unpredictable—as are the moods of most abusive

partners, so their significant others can never quite predict when they will

next turn violent. Iago’s reaction to Emilia’s possession of the handkerchief

may further illustrate this, particularly in certain stagings of the play. In one
scene, for example, Iago’s hand clenches Emilia’s jaw. The fear in her eyes
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and the malice in his are both quite obvious, underlining the violence of
their relationship.
Desdemona’s conversation with Emilia, however, after Othello hits
her publicly, provides perhaps the best illustration of Emilia as a victim of
abuse. She tells Desdemona that it takes a year, maybe two, to really know
one’s husband, echoing the fact that abuse almost always begins within the
first year of marriage, and perhaps indicating that this was the case for her

(Schwab). Emilia continues by deriding male jealousy, indicating that the
jealousy Iago expresses a few times throughout the play—first of Othello,
then of Cassio—is well known to her, and she has attempted to deny it
by telling her husband of her fidelity, but he will not listen because he is
“not ever jealous for the cause,/ But jealous for [he’s] jealous” (3.4.160–61).
This jealousy that Emilia so disparages began the tragedy’s events in the
first place. Iago tells the audience he “hate[s] the Moor” (1.3.357) because
of his certainty that “’twixt my sheets/ he has done my office” (1.3.358–59).
Despite Emilia’s assertions otherwise, Iago chooses to act as though Othello
has “done [his] office,” even though he admits to the audience he does not
know if the rumor is true (1.3.359). Consequently, the tragedy in Othello
results from Iago’s abusive relationship with Emilia and his refusal to trust
or listen to his wife.
That domestic violence executes the play’s tragedy, yet provides perhaps
the most compelling evidence that it is the central tragedy in Othello. Domestic
violence accomplishes or motivates every death in the play: Emilia and
Desdemona are ultimately victims of domestic violence; Iago kills Roderigo
to further his plan—a plan ultimately motivated by the idea of Emilia’s
infidelity, which itself further encourages domestic violence; and Othello’s
realization of what he has done to Desdemona as well as her innocence—an
important factor in determining correction versus violence for early modern
English people—causes him to commit suicide. Othello not only portrays
domestic violence as tragic, rather it portrays domestic violence as the
tragedy. Far from the resolving role such violence plays in The Taming of the
Shrew, domestic violence in Othello is unambiguously tragic, with terrible
ends for not only the victim, but also for the abuser. Importantly, Othello and
Iago do not go unpunished for their abuses of their wives. Othello, obviously,
commits suicide, but Iago, too, is unmasked at the end of the play, left to
live with the crimes he has committed—and the audience may reasonably
presume, the punishments given to him by Venetian society. Then, as a plot
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device, domestic violence differs dramatically from The Taming of the Shrew:
in that play, it was the means of resolving a community; in this play, it is the
means of destroying one.
Othello and The Taming of the Shrew clearly deal with domestic violence in
ways that could hardly be more different. The question, then, is why. What
changed? Or, did anything change at all? To me, it seems the most significant
change was time. The Taming of the Shrew was written in 1593 or 1594, at the

beginning of Shakespeare’s playwriting career. Othello was written in 1603
or 1604. Almost exactly a decade passed between the two plays’ creations.
The most likely explanation is that Shakespeare simply gained more life
experience during this time, and somehow gained a more realistic view of
domestic violence. As Sharon Hamilton points out in her discussion of abuse
in Othello, “Long before the phrase ‘spousal abuse’ came into popular usage,
Shakespeare understood its nature” (60). Moreover, Shakespeare does seem to
understand something of domestic violence’s nature, portraying realistically
escalating violence as well as abusers and victims with psychologically
accurate actions, reactions, and characteristics. Perhaps Shakespeare, ever
the master of human portrayal, simply saw more domestic violence and felt
the need to return to the subject in Othello, in order to truly show its darkness
and its terror.
At around the same time that Shakespeare revisited the topic of domestic
violence and wrote Othello, John Fletcher wrote The Woman’s Prize, or The
Tamer Tamed. This play responded to The Taming of the Shrew, as the title may
suggest, and forced Petruchio to undergo his own taming at the hands of
Maria, whom he courts after Katherine’s death. This play’s very existence
demonstrates that early modern audiences were not entirely comfortable
with Petruchio’s behavior, and at least some of them thought he crossed a line
and were unsatisfied with the play’s original ending. Indeed, during later
generations, The Taming of the Shrew and The Woman’s Prize were sometimes
performed in tandem, and Fletcher’s play was extremely popular—more
popular, actually, than The Taming of the Shrew (Amussen “Re: Domestic
Violence”). Concurrently, Shakespeare wrote his own revision of domestic
violence in Othello. It is also possible that attitudes about domestic violence
underwent a slight shift at the turn of the century to more strongly emphasize
peaceful and loving relationships between husbands and wives. Perhaps if
The Taming of the Shrew were written later in Shakespeare’s career, Petruchio’s
behavior would be different—less violent. It is impossible to be certain why,
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exactly, domestic violence plays such different roles in Othello and The Taming
of the Shrew. Although this would require further study and historical archival
work, more scholars should examine Othello and The Taming of the Shrew in
conjunction with each other, as well as investigating other contemporary
primary sources, in order to obtain a clearer picture of views on domestic
violence in early modern England and how they may have changed.
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Morphing Identities
The Muse, the Art, and the Artist in “Ligeia”
and “The Oval Portrait”

Emery Nielson

Edgar Allan Poe claims in “The Philosophy of

Composition” that “the death . . . of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably,
the most poetical topic in the world” (165), a concept which, as explained
by Elizabeth Bronfen, elicits some contradictions. Bronfen addresses the
apparent incompatibility in “the combination of ‘beautiful,’ ‘poetical’ and
‘death’, since death is a decomposition of forms, the breaking of aesthetic unity”
(60). Many of Poe’s works exemplify the concept of the feminine aesthetic,
with numerous instances of the destruction of the beautiful feminine form
(see Berenice’s stolen teeth, the axe in the skull of the wife in “The Black
Cat,” and even subtler examples of decay like the entombed Annabel Lee).
These depictions of temporary beauty fulfill Poe’s “poetical” aesthetic, but
when we look at “Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait,” we find demonstrations
of permanent beauty (or endeavors to achieve it). These stories of portrayed
beauty and metempsychosis exemplify a “cultural convention, namely the
confusion of woman and art” (Bronfen 112). In their efforts to immortalize
beauty, the artists in “Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait” fuse their muses with
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their art and, subsequently, ruin them both. The destruction of the muses
adds a layer of complexity to these stories when we consider parallels of loss
in Poe’s own life, just as the attempts of the artists to immortalize their muses
mirror Poe’s own processes of grieving and artistry.
For the purposes of this discussion, the role of the muse is based on the
following definition: “a person (often a female lover) or thing regarded as
the source of an artist’s inspiration; the presiding spirit or force behind any

person or creative act” (OED, “muse,” n., 2c). Several scholars have already
made the claim that Ligeia acts as the narrator’s muse. Grace McEntee states
that “if the narrator is an artist, then Ligeia was surely his muse, a muse
who initially led the narrator along transcendental ways” (75). Catherine
Carter simply states, “She is the embodiment of the narrator’s muse” (46).
The narrator admires Ligeia’s beauty and intelligence, looking to her for
guidance and inspiration in the realm of intellectual exploration. This
admiration extends to Ligeia’s strength of will as she lies on her deathbed
and says, “Man doth not yield him to the angels, nor unto death utterly,
save only through the weakness of his feeble will” (Poe, “Ligeia” 319).
Carter claims that “most authors imply that the muses’ place is to inspire .
. . authors in order that they might do or sing something, rather than to act
for themselves” (51). Ligeia’s statement regarding the power of the human
will inspires the narrator: rather than acting for herself and being the cause
of her own reincarnation, Ligeia is inspiring the narrator through her own
example to strengthen his will so he can resurrect his wife. As a result, while
the narrator works to provide an environment for his wife to return, he seeks
inspiration and looks for guidance from a source beyond the grave. This
looking toward a dead muse for inspiration brings darkness to the narrator’s
art and ultimately results in horror.
With his will aligned with Ligeia’s, the narrator wants nothing more than
to create an opportunity for her to return: “His response to the physical loss of
his beloved is to endow his surroundings imaginatively with her ubiquitous
presence and resurrect her in his poetic utterance” (Bronfen 367). There is
evidence of this in his treatment of his new wife, Lady Rowena, whom he
“loathe[s] with a hatred belonging more to demon than to man” (Poe, “Ligeia”
323). This intense hatred, in combination with his strong lingering feelings
for his first wife, makes it clear that the narrator did not remarry for love or
companionship. We must thus assume an ulterior motive; the presence of
Rowena could be explained by the narrator’s desire for access to her finances,
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but I argue that the narrator’s purpose in marrying her was to achieve an
ideal physical vessel for the reincarnation of his first wife. The narrator’s
loathing of Rowena allows him to overcome any potential guilt or hesitancy
in sacrificing her. The location of the abbey “in one of the wildest and least
frequented portions” of England, as well as the location of the bridal chamber
in a turret “altogether apart from the portion of the abbey tenanted by the
servants” (Poe, “Ligeia” 320) demonstrate the narrator’s efforts to isolate

Rowena from anyone who might help her, befriend her, provide any sort of
enjoyment for her, or miss her when she is gone (327). The bridal chamber
itself is “pentagonal in shape,” supporting the narrator’s involvement with
dark magic, and the decorations and draperies around the room create a
“phantasmagoric effect” (321) that elicits “a hideous and uneasy animation to
the whole” (322). Rowena has confided in the narrator that she despises the
decor, yet he does not remove or alter the room to her taste. If the narrator is
not acting for the purpose of reanimating Ligeia, we would have to assume
his harshness towards Rowena stems from her not being his first wife.
However, considering the tactics the narrator is willing to employ to make
Rowena miserable, it is of little question that his actions imply once again a
motive singular to his own interest: reanimating Ligeia.
When Rowena falls ill, the narrator describes her condition as follows:
“Lady Rowena was attacked with sudden illness” (Poe, “Ligeia” 323). He
uses passive voice here, giving power to the illness and making Rowena
simply a force acted upon. He also uses a significantly powerful word—
“attacked”—to describe the illness’s action. The language here suggests
more intention behind Rowena’s sickness than an implied coincidence
between her falling ill and Ligeia requiring a vessel. The “sudden” quality
of the illness as well as the narrator’s admittance that Rowena was, in
some form, “attacked,” suggests the narrator’s implicit and purposeful
involvement in her weakened condition.
Throughout the story, while Rowena is sick and flickering between life
and death, the narrator’s mind is constantly fixed upon his muse. She is “the
presiding spirit” behind his actions as he calls upon the dark knowledge
she taught him. The function of the muse becomes complicated when we
recognize that the identity of the narrator’s muse, the deceased Ligeia,
coincides with his end goal and his final product of art: Ligeia reborn. With
Ligeia acting as both the muse and the art, the end result of the narrator’s
sorcery is something which he neglects to recognize as his first wife, let
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alone human. The narrator tells us this story through his memories, and
so when he says, “The thing that was enshrouded advanced bodily and
palpably into the middle of the apartment,” we know he does not associate
the reincarnated Ligeia with his beloved wife, going so far as to call the
spectral being a “thing” (Poe, “Ligeia” 329). When the image of Ligeia is
once again before him, the narrator does not identify the being as Ligeia,
merely drawing attention to physical features like “the black, and the wild

eyes . . . of the LADY LIGEIA” (334). While the “thing” may possess Ligeia’s
eyes and hair, the narrator’s horror confirms that the being before him is not
Ligeia herself. He also acknowledges that “it is by that sweet word alone—by
Ligeia—that I bring before mine eyes in fancy the image of her who is no
more,” further testifying that his attempts to reanimate his wife failed and
that he can only see a representative image of her in his memory: the true
Ligeia “is no more” (310–11). The art the narrator attempts to create, when it
is fused with the identity of his dead muse, is far from his goal of resurrecting
his wife. Because of the deceased nature of the muse, the art could not be
completed in its proper and beautiful form; the death of the beautiful woman
altered the narrator’s muse and art into something of “horrors” (328). The
narrator’s attempt to find life in death proves fruitless as his efforts are only
rewarded with the dark and the unnatural.
While the roles of artist and muse in “Ligeia” appear more symbolic,
“The Oval Portrait” provides a more obvious depiction of the muse, with the
artist’s wife serving as his visual inspiration. The artist’s efforts to create a
likeness of his wife place her in the position of his muse as she is the aesthetic
inspiration for the image he is painting. Though his wife is his original muse,
the artist becomes increasingly less focused on his wife as he becomes more
fixated on the painting itself. The story tells us that prior to his marriage, the
artist already possessed “a bride in his Art,” and this relationship between the
artist and his art causes his wife to dread the “instruments which deprived
her of the countenance of her lover” (Poe, “Life in Death” 665). Here we are
already presented with a conflict regarding the identity of the muse. The artist
has given his art not only human characteristics, but romantic ones as well.
Because he considers art his first wife, and he continues to turn toward his art
for inspiration for the duration of this story, we see the art begin to function
as a muse. Catherine Carter suggests that “muses in general are, as their
gender suggests, objects rather than subjects” (51). The artist works “day and
night to depict her who so loved him,” neglecting his wife’s humanity and
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treating her as if she has no mortal needs, thus ignoring the ever-weakening
condition of her health (Poe, “Life in Death” 665). The objectification of the
artist’s wife, as well as the attribution of human characteristics to the art, blur
the lines between art and muse and facilitate a fusion between them.
When the artist finishes his painting and finally looks away, we
recognize that the wife has died, and the “life-likeliness” of the painting
suggests a transfer of life from the wife to the art (Poe, “Life in Death” 664).

Bronfen suggests that “the conflict between his two brides provokes in the
painter a desire to merge the two, to transfer his living wife into the wife
he already had” (111). It is through successfully merging his two wives that
the artist combines the identities of his living muse with his art. Not only
has the muse’s identity been fused with the art, but her living essence has
been trapped inside it as well. The artist has captured the image of his wife
“just ripening into womanhood” (Poe, “Life in Death” 663), an image which
naturally evokes symbols of life and fertility. He paints her at a state in which
she is symbolically blooming, and in doing so, he “creates a fictional idol/
idealization that, while living on, replaces the wife’s corporeal existence”
(Webb 216). The artist has to kill the muse in order to fuse her essence with
the art, thus making her immortal.
Robert M. Mollinger addresses a romantic cliché regarding this story that
“life is destroyed by art which, at the same time, preserves life forever” (150).
While this move may appear cliché, when we consider the role of the muse as
a source of inspiration, her death and simultaneous fusion with the art adds
layers of complexity to what Mollinger sees as formulaic. Life is not simply
destroyed by art, but the muse, the source of inspiration, becomes fused with
the art when the wife’s living essence is transferred to the painting. Fusing
art with inspiration creates a paradox that suggests an end to the muse but,
simultaneously, an infinite loop of inspiration and art.
By killing the muse, the artist has created the most lifelike portrait
imaginable: “as a thing of art nothing could be more admirable than the
painting itself” (Poe, “Life in Death” 664). Yet the truth behind the painting’s
creation alters the association of life and liveliness and instead attributes
a heavy context of death. While the portrait possesses “life-likeliness,” and
immortalizes its subject in its portrayal of her, it depicts a representation
of ultimate mortality. The art was meant to be an image of life, and it is
initially, but because of its fusion with the muse, the art’s essence has been
altered forever. In killing his muse, the artist has forfeited all access he had
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to his living source of inspiration. His living wife gone, her essence having
transferred into his art, the artist will now have to seek inspiration from this
unnatural fusion of life, death, and art. Without access to a living muse, the
artist will be forced to rely on a living dead muse for inspiration, forever
altering the nature of his art and bringing darkness to his future creations.
In addition to claiming that “the death . . . of a beautiful woman is,
unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world,” Poe says that “equally

is it beyond doubt that the lips best suited for such topic are those of a
bereaved lover” (Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition” 165). While this
rule is not explicitly followed in “The Oval Portrait,” “Ligeia” is told from
the lover’s perspective, as are many of Poe’s tales regarding dead or dying
women. In “The Oval Portrait” and “Ligeia,” the male lover is synonymous
with the identity of the artist. While viewing Poe himself as an artist, we
can find instances of his acting as a bereaved lover for the death of beautiful
women in his own life.
Because of Poe’s role as an artist, we must question the sources of his
inspiration. Who were Poe’s muses and what do they inform us about
these pieces? Carter connects Poe to the narrator in “Ligeia” as she says,
“inspiration is traditionally feminine, beautiful, mysterious, stronger than
death (as the art remains to confer immortality on the artist), and dedicated to
giving aid to men—in this case aid in writing” (Carter 49). The question of the
identity of Poe’s muse or muses then remains. I propose that Poe’s muses for
“Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait,” are his dead mother, Eliza, and his dying
wife, Virginia, respectively.
Eliza passed away on December 10, 1811, when Poe was just shy of three
years old (Bradford 20). At such a young age, Poe was unlikely to retain
any solid memories of his mother, and it is this lack of memory that we see
mirrored in “Ligeia.” The narrator is unable to recall where, when, or how
he met his wife, nor can he remember anything about her family or her
life outside of their marriage. All of his memories of her seem to be broad
ideas: her singing, her shadow-like presence, her beauty, her intellect. Not
only does he struggle to remember her, but he remembers her as an almost
inhuman ideal with “an airy and spirit-lifting vision more widely divine than
the phantasies which hovered about the slumbering souls of the daughters
of Delos” (Poe, “Ligeia” 311). This idealization of Ligeia suggests an inability
to remember her for who she truly was as the narrator fills in the gaps with
characteristics stemming from feelings of love and loss.
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In his biography of Poe, Kenneth Silverman addresses the death of
Ligeia, saying that “one reason the narrator finds the loss irremediable is that,
although an adult, he depends on Ligeia as if he were a child” (139). This
parent-child relationship is supported by the text, as the narrator compares
himself to a child several times throughout the story: “I was sufficiently
aware of her infinite supremacy to resign myself, with child-like confidence,
to her guidance through the chaotic world of metaphysical investigation at

which I was most busily occupied during the earlier years of our marriage”
(Poe, “Ligeia” 316). The narrator admits that he looks up to Ligeia as a
mentor, but here we see that he is so enraptured by her vast knowledge that
he views himself as childlike. While considering the failing health of his wife,
the narrator remarks, “Without Ligeia I was but as a child groping benighted”
(316). Without his muse, the narrator feels as helpless as an unenlightened
child, creating implications of their relationship that feel less romantic and
more maternal. This desire for Ligeia to teach and lead him mirrors Poe’s
own desires for a relationship with his mother.
We see further connections between Ligeia and Eliza when we consider
the circumstances of their deaths. Similar to Ligeia’s illness, Poe’s mother
died “most likely of tuberculosis” (Bradford 20). While Ligeia is far from
being the only woman Poe has killed with a sudden illness, considering the
similarities between Poe and the narrator, there is a clear relationship between
“Ligeia” and Poe’s feelings of loss regarding his mother. “Ligeia” was first
published in 1838 when Poe was twenty-five years old, and it illustrates his
sorrow for growing into adulthood without a relationship with his mother.
Unfortunately for Poe, his loss did not end with his mother’s death. It was
many years later when he found another muse of a more conventional model:
his wife Virginia. It is in the tragedy of Virginia’s dying that we can find clear
inspiration for “The Oval Portrait.”
Virginia Eliza Clemm Poe loved to sing, and, not knowing that Virginia’s
singing would eventually result in her death, Poe supported his wife in her
passion (Silverman). In 1842, Virginia was practicing when she “began to
bleed from her mouth . . . she was hemorrhaging from her lungs” (179). The
result of the hemorrhage brought Virginia into an early stage of tuberculosis,
which at the time was commonly referred to as “death-in-life” due to the
seemingly hopeless fatality of the illness (179). Much like Virginia’s illness
was often called “death-in-life,” the original title of “The Oval Portrait” was
“Life in Death,” due to the lifelike nature of the portrait of the deceased
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wife. Virginia underwent “death-in-life” for several years, living but
growing increasingly weaker as her expectant death drew nearer. Not only
did Virginia die young, but the nature of her death becomes particularly
intriguing when we recognize what killed her: singing. Just as the wife in
“The Oval Portrait” is consumed and destroyed by art, the art of singing
eventually killed Virginia.
On June 12, 1846, Poe wrote what remains today the only known letter

addressed to his wife. In it he addresses Virginia as “My Dear Heart” and
tells her, “You are my greatest and only stimulus now, to battle with this
uncongenial, unsatisfactory, and ungrateful life” (Harrison 232). He later
claimed he loved her “as no man ever loved before” (287). Poe’s love for
Virginia is evident in his letters, as is his suffering in watching her illness
progress: “This ‘evil’ was the greatest which can befall a man” (287).
Rather than focusing on Virginia’s loss of liveliness, Poe wrote a piece
that immortalizes a woman at her most lively state. Because the story was
published the same year Virginia fell ill, other scholars have made the clear
connection between the dying Virginia and the wife in “The Oval Portrait.”
Silverman describes the text as a tale concerning an artist “and his . . . Virginialike bride . . . The painter will not or cannot accept his bride is dying” (180).
This inability of the artist to acknowledge his wife’s failing health mirrors
Poe’s own experience as he watched Virginia grow weaker and weaker. Poe
wrote that “at each accession of the disorder [he] loved her more dearly and
clung to her life with more desperate pertinacity” (Harrison 287). The artist
“cannot accept his bride is dying,” just as Poe struggles to accept the mortality
of his own wife.
Though Virginia was not yet dead when Poe published this piece, he was
brutally aware of her worsening condition. His drinking habits increased
as Virginia’s condition worsened, and he writes that he “became insane,
with long intervals of horrible sanity” (Harrison 287). The pain of watching
his wife die was so unbearable that Poe indulged in alcohol to occupy his
conscious mind. As an artist in his own craft, he was faced with the reality of
a potential world without his muse, a world without the “only stimulus” in
his “ungrateful life.” By placing the artist in “The Oval Portrait” in a position
that forces him to use a dead muse for inspiration, Poe recognizes the very
real possibility of his own condition in the future. In her dying, “Virginia
Clemm unwittingly served as the muse who gave birth to Edgar Allan Poe’s
creative powers,” most specifically those regarding themes of death, loss,
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and other forms of the macabre (Bronfen 366). Seeking inspiration from a
dead or dying muse is not unlike finding inspiration in death itself, and it is
this fixation on death that permeates so many of Poe’s works.
Just as the artists in “Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait” acquire inspiration
from dead and dying muses, Poe wrote these stories with the invocation
of his own dead and dying muses. The doubling of the dead/dying muse
further justifies the dark plots of these texts: the artists create art that is dark

and close to death just as Poe has created these stories, his art, with themes of
darkness and death. His “need to keep writing versions of the revenant plot
indicates clearly enough his own difficulty in putting the past to rest” and
his inability in finding living forms of inspiration rather than relying on his
dead muses (Silverman 140).
By identifying Poe’s sources of inspiration for these two stories, we
can further identify his processes of mourning with each respective loss.
Bronfen says, “The doubling of one wife by another [in “Ligeia”], by virtue
of metempsychosis, is meant to prove a continued existence of the ‘soul’
after bodily decay and serves to soothe the mourner about his own fear of
mortality” (334). We can connect this idea to “The Oval Portrait” as well,
considering the function of the painting as an immortalizing of the wife’s
image and essence. Considering these stories to be representations of the
women in Poe’s life, Poe is mirroring the artists in these stories by creating
doubles of his mother and wife in order to soothe his own fears. Bronfen
continues, regarding the final death of Ligeia, “this second death also marks
a closure of the protagonist’s uncanny exchange with the dead, usher[ing] in
a new phase in his mourning. Realising that the lost object can be retrieved
in the form of a mental image confirms his belief in the omnipotence of his
thoughts” (335). Again, we see Poe’s characters acting as representations of
his own life, as he uses his stories to remember his muses and gain some
control over the reality of their deaths through his mental powers.
At the close of “Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait,” both artists make similar
exclamations regarding the completion of their art. However, it is through
the artists’ individual reactions that we can draw conclusions regarding
Poe’s state of mourning for his dead and dying muses. “Ligeia” concludes as
the narrator “shriek[s],” “these are the full, and the black, and the wild eyes—
of my lost love—of the lady—of the LADY LIGEIA!” (Poe, “Ligeia” 330).
The narrator recognizes a resemblance to his wife, but we know through his
narration that his attempts to resurrect Ligeia ultimately fail. He questions,
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“But why shall I minutely detail the unspeakable horrors of that night,”
suggesting that Ligeia does not return to life in the form he desires (328).
The narrator’s recognition of the “horrors” of his art illustrates an ultimate
acceptance that Ligeia is gone, despite his best efforts. He still longs for the
woman he remembers, but having experienced such dark terrors, the narrator
is able to acknowledge the permanence of Ligeia’s passing. He doubtless still
remembers her through a perfect lens, but after his failed attempt to reunite

with his wife, he is able to accept that Ligeia is gone. When he published this
story, Poe had been without his mother for many years. Though he never
truly knew his mother, Poe’s longing to be close to her is apparent in this
story, just as “Ligeia’s ultimate rebirth only dramatizes more horrifyingly
how those most deeply beloved live on within oneself, never dead and ever
ready to return” (Silverman 140). Unable to remember her for who she truly
was, his memories likely idealized her to be a perfect representation of what
a mother can be, just as the narrator idealizes his memories of Ligeia. Since
Eliza had been absent from Poe’s life for so long, he was able to accept the
fact of her passing, and, like the narrator comes to acknowledge Ligeia’s
death, Poe recognized that he would never see his mother again.
Before discovering his wife is dead at the conclusion of “The Oval
Portrait,” the artist finishes his painting and declares, “This is indeed Life
itself!” (Poe, “Life in Death” 666). We do not have the perspective of the artist
to conclude how he feels about the nature of his finished art like we do the
narrator of “Ligeia,” but we can judge his acknowledgement of his wife’s
death through his actions. The artist “would not see that the light which fell
so ghastly in that lone turret withered the health and the spirits of his bride,
who pined visibly to all but him” (665). Poe’s choice of the conditional text
suggests a willing ignorance (or even purposeful neglect) in the artist to
disregard the condition of his wife. We also know from this quote that the
wife’s failing health was clearly visible and should have been recognizable to
the man who was painting her. As the artist finishes the painting, he “comes
face to face with his bride’s death but still cannot or will not recognize it”
(Silverman 180). The artist’s negligence toward his wife suggests a feeling
of guilt within Poe for Virginia’s condition as well as his use of her for
inspiration.
The wife in “The Oval Portrait” “is gentle and forbearing, and quietly
sacrifices her life on the altar of her husband’s passionately blind pursuit of an
ideal,” whether that ideal be the immortal youth and beauty of woman or the
66

Winter 2021

most perfect, lifelike art (Gross 18). By attributing these characteristics to the
wife and aligning himself with the artist, Poe identifies himself as at fault for
Virginia’s illness. The wife’s death due to the artist’s actions illustrates Poe’s
fear of a worsening in Virginia’s condition due to unintentional neglect on
his part. While Poe was diligent in caring for his wife, doing all he could to
improve her health, the emotional strain of seeing her improve and decline,
of finding hope and losing it over and over, weighed on him. Poe admitted

after Virginia’s death that he had “nearly abandoned all hope of a permanent
cure, when [he] found one in the death of [his] wife” (Harrison 287). Poe felt
extreme loss at Virginia’s death, but he also experienced an end to unbearable
torment. The artist’s inability to recognize his wife’s weakened state in “The
Oval Portrait” communicates the complexity that Poe experienced when living
with his ill wife: distracting his mind with alcohol would allow him to forget
her pain and retain a perfect and healthy image of her, but failing to accept and
address her situation would result in her death. Poe fought to keep Virginia
alive, but in doing so he suffered great emotional stress. This is the struggle
that Poe illustrates in “The Oval Portrait”: that the obligation of caring for his
wife forced him to become familiar with her increasing weakness.
While the relationships of the artists and muses in these stories differ
from Poe’s life, we can see clear connections between his personal muses and
the muses in “Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait.” Rather than using his art to
distance himself from his pain and loss, Poe infuses his grief into his writing.
“Ligeia” and “The Oval Portrait” illustrate Poe’s inability to find inspiration
among the living. Trapped in memories of the past, Poe is left in a position to
call upon dead and dying muses for inspiration, resulting in art that is laced
with death and darkness.
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Ghosts of Past, Present,
and Future
On Political Purpose and Critical Hope in
Colson Whitehead’s The Nickel Boys

Adelaide Strickland

Colson Whitehead’s The Nickel Boys, based on

a true story, takes as its inspiration a particularly horrific example of failed reform.
The Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys, in Marianna, Florida, closed in 2011 but
left a shadow of rape and torture—and the deaths of more than 50 boys—in its
wake (Chadwick and Vermeulen 96). When news of the bodies made its way
to Whitehead’s Twitter feed in 2014, “in the very summer Michael Brown and
Eric Garner, two African Americans, were murdered by white policemen,” he
felt like he had to share their stories (Chadwick and Vermeulen 96). He told a
reporter that the story stayed with him, that “if there’s one place like there, there
are many places,” and that “if the story hadn’t been told, someone needed to tell
it” (Davies). Tom Chadwick and Pieter Vermulen suggest, however, that “if The
Nickel Boys manages to amplify the story . . . the novel itself is not so much filling
an archival gap as tapping into a prevailing mood” (96). While Whitehead felt
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a great conviction to tell the story of the Dozier boys, Chadwick and Vermulen
argue that the resulting novel “cannot claim a heroic political posture” because
it is “merely one relay station in a saturated media sphere in which stories of
African American suffering are never absent and instead possess an almost
ambient availability” (96). While I can agree with Chadwick and Vermulen’s
analysis of the archive as overflowing with stories of suffering, I take issue with
their statement that Whitehead’s The Nickel Boys has no political purpose

alongside it. It is the task of journalists and archivists to tell true stories as they
are; it is the task of the author to fictionalize those stories, to help them come to
life in order to bring them into conversation with the greater social and political
landscape, and to trace their roots through history—simultaneously engaging
the past, present, and future.
Drawing from the work of journalists and the archives of stories from past
Dozier victims, Whitehead’s novel begins in the present with the discovery
of the bodies at a fictionalized Dozier, which he calls “Nickel Academy.” The
novel then dives into the story of how they got there by following the journey
of a conscientious high school senior named Elwood. Throughout the rest of
this paper, I will examine how Whitehead uses a fictional Dozier to critique
the reform system and bring the story into debate with the greater historical
contexts of slavery and the civil rights movement. I will look first at how
Whitehead plays with time in regard to his “haunting” of Nickel and the boys
who go there. Then, I will turn to how he sets about fictionalizing the school
and its students—namely, to Elwood’s character—and what that allows him
to do that journalism and the archive cannot. I will conclude with a discussion
about how, despite all odds, Whitehead structures the novel in a way that
leaves his readers not without hope that Elwood’s seemingly naive reveries
will one day be realized. The novel’s interconnection of the past, present, and
future in critique of reform schools, alongside its mission to instill hope, lend it
the “political purpose” that Chadwick and Vermulen claim is missing.
Though the novel begins in the literary present, Whitehead immediately
introduces his readers to the past with the exhumation of bodies from Nickel’s
graveyards—marked and unmarked. The novel’s first line, “even in death
the boys were trouble,” sets the tone for the rest of the narrative (Whitehead
1). Over the course of the prologue, readers see pieces of that past coming
back to haunt the school’s grounds and its survivors, starting with the mere
existence of the bodies as they pose trouble for the construction company and
the anthropologists exhuming them. This haunting is a thread that Whitehead
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carries throughout the novel, haunting the grounds of Nickel, situating the
story within the shadow of the civil rights movement, and showing readers,
at various instances, a haunted “Elwood,” who we later learn is actually a
boy named Turner. Through the carrying out of this thread, Whitehead is
tapping into what Kashif Powell refers to as “the story of blackness,” made
up “of subjectivities birthed in the liminal depths between life and death . . .
a ghost story narrated by muted voices” (254). Luckhurst writes, in a similar

regard, that “ghosts are the signals of atrocities” (247); in the novel’s first line,
Whitehead introduces his readers to the ghosts of Nickel boys from the past
and brings the atrocities that led to their condition into the present.
The atrocity that the reform school as an institution represents, in
particular, is one target of Whitehead’s fictionalized Dozier, highlighted in
his interplaying of the past and present. To fully understand Whitehead’s
critique, I will look first to the archive. Reform schools emerged in the
United States in the early nineteenth century, influenced in part by what
has been deemed “the child-saving movement” (Platt 21). The movement,
driven largely by feminist reformers, created new institutions for dealing
with young criminals, namely juvenile courts and reformatories geared “to
accommodate the needs” of so-called “delinquent” youth (22). The “childsavers” believed that a focus on nurture could retrain youth for “lawabiding careers” and obliterate “nature’s defects,” or, more specifically, “the
intractability of human nature and the innate moral defects of the working
class” (32, 22). The schools were not, in the beginning, disproportionately
populated by Black youth as they have been in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries; Black youth were being directed into prisons instead, and
it was not until after the civil war that their numbers in reform schools
began to rise (Span 109). What sets the reformation of Black youth apart is
that it was not only targeted at those convicted of crimes but also at those
“presumed to be prime candidates for committing crime” (116). Those
presumptions were based on whether a child was deemed to have worthy
parents, if they were frequently seen loitering or engaging in unproductive
activities, and other vague criteria evidently susceptible to the influence
of law enforcement’s or legal officials’ own biases (Platt 32). Given that
Black people in the United States are also more than twice as likely than
white people to live below the poverty line, the criteria outlined above as
“defects” to be reformed affect them disproportionately (“Poverty Facts”).
The racial history of reform schools is heavy, and something that many
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might not be aware of, but Whitehead is able to use fiction as a means to
reach and educate a wider audience.
Whitehead’s fictionalization of Dozier and his characterization of Elwood
allow readers to consider these injustices in a way that archives can rarely offer,
both by making space for empathy and forcing readers to consider the greater
historical context—including Saidiya Hartman’s “afterlife of slavery”—as it
relates to the boy’s experience. Whitehead’s focus on the haunting of the school’s

survivors is the strongest example of how he achieves this; for most of the boys
we meet, the crimes are minimal—being “recalcitrant,” skipping school, breaking
a pharmacy window—or, in Elwood’s case, non-existent (Whitehead 46–47).
Elwood is undeniably a good kid; he dreams of being on the front lines of the
civil rights movement, gets good grades, is different “from the neighbourhood
boys,” and somewhat of a goody-two-shoes—quite the opposite of someone
who we might imagine needs reform (19). And yet, despite his stellar character,
Elwood is stuck in a system designed for “delinquents,” that claims it will make
them better members of society. The fact that readers get to know Elwood as
well-mannered and law-abiding before he finds himself at Nickel allows them
to empathize more with his situation than they might if they came across a
similar story in real life. This is something that fiction does well because there
is “no expectancy of reciprocation involved in the aesthetic response . . . the very
nature of fictionality renders social contracts between people and person-like
characters null and void” (Keen 212). The more we learn about the character
through specific aspects of characterization—“naming, description . . . depicted
actions”—Keen suggests, the higher the potential for empathy (213). Learning as
much as we do about Elwood’s character, alongside the triviality of the “crimes”
committed by the other boys, highlights the fact that crime, in reality and in
fiction, is not the problem; blackness is.
There were white students at the school as well—both at Dozier and at
Nickel—but the way Whitehead frames the novel draws our attention to the
plight of its Black students; haunted, again, by the afterlife of slavery. Laying
out the horrors of reform school alongside the struggles of the civil rights
movement allows Whitehead to further solidify the connections between
past and present. The era in which the novel takes place is saturated with
social protest, encompassing the rise of the civil rights movement and the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. These two storylines—of Nickel and
greater social climate—are tied together as readers watch Elwood’s own hope
for justice begin to subside as his stay at Nickel draws on, and as they witness
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his realization that if he wishes to survive, he must suppress his own morality—
his conception of right and wrong. The civil rights movement fights for Black
people and white people to be seen as equals under the law; and yet, while
Black people and allies are fighting for justice, the so-called justice system is
treating young Black boys as disposable. The living quarters and schoolhouse
for Black students are in worse shape than those for their white counterparts,
and the work more challenging; Boot Hill cemetery, where the first bodies are

exhumed, is located on the “‘colored’ side” of the school grounds, “immediately
adjacent to the school’s garbage dump” (Jackson 159). The “secret graveyard,”
we can only imagine, harbours similar racist underpinnings (Whitehead 5).
Whitehead’s framing of the novel with the exhumation of the bodies, coupled
with his focus on the civil rights movement and Elwood’s engagement with it,
once again works to intertwine the past and present, emphasizing the horrors
of Nickel and the reform school system.
Reform schools in general also placed emphasis on two primary means of
rehabilitation: education and work, though at many schools work seemed to take
precedence. Historian Robert Pickett said, in regard to a New York reformatory
called “The House of Refuge” that opened in 1825, that at no time “did any of
the youngsters work less than six hours” per day, leaving little time, it seems,
for the education portion of their reform (Span 111). In the aftermath of the reallife Dozier School for Boys, hundreds of Black boys told the press that “they
were ‘modern day slaves’” (Harrell). We also see this reflected at Nickel, where
Whitehead draws attention to the fact that work did not have the intended effect
of teaching students valuable life skills or making them employable. Rather, it
“toughened and prepared them—especially its African American and Hispanic
American offenders—for a life of continued delinquency and eventual prison”
(Span 109). Whitehead tells us that many of the remaining Nickel boys are “dead
in prison,” “decomposing in rooms they [rent] by the week,” or have “frozen
to death in the woods after drinking turpentine” (7). This observation is very
much in line with what Ruth Gilmore argues about prisons, using statistics to
prove that the “crime went up; we cracked down; crime came down” narrative
is entirely false (17). The juvenile court, instead of achieving the reform goals it
set out, “reached into the private lives of youth and disguised basically punitive
policies in the rhetoric of ‘rehabilitation’” (Platt 33–34).
What Nickel practices, essentially, is convict-leasing by another name—yet
another remnant of the past that Whitehead brings forward into his narrative
present. Some academics and activists have deemed prisons’ practices of
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convict-leasing as evidence of “new slavery” (Gilmore 21). The problem with this
conception, Gilmore writes, “is that very few prisoners work for anybody while
they’re locked up” (21). This logic, however, may not apply to reform schools
and their focus on work as rehabilitation since work is built into the institution
itself. Perhaps, if education had been promoted with equal importance, the
element of work would be less problematic; however, contrasted with Elwood’s
struggle to find material he has not already learned, and the fact that he takes

to teaching himself the British classics he finds while cleaning out the basement,
Whitehead urges readers to question whether Nickel truly deserves to be called
an educational institution. He also highlights, once again, the traces of the past
that cling to the boys’ present day. The view Whitehead gives us of their future
(in relation to the boy’s experience at the school), that “no one believed them
until someone else said it,” only serves to solidify the broader afterlife in which
the boys and the school exist(ed) and its lasting effects (Whitehead 5). The
disregard for Black lives, on all fronts, is part of “memory’s cruelty,” which finds
“that the affective ecologies of death erected during the Transatlantic Slave Trade
continue to have authority over ontological imaginings of blackness” (Powell
254). Black lives in the time of slavery were viewed as disposable, as are the lives
of the boys at Nickel. In pushing readers to make these connections—in pulling
through the historical underpinnings that lead the novel’s characters to Nickel
and that inform the greater context of the time—Whitehead infuses The Nickel
Boys with a political purpose beyond what non-fiction materials, whether the
products of journalism or the archive, are apt to produce.
Where The Nickel Boys holds the most political purpose, however, may
be in allowing its readers room for hope. Fiction has long been seen as a means
of imparting emotions, including hope; the genre of utopia is perhaps the most
potent example of the power fiction holds in that regard. Darren Webb writes
that when “confronted with contemporary suffering and injustice, utopianism
is widely heralded as a means of recapturing the category of hope” (Webb
197). Though Whitehead certainly does not go so far as to promise utopia, the
glimpse of a better future, even if only marginally so, is a similar response to
injustice, and holds a great deal of political purpose in that it affords readers the
hope necessary to keep fighting. That hope itself holds a great deal of political
purpose is undeniable, in large part for this very reason; Barack Obama ran an
entire election campaign based on that fact. In The Nickel Boys, Whitehead
engages with hope in two key ways: first, in a very subtle manner, building on
the relationships he draws between past, present, and future that have been
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discussed so far in this essay. Then, in the motif of escape that leads us to the
novel’s ending.
The Nickel Boys’ subject matter is arguably quite discouraging; as
explored earlier, Whitehead is successful in illustrating a piece of Hartman’s
“afterlife of slavery” through his portrayal of the horrors of reform schools,
and the struggles of the civil rights movement. The depiction of this afterlife—
the lingering injustice affecting Black lives in America—in the archive, may
not leave much room for hope. The way Whitehead structures the novel,
however, allows his readers the hope that Elwood’s seemingly naive reveries
will one day be realized—allowing them to glimpse a future that is further
from slavery and injustice in more than just time. Whitehead’s efforts in this
regard begin in the prologue, when readers are introduced to “a Nickel Boy
who went by the name of Elwood Curtis” (7). Instead of revealing Elwood’s
death outright, he presents an opportunity for readers to maintain hope. A
perceptive reader could assume, based on the line above, that Elwood might
be dead—we know in the back of our minds that something is not right—but
how the information is presented allows us to believe that we may still find
a happy ending. Whitehead hides further clues throughout the rest of the
novel as well. When the man introduced as Elwood in the prologue runs
into an old Nickel acquaintance, Chickie Pete, he decides he had better not
pass along his business card (167); later, he refuses to give an interview
(188). Another scene finds his partner, Denise, massaging his back, with no
mention of the scars readers know to expect from Elwood’s time in the White
House (139). The truth, here, is hidden in plain sight—just as Turner Jack
hides behind Elwood’s name—but the fact that it is not clearly stated allows
readers the opportunity to hold onto hope and avoid believing that Elwood
dies until it is stated explicitly at the end; it allows readers to believe that he
will overcome the hardships of reform that Whitehead illustrates so vividly.
The archive is far less likely to offer readers the chance for hope in the face of
discouraging subject matter.
This structure of purposeful deception favours a reader’s hopeful tendencies
and encourages them to finish the novel rather than give in to discouragement
early on. Admitting a death in the first few pages has the potential to deter
someone from reading on, which, in the case of this novel, would deprive them
of another opportunity for hope. The novel’s last few chapters, while they reveal
the tragic death of the real Elwood Curtis, also provide a motif of escape. Turner,
in his life post-Nickel, is haunted by his escape—so much so that it affects
75
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how he lives his life. In his day-to-day, before we realize his true identity, we
witness Turner’s hobby of attending the New York Marathon, where he cheers
for the last-place finishers, “for the runners bringing up the rear of the pack . . .
who summoned him from his uptown apartment by a force he could only call
kinship” (Whitehead 160); we see him watching The Defiant Ones with Denise;
in his interaction with Chickie Pete, he is disappointed that tales of his “Great
Escape” from Nickel haven’t caused the stir he imagined they would (168).

Escape is a hopeful idea in and of itself; yet, at the same time, we see a Nickel boy
who, despite having physically escaped the grasp of Nickel, is haunted by his
experience and by the death of his friend. It is through this haunting, however,
that Whitehead leaves readers with one final glimpse of the future when we
see Turner seated in the restaurant in which Elwood’s grandmother, and later
Elwood himself, worked. As a kid, Elwood played a game: “whenever the
dining room door swung open, he bet on whether there were Negro patrons out
there” (18). Elwood never did see a Black face in the restaurant; but, as readers,
we watch Turner realize Elwood’s dream. Elwood’s haunting of Turner leads
Turner to this moment, driving his return to Nickel and to Elwood’s hometown.
In bookending the novel in this way, Whitehead gives us the past, illustrates
the horrors of reform, the struggles of the civil rights movement, and shows us
where it all started. And yet, through the story he has crafted on top of those very
real histories, he allows us to remain hopeful. Despite the horrors, despite—and
perhaps because of—the struggle, there has been change.
This is not an overly romanticized kind of hope, but rather what Webb and
others have deemed “critical hope.” Critical hope recognizes tragedy and long
histories of injustice but positions those things as moments “that can catalyze
change,” finding a middle ground between cynicism and idealism (Grain
and Lund 51). It is often driven by the objective of combating oppression, but
recognizes that “critique is not enough,” though “the collective response to
human suffering cannot afford to get lost” in romantic ideas about solutions
(Webb 199–200). Whitehead’s weaving together of the past, present, and
future allows for critical hope to happen because it lets his readers see what
change—even the most miniscule—has happened along the way from there
to here, while also highlighting what still needs to change. Throughout the
novel, readers are led to hope, through the clues Whitehead provides and
through the motif of escape, that Elwood may survive his experience at reform
school—but at the same time, we see that the boy who goes by the name of
Elwood is haunted by his experiences there. We get another glimpse of hope
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for the future when Turner, still haunted by the death of his friend, realizes
a piece of Elwood’s childhood dream—a somewhat marginal act in and of
itself, but perhaps, we might hope, representative of something more to come.
Haunting, in the words of Powell, “is not the initiation of the story of blackness,
but thrusts us toward an end that has yet to be written” (259). That future
which has yet to be written holds a great deal of political power in that it fuels
the fight of right now; if there was no hope for a better future, what would

there be for which to fight?
While the archive, the true stories of the Dozier survivors, is important in
its own right—in presenting facts and recording history—The Nickel Boys, as
a fictional representation, allows readers to make connections, to empathize,
and to have hope. The archive presents examples of slavery’s afterlife; fiction
allows us to trace the afterlife from past, to present, to future. Whitehead’s The
Nickel Boys simultaneously engages the past, present, and future to bring the
true story of the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys into conversation with the
greater social and political landscape of the civil rights movement and with the
fight for Black lives that has spanned centuries. Whitehead’s fictionalization of
the archive he draws from allows his readers to empathize with the characters
in a way that they might not be afforded by reading the news or other nonfiction work; it allows him to haunt his readers with the history of racial
injustice and the horrors experienced by reform school survivors. And finally,
it allows Whitehead to show his readers glimpses of a more just future. To say
that The Nickel Boys holds no political purpose is to overlook the political
power of history, empathy, and hope.

77

Criterion

Works Cited
Chadwick, Tom, and Pieter Vermeulen. “Politics of Literature, Politics of the Archive.”
Lit: Literature Interpretation Theory, vol. 31, no. 2, 2020, pp. 95–101, doi:10.108
0/10436928.2020.1747183. Accessed December 2020.
Davies, Dave, host. “Colson Whitehead On The True Story Of Abuse And Injustice
Behind ‘Nickel Boys.’” Fresh Air, NPR, 16 June 2019, https://www.npr.
org/2019/07/16/742159523/colson-whitehead-on-the-true-story-of-abuse-andinjustice-behind-nickel-boys. Accessed December 2020.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. Golden Gulag. University of California Press, 2018.
Grain, Kari M, and Darren E Lund. “The Social Justice Turn: Cultivating ‘Critical
Hope’ in an Age of Despair.” Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning,
vol. 23, no. 1, 2017, pp. 45–59, doi:10.3998/mjcsloa.3239521.0023.104. Accessed
December 2020.
Harrell, Antoinette. “Hundreds of Black Boys Say They Were ‘Modern Day Slaves’
at a Recently Closed Reform School.” BlackNews.com, 1 May 2015. Accessed
December 2020.
Hartman, Saidiya. Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route.
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008.
Jackson, Antoinette T. “Exhuming the Dead and Talking to the Living: The 1914 Fire
at the Florida Industrial School for Boys—Invoking the Uncanny as a Site of
Analysis.” Anthropology and Humanism, vol. 41, no. 2, 2016, pp 158–177, doi:
10.1111/anhu.12141. Accessed December 2020.
Keen, Suzanne. “A Theory of Narrative Empathy.” Narrative, vol. 14, no. 3, 2006, pp.
207–236.
Luckhurst, Roger. “‘Impossible mourning’ in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Michele
Roberts’s Daughters of the House.” Critique, vol. 37, no. 4, 1996, pp. 243–260.
Platt, Anthony. “The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and
Correctional Reform.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, vol. 381, no. 1, Jan. 1969, pp. 21–38, doi:10.1177/000271626938100105.
Accessed December 2020.
“Poverty Facts.” Poverty USA, 2020, www.povertyusa.org/facts. Accessed December
2020.
Powell, Kashif J. “Making #BlackLivesMatter: Michael Brown, Eric Garner,
and the Specters of Black Life—Toward a Hauntology of Blackness.”
Cultural Studies— Critical Methodologies, vol. 16, no. 3, 2016, pp. 253–260,
doi:10.1177/1532708616634770/. Accessed December 2020.

78

Winter 2021
Span, M. Christopher. “Educational and Social Reforms for African American Juvenile
Delinquents in 19th Century New York City and Philadelphia.” The Journal of
Negro Education, vol. 71, no. 3, 2002, pp. 108–117.
Webb, Darren. “Exploring the Relationship between Hope and Utopia: Towards a
Conceptual Framework.” Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2008, pp. 197–206, doi:10.1111/
j.1467-9256.2008.00329.x. Accessed December 2020.
Whitehead, Colson. The Nickel Boys. Anchor Canada, 2020.

79

Criterion

80

“Ghosts Hanging over
the House”
Anja Spiegelman and Holocaust Memory in
Art Spiegelman’s Maus

Angela Ricks

Art

Spiegelman’s groundbreaking graphic

novel, Maus, is saturated by memory, both literally and thematically. Memory
and its impact are explored through two different storylines, both of which
are conveyed almost exclusively as memories. Using a nonlinear narrative,
Maus follows the experiences of a Holocaust survivor, Vladek Spiegelman,
and those of his son, Art, as both men navigate their relationship to each
other and their relationship to the the Holocaust. To differentiate between
Art Spiegelman’s role as a character and as an author, the character in Maus
will be referred to as Art and the author of the work will be referred to as
Spiegelman. This narrative weaves together memories of the distant past,
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recent past, and present, raising compelling questions about the role of
memory in framing the travesties of the past. One such question, prominent
in both Vladek and Art’s memories, is this: how should the living remember
the past and the lives of the dead? The character who brings this issue most
to the foreground is Anja Spiegelman, Vladek’s wife and Art’s mother. Anja,
who died before the start of the narrative, exemplifies the intangible yet
pressing weight of memory. Her life and legacy have an indelible impact on

the lives of her family members and how they view the past. I suggest that
Anja’s role as a character in the text is to symbolize the persistent memory
of the Holocaust and how the Holocaust’s legacy affects the lives of her
family members. Due to her passing, she is unable to directly represent her
perspective of the events that make up her family’s Holocaust past. Instead,
Anja is seen only through the lenses of her grieving family. How Vladek and
Art relate to Anja’s life and death parallels how they grapple with the weight
of Holocaust memory and its effects on their lives. By creating a link between
Anja’s memory and the Holocaust, Spiegelman suggests that the memories
of past atrocities, whether acknowledged or ignored, still permeate the lives
of those affected by them.
Anja is a silent presence in the text, yet one that “dominates” every part
of Spiegelman’s carefully constructed narrative (Hirsch 418). Despite her
influence on the narrative, there are two reasons for her direct absence. First,
Anja died prior to Spiegelman beginning to interview his father to gather the
content that would become the subject of Maus. (Her suicide is graphically
depicted in the novel and will be discussed in detail later in this essay.)
Second, Anja’s written record of her Holocaust experience was destroyed
(Spiegelman 160). While her inability to share her voice in the present was
a byproduct of her own tragic decision, the destruction of her journals was
not. Vladek, in a moment of intense emotion after his wife’s death, destroyed
the handwritten records containing the entirety of her Holocaust experiences
(Spiegelman 160). This loss of Anja’s voice is due, in large part, to Vladek’s
decision to burn her Holocaust journals. The simultaneous loss of Anja
herself and of the destruction of her journals creates a vacuum in Vladek and
Art’s lives. As a result of this pressing vacancy, Anja and her memory hangs
over her family, permeating the past and the present.
Despite her importance to Vladek and Art’s lives, Anja would be
rendered invisible without her family integrating her into the narrative via
their memories. Most of these memories are Vladek’s and are told to Art
82

Winter 2021

during their interview sessions. Art discusses only one memory of Anja, and
much more briefly than Vladek. These dual recollections of Anja, as related
through the lenses of a grieving widower and a disillusioned son, are crucial
to understanding both Anja and her family. Anja’s absence in the present
serves to emphasize the importance of memory throughout Maus. Like
Anja’s absence in Maus’ narrative, millions of Jewish people had their voices
silenced in the Holocaust and were unable to testify of their own experiences,

requiring their story to be told by the survivors of the tragedy. This parallel
between the loss of Anja’s voice and the loss of the voices of those killed in
the Holocaust creates a strong link between the two events (Mandaville 218219). This link, in turn, elevates the importance of Anja’s memory to Art and
Vladek. Her past now takes on a new weight, representing both the personal
tragedies of the Spiegelman family and how Art and Vladek relate to the
memory of the Holocaust. Anja’s death, a tragic byproduct of the Holocaust,
hangs over the text, a specter, indirectly driving the events of the storylines
of the past and present.
One such storyline of the present is about Vladek’s life in the aftermath
of the Holocaust. As seen through Art’s eyes, Vladek’s personal life is
riddled with longing for his deceased wife, making his decision to burn
her journals that much more surprising. I suggest that Vladek’s choice
to burn Anja’s Holocaust memories symbolizes how he suppresses his
own Holocaust experiences. In a 1991 interview about Maus, Spiegelman,
described these Holocaust memories as “. . . ghosts hanging over the house”
and as being an influence on Anja’s decision to kill herself (UW Video).
These ghosts, intangible remembrances of past horrors, were something
that Vladek also could not escape. Anja’s suicide forces him to face his
recollections of Auschwitz that he had previously brushed aside. In the
wake of Anja’s death, no longer could Vladek face his past experiences
with casualness. When explaining to Art why he destroyed the journals,
Vladek says, “These papers had too many memories” (Spiegelman 160). In
his struggle to carry the weight of his past, Vladek chooses to destroy the
journals. He tries to destroy the memories—symbolically and literally—
and incinerates Anja’s journals. This coping mechanism only further
suppresses Vladek’s traumas, which manifest themselves in his strained
relationships with his son and his second wife.
Vladek’s decision to burn Anja’s journals creates tension in Art’s
relationship with his father. Prior to the beginning of the narrative, Art’s
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relationship to the Holocaust and Anja begins as an inquiry to process

how both events have defined him as a person. He struggles to define his

relationship to either event. As a result, he is badly shaken by the loss of his
mother, and, later, by her Holocaust narrative. Art sees the inclusion of his

mother’s Holocaust account as a key element to understanding his past. Art

demonstrates this desire to have a clear picture of his family’s past when
he asks Vladek about Anja’s journals multiple times. When Vladek reveals

the destruction of the journals, Art is outraged, denouncing his father as a

“murderer” (Spiegelman 160). In extinguishing Anja’s first-person account

of the Holocaust, Vladek, in Art’s eyes, has severed a crucial way Art could
have understood the past. By branding his father a murderer, Art reveals

his anguish over what is the death of his mother a second time. With her

memories destroyed, Art is unable to have a more complete picture of the

Holocaust. Without his mother’s account, Art struggles to comprehend his

mother’s life and her experiences in Auschwitz. By linking Anja’s loss and

Art’s inability to process his relationship to the Holocaust, Anja becomes a

symbol for Art’s Holocaust memories. Anja’s absence in the narrative, much

like his lack of answers about the Holocaust, haunts Art, weighing him down

with guilt throughout the narrative. What began as a vehement discussion
between Art and Vladek has a hidden depth, as Anja’s memory and its ties

to the Holocaust endow the act and implications of burning the journals with

deep psychological consequences, directly affecting Vladek and Art.

Nowhere is Anja’s absence more apparent than in the singular memory

Art shares of his mother—her suicide. This tragic event is brought to the
forefront when Vladek stumbles upon Art’s comic about his mother’s

death, entitled “Prisoner on the Hell Planet: A Case History” (Spiegelman

101). Inserted into Maus, the comic displays Art’s staggering grief through a
harsh black and white color scheme and tortured, expressive characters. It is

clear that Art’s relationship to Anja is one of crippling guilt, confusion, and
isolation, and that this relationship with his mother’s memory is paralleled
by his reaction to the Holocaust. Art’s comic, with its lamentations about

Anja’s death, also indirectly addresses their shared familial trauma that
stems from the Holocaust. By addressing both events simultaneously in

his comic, Art equates his complicated relationship with his mother to that

of his complicated relationship with the Holocaust. The catalyst of Anja’s

death, combined with the linkage of these two traumatic events, forces Art to
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grapple with the guilt from life-altering events at the same time, causing him
to struggle with the familial trauma that has defined his life.
Art conveys his sense of loss and confusion about Anja’s death by linking
it to the Holocaust through three crucial themes, which are reflected in the
formal elements of “Prisoner on Hell Planet.” First, Art’s visual depiction
of his grief, surrounded by imagery of Anja’s suicide and of the Holocaust,
suggests that the guilt he feels towards his mother’s suicide is similar to

the guilt he feels about the Holocaust. One significant panel contains several
different images: Anja’s corpse in a bathtub; a pile of Jewish corpses; arms,
bearing an Auschwitz identification tattoo, that cut their own wrists; and
Art’s stricken, grieving form huddled in the corner (Spiegelman 105). Mixed
in with these images are the phrases “menopausal depression,” “bitch,”
“Hitler did it!” and “Mommy!” (Spiegelman 105). Since this comic is set in
Art’s memories, which occur from his psychological perspective and are of
his own creation, the lack of separation between the imagery of Anja’s suicide
and that of the Holocaust points suggest the inseparable nature of these
events in Art’s mind. To Art, these events are striking in their similarities:
they are both unexpected and unfathomable personal tragedies that define
his family and his own life. How Art draws himself in relation to the images
in this panel further suggests this relationship. The other images in the panel
are visually oppressive as they hover above Art, who sits in the bottom of the
panel, weighed down with the heaviness of the elements overhead. These
elements are overwhelming: the figure of his mother’s naked corpse in bloodfilled water is haunting; the phrases inserted in the panel are intrusive and
violent; the distinct visibility of his mother’s Holocaust tattoos as she cuts her
wrists suggests an unspeakable weight of the past; the unidentifiable heap
of Jewish corpses rots beneath a Swastika (Spiegelman 105). In response to
these graphic elements, Art’s comic self is bent in grief, pressed down under
circumstances that are out of his control. He is a passive viewer of this panel,
displaced in time and space, unable to interact with the panel and its events
that have already occurred. All he can feel, instead, is guilt, which literally
weighs him down. Art’s overwhelming guilt showcases how the memory
of his mother and the memory of the Holocaust are symbolically linked
together, compounding his grief about both events together.
Second, Art’s unbalanced memories of his mother reflect his view of
the past. Art grew up with his mother and had a relationship with her well
into his adult years. However, the only memory Art includes in this comic,
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outside of the events directly before and after Anja’s suicide, is a black and
white photograph of his childhood self with Anja. Surely, after years of life
with his parents, Art has some other memory to include? As the picture in the
opening spread suggests, Art must have had other memories of his mother
(Spiegelman 101). Instead of including these memories, however, Spiegelman
silences Art’s other thoughts of Anja, deliberately excluding “. . . childhood
memories, vignettes, or even small details that would suggest anything

about his own relationship with Anja” (Elmwood 709). To emphasize this
point, Spiegelman’s inclusion of the comic is the only time Art’s direct
memories of his mother are shown in the narrative. What “Prisoner on Hell
Planet” implies is that the trauma of his mother’s death has superseded his
childhood and adolescent memories of her, redefining and recontextualizing
Art’s relationship to Anja. This overwhelming event has transformed all of
the memories they had together. This echoes Art’s relationship to his family’s
Holocaust memories. Although his mother survived her time in Auschwitz
and gained some semblance of a happy ending, her death throws Art’s
interpretation of the Holocaust into flux. Throughout several points in the
text, Art notes that the events of the Holocaust were somewhat normalized
when he was a child. As he confesses to his wife, Art used to “think about
which of my parents [he’d] let the Nazis take to the ovens if [he] could only
save one of them” and imagine “Zyklon B coming out of [his] shower instead
of water” (Spiegelman 174, 176). In the wake of Anja’s death, however, he
must confront Anja’s death and its implications on his relationship to the
Holocaust together, since both events have become inextricably linked
through cause and effect. Anja’s suicide was influenced by her relationship
to the Holocaust, and now Art’s understanding of the Holocaust is shaken by
her death, needing to be processed anew. The death of his mother drives Art
to confronting his family’s Holocaust experiences. The similarities between
Art’s recontextualization of his mother’s death and his need to truly process
his family’s relationship to the Holocaust establishes a link between Anja’s
memory and how Art processes the past.
The third important element of “Prisoner on Hell Planet” is how Art
feels that he is being held prisoner by Anja and her Holocaust experiences.
In the last three panels, Art’s character stands behind bars, quarantined, and
is the only person visible in the jail. He yells out into the building, declaring
to Anja, “You murdered me, Mommy, and you left me here to take the rap!!!”
(Spiegelman 105). Art feels he is a prisoner of Anja and her Holocaust
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experiences, as represented by how he is literally being held captive. He
feels trapped by Anja’s memory, including that of her life and legacy. He
has become imprisoned by both memories and grief over past events,
extending to the point where Art feels “his parents have psychologically
destroyed him” (Gordon 57-58). Art’s isolation is common among surviving
relatives whose family members have taken their own lives (Saarinen
221). This perception of destruction has created in Art a profound sense of

isolation, as he is the only person visible in the jail. His experience is unique,
isolating him from his American peers, whose parents did not experience
the horrors of the Holocaust (Spiegelman 5-6). This is compounded by the
stigma surrounding suicide during the 1960s (Ginsburg 202), as shown in
the reactions of Anja’s friends and family to Art’s “wrong” reaction to his
mother’s death (Spiegelman 104-105). Art feels wrongfully imprisoned by
circumstances out of his control, which contrasts to the overwhelming guilt
he feels he has earned because of perceived complicity in Anja’s death. By
not doing more to confirm his love for her, especially during the last time
he saw her, Art feels deserving of his guilt (Spiegelman 105). Complicated
and complex, Art simultaneously feels he is deserving of punishment while
simultaneously pushing back against this guilt. To link this psychological
“jailing” to the Holocaust, “Prisoner on Hell Planet” provides a striking
visual connection: Art’s clothing. In jail, Art’s cartoon version of himself
wears a uniform similar to those worn in concentration camps (Spiegelman
294). Art’s clothing—which he has to wear because his mother “left [him]
there to take the rap!!!”—gives interesting insight into Art’s relationship with
the Holocaust (Spiegelman 105). The reader does not see Art being taken to
jail. Instead, his cartoon depiction of himself appears there suddenly, with
no transition between panels, now atoning for atrocities he did not commit.
His guilt about Anja and the Holocaust, further muddled by his rupture with
his past relationship with the Holocaust, condemn him to suffer through a
similar experience to Anja, being “murdered” and unjustly imprisoned. By
reenacting the general shape of Anja’s Holocaust experiences through his
comic, Art is equating his mother and her death with the Holocaust, resulting
in Art needing to grapple with his grief about both events at the same time.
Taking a different shape than Art’s grief, Vladek’s reaction to Anja’s
death is one of explosive mourning that cools into a more internal, but no
less potent, feeling of loss. This transition from intense outward expression to
aching introspection parallels Vladek’s post-war relationship to his Holocaust
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experiences. While Art grieves in his quiet, internal world, passively taking
in his mother’s funeral and the words of friends and families, Vladek turns
outward to express his grief. He clings to Art, literally and emotionally, as
he insists they sleep on the floor the night after Anja’s suicide, as Jewish
custom dictates (Spiegelman 104). At Anja’s funeral, Vladek cannot contain
his grief, sobbing openly on her closed casket (Spiegelman 104). His sorrow,
starkly visible in Art’s comic, eventually fades to something less external,

moving away from outward grief and into the realm of memory. Vladek’s
remembrances of Anja slowly become his way of mourning his late wife. This
transformation of grief from the external to internal world mirrors Vladek’s
relationship to his Holocaust experience. Initially, Vladek’s experiences with
the Holocaust are overshadowed by his boundless expression of joy after
making it out of Auschwitz (Spiegelman 296). In response to the Holocaust,
Vladek sensibly begins to reestablish his material wealth to find financial
security, which has been taken from him when his property was seized
during the war (Spiegelman 284-285). This external, physical reaction, with
actions that are motivated by a direct response to the impact of the Holocaust,
fails to address the internal, emotional aspects of Vladek’s reaction to his
experiences. Gradually, his external indicators of processing his relationship
to the Holocaust fade, become less consuming as the years go by, allowing
Vladek’s reaction to the Holocaust to become more internal. Somewhere
between reuniting with his wife and Anja’s suicide, Vladek’s memory of
the Holocaust becomes subdued, no longer a clear motivator driving all
his actions. The parallel between the transformation of Vladek’s grief over
Anja’s suicide and Vladek’s reaction to his post-war experience links the two
processes together, firmly establishing Anja’s memory as a symbol of how
Vladek processes his traumatic past prior to the beginning of Maus.
Vladek’s pre-war memories of Anja are precious commodities in the
wake of Anja’s suicide and the loss of her journals, pushing Art, along with
the reader, to rely on Vladek for a fundamental understanding of Anja’s
character. These flashbacks, while providing more information about
Anja, mostly serve to inform the reader about Vladek’s character, as he is
the one interpreting and presenting Anja in each memory (Elmwood 712).
These segments of memory, as seen from the perspective of the present,
reflect how Vladek processes his memories of the traumas of the Holocaust.
Understanding this filter of memory allows Vladek’s stories of Anja to be a
reflective medium for how he understands his relationship to both his wife
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and the Holocaust. Vladek’s memories of Anja before, during, and after
World War II have a deep impact on how he relates to his Holocaust trauma
in the present.
One insight Vladek’s flashbacks give is that he views Anja, and the
pre-war period, as an idealized, unreachable past. Before the war, Vladek’s
remembrance of Anja is wistful and sweetly nostalgic. He recalls the beginning
of their romance, as he later recounts to Art, which Vladek remembers as

sweet and innocent (Spiegelman 20). In some of his earliest memories of
Anja, Vladek remembers meeting her wealthy, upper-class Jewish family
and being impressed by their material circumstances (Spiegelman 17). When
Vladek first entered Anja’s family home, he remarked, “But when I came
in to their house it was so like a king came . . .” (21). This sense of gentle
awe surrounding both Anja and her financial situation is infused throughout
Vladek’s early stories about her. Even after Anja suffers a mental breakdown,
Vladek recalls that period of their life as being a happy time: “And [Anja]
was so laughing and so happy, so happy, that she approached each time
and kissed me, so happy was she” (Spiegelman 37). This statement, fondly
recalling the past, contrasts with the reality of the situation. Anja’s breakdown
was so severe that she declared she no longer wanted to live (Spiegelman 33).
Yet, the grimness of Anja’s mental health is completely offset by Vladek’s
amiable feelings towards the event years later. The divide between the reality
of the memory and Vladek’s interpretation of it highlights his idealization
of that phase of his life. The dreamy quality of Vladek’s pre-war memories
of Anja, lightly touched by a sense of yearning, serves as a brutal contrast
between the couple’s later time in Auschwitz. The brightness of Vladek’s
pre-war memories, when compared with his harrowing time during the
war, helps establish Anja as a representation of both the Holocaust and an
unreachable past.
Vladek’s repeated tendency to romanticize Anja and the pre-war period
directly plays into his marital strife with Mala, his second wife, after the
war. His relationship with Mala is characterized by constant bickering and
confrontation. Through Vladek’s constant comparisons, Vladek sets up
Mala as a foil for Anja and her memories. Mala has become a symbol of
Vladek’s discontent with the present, as opposed to his conception of Anja
and the idealized past. Vladek’s act of comparing the two women occurs
in a smorgasbord of domestic situations, ranging from comments about
purchasing new clothing to managing household finances. This contrast,
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which is the source of multiple arguments between Mala and Vladek,
highlights the difference between Vladek’s idealized life with Anja before
the war and the reality of his present life in America. Mala, in Vladek’s
eyes, constantly falls short of Anja. Anja, who has become memorialized
in her husband’s mind, has had her flaws glossed over in the wake of her
death; Vladek does not include any negative memories of her in Maus,
other than a few mentions of her mental health struggles. This avoidance

of Anja’s negative qualities or darker aspects mirrors Vladek’s avoidance
and suppression of his Holocaust memories since Vladek choosing to avoid
thinking about the Holocaust in lieu of focusing on the good in his pre-war
past. Using a purifying lens of nostalgia and grief allows him to see only her
good qualities, further solidifying Anja’s role as a symbol of an idealized past.
In contrast, Mala exists imperfectly in the present, unable to compete with
the rose-tinted memories of a former wife. Vladek’s perpetual juxtaposition
of Mala and Anja represents his desire to return to the past, to suppress
traumatic memories, and to remain dissatisfied with the present.
Vladek’s attempted suppression of his Holocaust memories also plays
into his constant thoughts of Anja and his normalization of his Holocaust
experience after the war. This reaction stems from Vladek’s relationship with
Anja, which is bound up in unfathomably deep emotional intensity, some
of which is due to their shared Holocaust experiences. Vladek’s primary
thoughts, while working various jobs in the concentration camp, were about
the welfare of his wife. This acute concern for Anja’s wellbeing propelled
Vladek to sneakily visit his wife when he was unable to send her letters or
packages containing much-needed food supplies (Spiegelman 217, 225). His
impetus to cling to life was heavily influenced by his desire to ensure Anja’s
survival, no matter the pain or suffering he might personally endure. This
pressing desire to take care of his wife, despite the dire circumstances, would
help form the Spiegelmans’ marital relationship into something that would
bind them together, creating immeasurably strong ties. The desperate urge
for survival, coupled with the instinct to cling to his wife, plays a crucial
role in defining Vladek’s relationship to Anja’s memory after the war. These
emotional ties consume Vladek’s day-to-day life, even after his wife’s death.
As Vladek tells Art, “Anja? What is to tell? Everywhere I look I’m seeing
Anja” (Spiegelman 263). Vladek’s consuming thoughts of Anja echo his
unconscious, consuming thoughts of his war experiences. While he is not
consciously thinking about the Holocaust, his behavior suggests his constant
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awareness of his memories. The present-day interactions between Vladek
and Art help readers understand that some of Vladek’s behaviors in the
United States are leftover Holocaust survival mechanisms. This behavior
ranges from meticulously counting pills to picking up scraps of telephone
wire (Spiegelman 28, 118). Vladek’s habitualization of previously “strange”
behavior shows his normalization of what happened to him during the war.
These behaviors, present in every facet of his life in America, rhyme with

Vladek’s constant pining for Anja. Both are on his mind, always. For Vladek,
Anja’s memory represents how he simultaneously internalizes and dismisses
the trauma of his Holocaust memories.
Vladek’s Holocaust trauma plays an integral role in understanding Art
and his relationship to his parents and their war experiences. As a child
of Holocaust survivors, Art is inadvertently placed in a difficult familial
situation. The effect of living through the Holocaust changed the whole
course of Anja and Vladek’s lives and affected different facets of what would
become their post-war personalities. However, Art did not live through
these same experiences. The traumas of the Holocaust, so integral to the
“founding” of the Spiegelman family, are something that Art can have no
first-hand experience with (Elmwood 691). At the same time, the Holocaust
still affects so much of Art’s life. This complicated tangle of memory and its
effects comprises what Marianne Hirsch, a professor and scholar of memory
studies, terms “postmemory,” which “characterizes the experience of those
who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own
belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the previous generation that
can be neither understood nor recreated” (416). Grappling with postmemory
defines Art as a character, as he imagined Zyklon B, a lethal chemical used
in the showers of Auschwitz, coming out of his own shower as a child
(Spiegelman 176). Attempting to process his family trauma is at the core of
Art’s relationship to both Anja and the Holocaust.
Reflecting the incomplete nature of postmemory, Art sees Anja’s memory
as a puzzle, one he must piece together to make sense of his own self. Art,
without explicitly expressing his motivations, turns to interviewing his father
to begin solving this puzzle. However, Art had spent his entire childhood
and adolescence without sparing much thought for the Holocaust. What,
then, was the catalyst for his decision to learn more about it? Art’s inability
to process his mother’s suicide is what propels him to try and understand
his family’s past. As Stephen Tabachnick, a scholar specializing in graphic
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novels, observes, “Spiegelman does not discuss openly the trade-off between
Anja’s suicide and his desperate need to write Maus” (11-12). Art’s silence
surrounding aspects of Anja’s death speaks of confusion and a lack of an
ability to process what happened. Suffocating between the postmemory of
his parents’ time in Auschwitz and the stark reality of his mother’s suicide,
Art turns to his namesake, art, to focus. Attempting to grapple with the
memory of his mother and all it represents, Art is propelled into the world

of art in order to heal and process from his familial trauma (Tabachnick
11). This act of attempting to understand the past represents another facet
of postmemory, in which the next generation must work to understand
and frame their relationships to the trauma of the past (Adams 231). In an
attempt to bear this burden, Art, as a second-generation child of Holocaust
survivors, decides to process his mother’s death and the Holocaust through
art. Mediating postmemory through art becomes an act of survival. Art’s
pressing need to piece together his family’s past in order to understand
his present has become tied to his ability to understand Anja’s memory. By
choosing to frame his relationship to the past through art, Art reinforces
his relationship to Anja’s memory as symbolic of his relationship to the
Holocaust. Art’s memories of his mother, although almost debilitating in
their guilt, become both the catalyst for Art’s understanding of the Holocaust
and the end goal for Art’s exploratory process.
Fortunately for Art, through the unfolding of events, Anja’s suicide
eventually becomes a topic of discussion with Vladek. This conversation,
along with Vladek’s shared memories of Anja, help Art to start processing the
“the chief trauma” of his life: Anja’s death (Morris 29). However, reflecting the
role of postmemory in his life, Art needs an intermediary to understand both
events. For that, he turns to his father. Anja’s role as a symbol of postmemory
and Art’s relationship to the Holocaust is emphasized by the relationship
between Art and Vladek during their interview sessions. Vladek serves as a
mediator between Art and the memories of Anja’s death and the Holocaust.
This role is essential because Art is unable to understand the past without
someone to tell him what has occurred. Interestingly, Art’s conceptions of
how he relates to the Holocaust differ from this viewpoint. Consciously, Art
tends to link the Holocaust with his father, not his mother. He often lumps
the two together, as when he tells his wife, Françoise: “I mean, I can’t even
make any sense out of my relationship with my father . . . How am I supposed
to make any sense out of Auschwitz? . . . of the Holocaust?” (Spiegelman
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174). Art, by making explicit verbal connections between his father and the
Holocaust, seems to see his father as a symbol of memory. Since Vladek is
telling Art his Holocaust narrative, Art’s connection seems natural. However,
Vladek functions as a conduit for understanding Anja, who represents Art’s
relationship to Holocaust. This is underscored by the fact that “Vladek is not
portrayed as a survivor who needs to talk about his past, it is rather the son,
Artie, who needs to listen” (Martínez-Alfaro 139). Art is the one with the
need to find out what happened, to discover the memories that defined him
since his birth. Vladek, on the other hand, is not demanding attention to his
Holocaust narrative. He is merely answering Art’s questions, helping him to
satiate his need to understand his mother and the Holocaust. Art’s hunger
to understand, to solve the puzzle of Anja’s memory, is further emphasized
by how the interviews with Vladek began. Art tells his father, “Start with
Mom . . . tell me how you met” (Spiegelman 14). By needing Vladek to tell
him about Anja, Art is linking his mother’s memory to that of postmemory.
This emphasizes Anja, not Vladek, as a symbol of Art’s relationship to the
Holocaust, a puzzle that must first have its pieces found through the role of
a mediator.
The complicated relationships between Art, Vladek, Anja, and the
memory of the Holocaust demonstrate how the weight of past atrocities still
affects those living in the present. In so many aspects of Art and Vladek’s
lives, Anja permeates their conscious and unconscious decisions. Her
memory symbolizes the profound longing, idealization, and guilt that Art
and Vladek feel towards her, and the past, during the entirety of Maus. Her
legacy looms, specter-like, over every aspect of the narrative, lingering in
the lives of her surviving family members. For Vladek, his wife typifies the
unreachable past—a past infused with longing but tempered by the reality
of the horrors of the Holocaust and Anja’s death. Vladek’s remembrance
of Anja also shows how he relates to his Holocaust memories, through
suppression and avoidance. Affected by his parent’s past, Art, a generation
later, tries to make sense of his family’s experiences and how they have
impacted his own life. For Art, Anja’s memory is like a puzzle, something to
be discovered and pieced together. This investigative aspect is characteristic
of post-memory and permeates the whole of Maus. Art must also come to
grips with his guilt towards his mother’s suicide and the Holocaust, along
with feelings of resentment towards the impact they have had on his life.
Lacking definitive answers about how to process his past, Art must come
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to his own conclusions about how to relate to his mother and the Holocaust.
Despite both being impacted by the same person, the Spiegelman men
each have a different approach to Anja and the Holocaust, processing and
managing their memories of painful experiences in different ways. Memory,
understood and handled so differently, is a powerful driving force, shaping
both the lives of Vladek and Art and the narrative trajectory of Maus.
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“Something Large and
Old Awoke”1
Ecopoetics and Compassion in Tracy K.
Smith’s Wade in the Water

Kaitlin Hoelzer

Both historical and contemporary Black poets

have used their work to identify and condemn problems stemming from
racism in American society, as well as to suggest solutions to these problems.
Indeed, as Arnold Rampersad notes in his introduction to The Oxford
Anthology of African American Poetry, many Black poets use “poetry as a
vehicle of protest against social injustice in America” (xxiv). Art is inherently
political, even when its arguments do not overtly engage in political debates.
As Lorraine Hansberry argues, all art is rooted in a particular social and
political consciousness. The choice is “not whether one will make a social
statement in one’s work—but only what the statement will say” (5). According
to these Black theorists, in order to fully understand any piece of art, readers
must understand the social and political context of the work.

Criterion

Pulitzer Prize winner and former U.S. Poet Laureate Tracy K. Smith’s
work is often understood in terms of its formal and aesthetic qualities rather
than its political components. However, the two are actually interconnected—
Smith’s formal and aesthetic choices serve to support her political arguments.
Her fourth volume of poetry, Wade in the Water: Poems (2018), examines racial
and environmental injustice, participating in what Katherine R. Lynes has
termed “African American reclamation ecopoetics.” Whereas ecocriticism

has traditionally focused on pastoral aesthetics, Black critics like Lynes,
Angela Hume, Camille Dungy, and others have expanded ecopoetics to
address environmental degradation and the structural oppressions that
connect environmental damage with ongoing racial injustice through both
formal and thematic elements (Lynes 51). The critical ecopoetic tradition has
failed to recognize and address the ways in which Black poets connect racial
injustice to environmental degradation in their ecopoetry. Often, scholars
identify Black poets who write about nature simply as poets writing about
race, ignoring their themes of nature. While race undoubtedly informs the
work of Black nature poets, analyzing these poems from the perspective of
race alone erases the connection of environmental degradation and racial
injustice addressed in the poems and thus perpetuates this violence. Black
poets, such as Robert Hayden, Melvin Dixon, Tiana Clark, Claudia Rankine,
and Lucille Clifton, have often been particularly sensitive to the connections
between these injustices, having seen both racial violence and environmental
degradation in their communities. African American reclamation ecopoetics
is “a protest of human injustices to both other humans and nonhuman nature”
and is a strong part of the contemporary Black poetic tradition (Lynes 55).
My paper will discuss Smith’s examination of the connection between
environmental degradation and racial injustice as well as her response
to these issues with a call for compassion for all humanity as well as the
natural world. In doing so, I will situate Smith’s work in a particular Black
conversation about restorative justice, demonstrating how her focus on
compassion extends contemporary African American reclamation ecopoetics.
Many prominent Black liberation theorists and activists, including bell hooks,
Brittney Cooper, and Charlene Carruthers, have noted the importance of
what they call love, solidarity, empathy, community, and compassion in
movements for social justice. They identify a feeling for others that respects
differences, motivates people toward liberation for all, and does not shy
away from reality as being vital to any successful liberation movement. I will
98

Winter 2021

use the term “compassion,” which literally means “to feel with,” to describe
this revolutionary feeling. Wade in the Water identifies the link between racial
injustice and environmental degradation, and readers are “confronted by the
real, / By the cold, the pitiless, the bleak” (lines 7–8). At the same time, Smith’s
book is also infused with a compassion that provides optimism in the face of
oppression and a potential tool for healing. The poems “Watershed,” “Wade
in the Water,” and “An Old Story” in particular draw attention to the damage

done to both the environment and Black people in America, countering
these injustices with a compassion that both Smith and other theorists see as
essential to dismantling unjust systems and bringing about healing.

African American
Reclamation Ecopoetics in
Wade in the Water

Contemporary conversations about Black nature poetry are beginning to
address the intersection between race and the environment in what has
become known as African American reclamation ecopoetics,2 though this
important theoretical understanding has yet to be applied to Smith’s work.
Attention to racial injustice, environmental degradation, and the ways in
which these issues overlap is present throughout Wade in the Water, making
it part of the African American reclamation ecopoetic tradition. Smith’s
poems “Watershed,” “Wade in the Water,” and “An Old Story” synthesize
issues of both environmental and racial injustice, illustrating the connection
between the two.
“Watershed” is an African American reclamation ecopoem that uses long
lists and global imagery to reveal the overarching system that creates both
environmental degradation and racial injustice. Pulling lines and phrases
from a 2016 New York Times Magazine article titled “The Lawyer Who Became
DuPont’s Worst Nightmare” as well as excerpts from narratives of survivors
of near-death experiences, “Watershed” tells the story of a single instance
of environmental degradation, but also universalizes the DuPont chemical
crisis to argue that incidents of pollution and other environmental damage
are indicators of an overall system that disregards the health and safety of
both land and people. The poem opens with descriptions of the effects of
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the chemical perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which caused “deranged”
and “skinny” cattle with “hair missing,” “brilliant chemical blue” eyes,
“malformed hooves,” and “lesions” and that are recorded as “suffering
slobbering / staggering like drunks” (lines 10, 20, 21, 23, 27–28). These
horrifying descriptions come in short, disjointed phrases, illustrating the
disturbing way the symptoms quickly cropped up in farmers’ cattle, and are
repeated throughout the poem. Smith tells the story of one tragic occurrence
of environmental degradation in lurid detail, thereby illustrating the dire
consequences of such careless actions.
Compared with more traditional ecopoetry, the images of environmental
horror in “Watershed” may seem out of place. However, Camille Dungy, a
Black nature poet in her own right and editor of the anthology Black Nature:
Four Centuries of African American Nature Poetry, writes that the category of
ecopoetry must be expanded beyond the “placid and pastoral tradition,”
noting that “as we advance our view of what it means to interact with the
natural world and include conversations about environmental justice, ecology,
and historically-informed environmental practices, there will be more room
for nature poetry that might be viewed as politically-charged, historicallybased, culturally-engaged” (762). Smith’s work enters this expanded region
of ecopoetics, using nature poetry as a way to make an argument about
the oppressive structures that create environmental degradation and racial
injustice. “Watershed” makes it clear that ecopoetry is far more expansive
than has been recognized, acknowledging not just the beauty of the natural
world but also the dangers it faces.
Smith moves beyond chronicling a single event as she describes the
global problem PFOA has become and introduces a chorus of voices affirming
the importance of protecting the environment. “Watershed” details PFOA’s
widespread effect on livestock, wildlife, and plants through contamination
of the water table in long lists. One section reads,
PFOA detected in:
		

…

		

blood or vital organs of:

			Atlantic salmon
			swordfish
			striped mullet
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			gray seals
			common cormorants
			

Alaskan polar bears

			brown pelicans
			sea turtles
			sea eagles
			

California sea lions

			

Laysan albatrosses on a

				

wildlife refuge in the

				

middle of the North

				

Pacific Ocean (lines 130–46)

PFOA has been found in water and animals throughout the world, making
it a global concern. The global imagery of “Watershed” demonstrates that
single instances of environmental degradation are part of a larger attitude

that is dismissive of the environment.

“Watershed” also pays careful attention to the ways PFOA has affected

the human population, arguing that individual environmental problems not

only indicate a larger disregard for the environment but also a disregard for

the common humanity of oppressed populations. PFOA is toxic to humans,

and through contamination of blood transfusions and drinking water, it
has caused birth defects, cancer, eye problems, vomiting, and fever (lines

67–76, 115–19, 123–26). Angela Davis and Macarena Gómez-Barris assert

that extractive capitalism creates the need to dominate the land, stripping
it of salable resources and contaminating it with the toxic byproducts of

production (Davis 163; Gómez-Barris xvii). Thus, environmental damage is

a symptom of a worldview that disregards the land in favor of domination

and profit. Further, Black people are particularly threatened by the systems of

domination and oppression created by extractive capitalism, and “Watershed”
recognizes the “long history of environmental subjugation in which nature
is contaminated by past acts of racial violence” as well as the fact that slave

patrols, lynchings, and police brutality often make it unsafe to be outdoors

as a Black person (Hume 80; Dungy 761). The environmental damage caused
by extractive capitalism is tied to the historical and current domination and
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exploitation of Black people through slavery, which was one of the earliest
manifestations of extractive capitalism. Thus, the poem’s condemnation of
DuPont’s individual actions calls for a justice that acknowledges the worth
and freedom of Black people and all humans as well as the earth.
Spliced alongside these chilling descriptions and separated by italics are
narratives of near-death experiences that call for better care for the earth and
those who inhabit it, which continues to frame this problem not as an isolated

incident but a global issue. In the poem, those near death are “swept away
by some unknown force” and realize that “every individual thing glowed
with life” and that the earth “is a true living being” that “has been weakened
considerably” (lines 35–36, 79, 109). In “Watershed,” the earth seizes people
near death and demands better treatment. Those near death see the world as
interconnected and interdependent, representing the way in which individual
environmental threats become global problems. The near-death experiences
additionally draw connections between environmental degradation and
harm to human populations. Those near death recount seeing “the myriad
human faces with an incredible, intimate, and profound love” (line 147),
extending the imperative to protect the earth to other humans as well. In
this way, “Watershed” asserts the need to treat both the environment and all
people, especially the marginalized, with justice and dignity.
“Wade in the Water” also exposes the violence that extractive capitalism
inflicts on both Black people and the land by evoking slavery. Smith wrote
this poem after seeing the Geechee Gullah Ring Shouters perform. At first
glance, “Wade in the Water” seems to be about a lively performance with
“handclaps” and “stomps” (lines 13–14); however, the dance in question
has a tragic history that recounts the enslavement of the dancers’ ancestors.
Geechee Gullah, which is the area along the Atlantic coast that includes
parts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, also refers
to the enslaved people who once worked there in cotton, rice, and indigo
fields as well as the unique language and art that evolved in this isolated
region (“The Gullah Geechee”). The Geechee Gullah Ring Shouters perform
dances and songs created when their ancestors were enslaved in this region.
The “rusted iron / Chains someone was made / To drag” (lines 15–17) are
not simply an artful metaphor, but are the literal history of Geechee Gullah
dance. Smith describes the beauty of the dance causing “a terrible new ache”
and “scraping at / Each throat” (lines 4, 25–26)—feelings caused by beauty’s
juxtaposition with the horrors of slavery that inform Geechee Gullah dance.
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“Wade in the Water” demonstrates that the environmental degradation
exposed in “Watershed” is rooted in extractive capitalism’s long history of
slavery, domination, and exploitation. Extractive capitalism relies not just
on domination of the land, but also on an underclass of exploited laborers,
created by the historical enslavement and disenfranchisement of African
and Indigenous populations and maintained by modern-day anti-Black
racism (Davis 163; Gómez-Barris xvii–xviii). The acknowledgement of the

legacy that slavery has left in the United States in “Wade in the Water” can
be linked to environmental degradation. This legacy of human and natural
plunder is depicted in the poem as the dancers pretend to wade in the water,
invoking the water that carried enslaved people from Africa to the Geechee
Gullah region. Like the descriptions of the claps and stomps in the dance, the
image of water connects the performance to the injustices caused by slavery;
however, this description of “the water / Where they pretended to wade”
(lines 20–21) in particular also allows the poem to hint at the environmental
degradation discussed in more detail elsewhere in the book.
In “Wade in the Water,” the Atlantic Ocean is metaphorically tainted
by the forcible importation of enslaved Africans. With the knowledge that
extractive capitalism created slavery, it follows that the waters of the world
also have been and will continue to be literally threatened by the careless
environmental practices of extractive capitalism. In Unapologetic: A Black,
Queer, and Feminist Mandate for Radical Movements, community organizer
Charlene A. Carruthers asserts that “capitalism, patriarchy, anti-Blackness,
and white supremacy work together to destroy people and the land we
depend on. . . . We see this collusion in extraction of land and exploitation of
people” (113–14). This collusion is evident in the context of slavery expressed
in “Wade in the Water;” plantation slavery relied on unethical practices
towards both human life and agriculture. Like other Black nature poems,
“Wade in the Water” “register[s] the structural forces and forms of power that
both racialize and subject raced bodies and environments to degradation
and violence” (Hume 80). Therefore, “Wade in the Water” participates in
the tradition of African American reclamation ecopoetics by articulating
an understanding of the ways in which extractive capitalism links both
environmental degradation and racial injustice.
“An Old Story” closes Smith’s book with a haunting image of the
devastation caused by domination and exploitation of both the land and
Black bodies in the United States, therein arguing that these inextricably
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linked injustices are structural, not individual. The poem voices a land that is

“livid” and “ravaged” and a people whose “every hate [has] swollen to a kind

of epic wind” (lines 3–4), describing the damage done to both the earth and
humans as “the worst in us . . . taken over” (line 5). “An Old Story” asserts

that individual beliefs become codified by the dominant group, making the
individual “hate” swell to “epic” proportions, cementing a structural injustice

in the United States that is more far-reaching than any one individual’s action.

That the poem presents the end of the world as something that involves both

structural environmental degradation and institutionalized human hatred

argues that when racial injustice goes unchecked, so does environmental

degradation, and vice versa. Because environmental degradation and racial
injustice “work together,” these oppressions multiply for Black people

(Carruthers 113). Black people not only face the daily threat of racial violence,
but also are more likely to live in areas where the environment is poor, due

to environmentally harmful governmental policies and corporate actions

that disproportionately affect poor communities of color (Cole and Foster

10–11, 54–58; Hume 83). “An Old Story” asserts the structural nature of the
problems of environmental degradation and racial injustice.

Like “Watershed” and “Wade in the Water,” “An Old Story” connects

racial injustice and environmental degradation; however, “An Old Story”
points this conversation toward future possibilities for compassionate change.

The “swollen” hate and “ravaged” land build upon each other until they are

countered with people taking “new stock” of each other and the land (lines

3–4, 14). “An Old Story” thus outlines the coming problems society will face

if oppressive systems are not replaced by systems of justice and compassion.

In this way, the poem reflects Lynes’s argument that African American

reclamation ecopoetics take responsibility for the future, “demand[ing]

stewardship of nature . . . and, in a manner of speaking, of other humans” (55).

“An Old Story,” while condemning the injustices of the past, is also forwardlooking, seeking to rectify past problems of environmental degradation

and racial injustice in order to build a more equitable future for all. Scholar

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor similarly notes that racism in the United States is

not only about Black people, but is a symptom of a broader unjust system,

writing, “When Black people get free, everyone gets free, [and] Black people

in America cannot ‘get free’ alone. In that sense, Black liberation is bound

up with the project of human liberation and social transformation” (194).
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Reading Smith in this light, her poems seek to enact “human liberation and
social transformation” that will create compassionate societal structures.

Compassion in Tracy K.
Smith’s Ecopoetics

Wade in the Water contends that neither racial nor environmental injustices can

be defeated without compassion. Indeed, the book underscores compassion

as a force for liberation, justice, and healing, therein also offering a new

way of envisioning the focus on the future of African American reclamation

ecopoetics. In so doing, Smith echoes what other Black women theorists of

liberation, including bell hooks, Brittney Cooper, and Charlene Carruthers,
have said as they center compassion as the foundation of any movement for

restorative justice. They, like Smith, assert that compassion leads to community,
enabling more effective resistance movements because it disavows hierarchy

and acknowledges the problems people face, creating mutual respect in which
all movements’ members are supported in their differences.

“Watershed,” “Wade in the Water,” and “An Old Story” in particular

emphasize compassion as a weapon in the battle for human dignity and

justice. These poems do not suggest that one should ignore the reality of

injustice or rely on trite calls to “just love everyone” as the solution to

systemic problems; rather, they pair compassion with an acknowledgement

of ecological disaster and racist violence, because compassion requires

that one acknowledges the injustice of the past and present in order to find
healing in the future. Nor are calls for compassion a way to avoid concrete

action, because “feeling with” requires both individual and collective work.

Bell hooks’s two books on compassion argue that compassion does not mean
ignoring difficult realities, but instead “allows us to confront these negative

realities in a manner that is life-affirming and life-enhancing” (All About Love

139). Thus, compassion, in the sense Smith and other Black theorists use it,
motivates care and community to combat injustice and in turn creates a more
equitable future.

For instance, “Watershed” demonstrates the way compassion creates

recognition of and care for others in its use of quotations from near-death
experiences juxtaposed with the story of DuPont’s pollution. These quotes
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articulate the speakers’ realization of the importance of compassion; near
the end of the poem, the speakers say, “Viewing the myriad human faces
with an incredible, intimate, and profound love. . . . All that was made, said,
done, or even thought without love was undone. . . . It was experiencing the
luminous warm water that I felt the most connection with the eternal” (lines
147, 154, 158–59). In “Watershed,” it is not the story of DuPont that inspires
the love the poem’s speakers feel. Rather, their epiphanies of compassion

provide a counterpoint to DuPont’s actions, arguing that seeing “the myriad
human faces” with compassion leads to a revolution in the way humans treat
each other. One speaker’s inclusion of “the luminous warm water” in their
revelation of compassion extends this care to all of nature. In “Watershed,”
compassion allows people to recognize and work to end wrongdoing.
Systems of oppression like extractive capitalism and white supremacy thrive
on a disregard for the well-being of others (hooks, Salvation 9–10), whereas
compassion brings “clarity” that “tells us what kind of world we want to see”
(Cooper 93–97, 273). Compassion, then, is a foundational force to combat
systems of oppression, because it creates care for others and turns such care
into action toward concrete change.
Furthermore, the multitude of unidentified voices in “Watershed”
creates a communal chorus that invites compassion. The poem pulls lines
from many different people affected by the DuPont crisis and places them
alongside the thoughts from those who have had near-death experiences
quoted above to form this chorus. Smith does not assign the characteristics of
race, class, gender, or sexuality to the plurality of voices she includes, instead
leaving them anonymous. This plurality suggests a need for solidarity
across the traditional boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexuality, or,
in other words, true compassion for the self and the other—a “concern for
the collective good” (hooks, All About Love 97–98). This call resonates with
other contemporary calls, revealing Smith’s collection to be part of a larger
national conversation about the role of compassionate community in social
movements. For example, the Black Lives Matter mission statement declares
their ultimate goal of “co-creating alongside comrades, allies, and family
a culture where each person feels seen, heard, and supported” (“What We
Believe”). Social movements must combat the multiplicity of oppression
under the combination of white supremacy, patriarchy, and extractive
capitalism with a tool equally able to connect “the myriad human faces”
across race, class, gender, and sexuality. Compassion is that tool, for it moves
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people toward solidarity and community while addressing the reality of
past harms. In the same way systems of domination create a complex web
that links racial violence with sexism, homophobia, and environmental
degradation, “Watershed” illustrates that compassion can create structures
in which every person and the environment is supported and respected.
In “Wade in the Water,” the repetition of the phrase “I love you” works
to underscore compassionate community and elevate compassion as a

liberatory force. Smith describes one of the Geechee Gullah Ring Shouters
greeting her by saying, “I love you” (line 2). The woman repeats “I love you”
again and again “as she continued / Down the hall past other strangers”
(lines 7–9). In the poem, though the group does not know one another, they
are “pierced suddenly / By pillars of heavy light” (lines 10–11). Carruthers
argues that “liberation is a collective effort” (25) and therefore, “eradicating
oppression requires us to identify connections” (32) and “[value] people
enough to believe we can be transformed” (56). The performers’ insistence
on love manifests Carruthers’ appeal for collective support. As they declare
compassion, the performers create a meaningful connection with the diverse
audience. The poem’s declaration of love to a group of strangers, like the
multiplicity of voices in “Watershed,” demonstrates the way compassion can
create community, connecting people despite their differences.
The repeated refrain of “I love you” accentuates compassion’s creation
of community, but also demonstrates the way compassion promotes care for
the self, which is key to any revolutionary activity. “I love you” is repeated
throughout the description of the performance, and this repetition among
the Geechee Gullah descendant performers as they dance together voices
their love for their community and thus implies that they love themselves
as part of that community as well. They embody hooks’s emphasis that
marginalized groups must shake off the self-hatred dominant power
structures have instilled in them in order to find liberation, performing a
compassion that identifies both the self and the other as worthy of love
(Salvation 7–8, 41–66). Compassion for the self, for one’s community, and for
strangers makes resistance possible by providing support systems.3 Because
of this repetition of “I love you” to both strangers and Geechee Gullah
descendants, every other action in the poem is inflected by the diverse
community compassion creates.
“Wade in the Water” personifies compassion, arguing that compassion
itself has the power to temper injustice and loose chains. Compassion is
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infused “throughout / The performance,” manifesting itself “in every /
Handclap, every stomp,” in “rusted iron / Chains,” and “in the water” (lines
12–16, 20). As compassion pierces the scene with light, the “rusted iron /
Chains” of racial injustice and environmental degradation are “unclasped
and left empty” (lines 16–18). This image clearly communicates the immense
power compassion has to combat injustice—it is compassion itself, not any
individual, that breaks the chains. hooks notes that compassion roots out

“obsession with power and domination” and instead cultivates the idea that
“everyone has the right to be free, to live fully and well” (All About Love 87).
“Wade in the Water” echoes this sentiment. Further, in the poem, compassion
“drag[s] us to those banks / And cast[s] us in” as well as pushes itself into
each audience member, “scraping at / Each throat” (lines 23–25). “Wade in
the Water” mimics a baptism and confirmation by the hand of compassion.
That compassion itself performs these actions again illustrates its potency in
resisting oppression. Compassion is not merely the motivator of liberation, it
is the liberator itself.
The book’s final poem, “An Old Story,” invokes a creation myth of
sorts to offer a vision of healing through compassion and argue that the
structures of the world must be reimagined. “An Old Story” begins with
a storm, “ravaged” land, and “swollen” hate—a picture of what the world
might become if the twin oppressions of racial and environmental injustice
are left unchecked. Eventually, however, “something / Large and old awoke”
(lines 2–3, 4, 10–11). This force causes the people in the story to “[take] new
stock of one another,” begin to sing together, and “[weep] to be reminded of
such color” (lines 11, 14–15). The “large and old” force coming back to life
after being suppressed by hatred and destruction can be read as compassion,
which reminds people of the brilliant and varied “colors” of the world. This
awakening of compassion also brings healing to the ravaged land, replacing
the storms with “a different manner of weather” and coaxing “animals long
believed gone… down / From trees” (12–14). Of “An Old Story,” Smith
has written, “I wrote this poem thinking it might be nice to take a stab at
creating a new myth” that takes “the failings of the twenty-first century. . .
and fashion[s] them into a story that culminates in humankind finding its
way to a compassionate existence” (Gioia 181). The healing of relationships
between humans themselves and between humans and nature that takes
place in the poem comes from a reassessment of how the world functions
and whom it serves. This reassessment facilitates a creation of a society based
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on compassionate structures. Because “An Old Story” depicts a new society,
it demonstrates compassion’s ability to incite expansive structural change,
not merely individual transformation and community support.
In addition, this closing poem illustrates that compassion can transform
resistance movements, making them inclusive and expansive and thus more
effective at fighting the underlying systems of oppression that create myriad
forms of injustice. In “An Old Story,” compassion guides people toward

imperative structural change, and thus, the poem argues that compassion
is essential to truly remove systems of domination at their roots, rather than
focusing only on singular instances of oppression. As Akiba Solomon and
Kenrya Rankin note in their book How We Fight White Supremacy: A Field Guide
to Black Resistance, compassion is not a magical quick fix, but is a guiding force
that creates “an enduring form of resistance that is radical, expansive, and
transformative at its core” (183). The theorists discussed in this paper agree
that in order to be successful, social movements must promote structural
rather than individual change and must do so by addressing injustice in all
its forms. “An Old Story” depicts the way in which compassion gives social
movements the power and scope to dismantle oppression at its roots.

Conclusion

Near the beginning of Wade in the Water, we read, “For our own good we
have to answer / For all that has happened” (23 lines 9–10). The collection as
a whole offers up compassion as a way to answer for the injustices described
therein. Compassion is undoubtedly good for communities and landscapes
threatened by systems of injustice; however, healing the injustices caused by
white supremacy, patriarchy, and extractive capitalism benefits all members
of society. A society that functions through the exploitation and harm of
others, including Black people and the land as well as other marginalized
groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, people of color, and women of all
races, is a society that degrades all of its members, even the most powerful.
Members of dominant groups, though not affected to the same extent, are
nonetheless negatively affected by systems built on extractive capitalism,
because those systems restrict individuality and creativity while requiring
indifference to destruction and injustice. Such a society cannot remain stable
for long. Compassion, on the other hand, prioritizes justice and dignity for
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all, ending environmental degradation and racial violence, as well as the
personal restriction and moral apathy that spreads across unjust societies.
Tracy K. Smith’s book joins other contemporary Black women theorists
in offering up a vision of a compassionate society that recognizes the value
in all humanity and in the earth and that is committed to comprehensive
structural change. In her touchstone essay “Poetry is Not a Luxury,” Audre
Lorde asserts that poetry “forms the quality of light within which we

predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and change,” thus laying
“the foundations for a future of change” (224). Compassion makes the
necessity of such change clear, but it is also the tool by which that change
is accomplished. Poetry gives us a place “to hint at possibility made real”
(Lorde 225). In this vein, Wade in the Water creates a world in which to
explore the radical revolution that compassion can enact if we let it guide
our actions and institutions. Wade in the Water urges us to start cultivating
this compassionate revolution.
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Notes
1
2

Smith, Tracy K. “An Old Story.” Wade in the Water. Graywolf Press, 2018, p. 75.
See, for instance, Dungy, “On Black Nature;” Hume, “Toward an Antiracist

Ecopoetics;” and Lynes, “African American Reclamation Ecopoetics.” See also “‘The
Light That Insists on Itself in the World’: Lucille Clifton and African American
Consciousness” by Bonnie Raub in CLA Journal, vol. 51, no. 4, June 2008, pp. 356–77
as well as “Going Overboard: African American Poetic Innovation and the Middle
Passage” by Evie Shockley in Contemporary Literature, vol. 52, no. 4, 2011, pp. 791–817.
3

For more on compassion’s ability to create support systems in the face of struggle,

see Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrisse Khan-Cullors’s memoir When They Call
You A Terrorist, especially pages 5, 35–42, 67, 99, 106, 129, 138, and 164–66.
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Profitable Reading or
Literary Usury?
Interpretive Communities within and without
The Merchant of Venice

Abby Thatcher

In

The First Folio of Shakespeare (1623), John

Heminges and Henry Condell address “the great Variety of Readers” in their
editors’ preface and say, “From the most able, to him that can but spell: There
you are number’d. We had rather you were weighd. Especially when the fate
of all Bookes depends upon your capacities” (7). While Heminges and Condell
were looking to woo undecided book buyers’ coin into their coffers, the larger
truth of “all Bookes” stands: their fate does indeed depend upon the capacities
of the “Reader.” “Fate” can be defined as both its historical longevity and as
the enduring meanings and legacies of its text and characters, determined
by the interpretive community of readers that encounters the work. Thus,
over time the fate of Shylock, the Jew of Venice, as a character within and
without The Merchant of Venice (1596) is dependent upon interpretive reading
communities. As Stanley Fish’s coined interpretive communities operate by
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the more traditional reading of written texts, rather than spectating, I use the
more liberal sense of “read,” as the audience members viewing a performance
are spectators expected to bring a certain literacy to the fore and must use
similar practices to read the play on stage. “Reading” and “readers” are here
largely synonymous with “spectating” and “spectators.”
But whether readers/spectators read Shylock as the vengeful angel
of Jewish salvation, as by Hermann Sinsheimer, or as the hooked-nosed

villain with rat-like insidiousness, such as in the “Third Reich” adaptations
of Shakespeare’s work, Shylock’s cultural capital has changed in not only
quantity, but quality over critical conversations since its first performance
or its first printed appearance in the First Folio. This is rather axiomatic
for reader response theory, as interpretive communities of readers shaped
by, and in turn shaping, their cultural, social, political, and economic
moment vary from one generation of readers to the next. What is curious
is the cumulative effect of overlapping interpretive communities’ work on
each successive reading of Shylock and the reading of other cultural “texts,”
brought to bear upon the usurer’s proud figure and their unchecked, or
unquestioned, latitude as they work with Shylock’s textual body. The effect
of interpretive communities’ reading of Shylock’s Jewish form on the Jewish
populations outside the text is especially disquieting and will be addressed
herein. Through a close reading of Portia’s “close reading” of the judicial text
and contract within Act IV, scene i of The Merchant of Venice, I will argue that
communities of interpretation within the redlined ghetto of Shakespeare’s
Venice demonstrate a need for governing practices or a code of justice for
“readers” in (interpretive) power, the Christians. I will also argue towards
the text’s lack of extant governing mechanisms to control interpretations
that skew towards the oppressive and perverse in their effects. Moreover,
my argument has much to do with questions for interpretive communities
without the text, or external to the world of Shylock. I will present a case
for the much needed work still to be done within reader response critical
theory towards an ethical, generous, and ultimately just methodology of
interpreting interpretive communities other than their own.
When Shylock is summoned to the Duke’s rooms for the deliberation of
his contract with Antonio, the Duke pleads for Shylock to show forth “mercy
and remorse” (4.1.19). Later, disguised Portia waxes poetic upon mercy,
saying, “We do pray for mercy, / And that same prayer doth teach us all
to render/ The deeds of mercy. I have spoken thus much/ To mitigate the
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justice of thy plea” (4.1.195–198). Shylock’s insistent “I’ll have my bond” is his

eventual undoing. He loses his property and is forced to become a Christian,

made poor by the Christian’s court’s “justice” and Portia’s close reading of
his contract informed by her own interpretive community. Portia could not
have interpreted the text of the contract however she chose in the Christian

court, as a central premise of reader-response theory posits that “interpretive

communities are delimited by the systems of intelligibility that inform it”

(Fish 1908). As Portia belongs to and has been accepted by the interpretive

community in power, and the Christian community has established practices,
or ways, of reading their cultural and social texts, Portia reads within and for
the benefit of the community.

However, although Portia’s reading of the contract is delimited within her

community, there are few external limitations at play upon the interpretive
community and how they choose to construct meaning. For indeed, in the

words of Stanley Fish, interpretation (including his provocative claims
regarding the interpretation of the law) is not “the art of construing but the

art of constructing” (Fish 1902). While the narrative of Christian dogma and
the practice of oligarchical law would have Shylock and the doge convinced
that reading a contract in favor of the Christian right is right (as the court

of Venice is filled with more rhetoric from the pulpit than the magistrate’s
bench), Shylock from the beginning operates from an interpretive deficit, as

he seeks to decode the contract, while Portia the Christian lawyer seeks to

make the law. In addition, elements of the interpretive community itself—its

power, its size, and its socioeconomic and political largesse—make its reading
more potent, its constructed claims more “valid” and therefore heighten the

sociopolitical impotency of the minority community, the Jewish people of

Venice. Therefore, Portia’s reading of the text prevails and enables a practice
of the law that leaves Shylock stripped of dignity and faith. Further, there

seems to be little care given to the effect of such a close reading upon Shylock

at the end of the play. The Christian interpretive community acts more as a

fraternity or brotherhood than an objective and merely differing ideological

group. Thus, it seems that communities of interpretation within the play
lack an effective structure that mediates competing readings of texts and

demonstrates how structures of oppression can be leveraged within large,
majority interpretive communities upon minority interpretive communities

with devastating effect.
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Christians within the world of The Merchant of Venice had been taught
to “read” a Jew as hostile, evil, opportunistic, and cunning and to read his
being outside of the Jewish ghetto as transgressive; Shylock becomes many
Shylocks in one to a given Christian, as they unfairly bring to bear external
contexts or “texts” when they encounter the actual character in the Venetian
marketplace. Thus, Shylock’s turn as the villain within the play is aided by
characters’ readings of him in their interactions: called “the Jew” more times

than “Shylock,” the fictional Venetians’ reading leaves the merchant socially
poor. To read Shylock in the 21st century, a reader may turn to the trauma and
tragedy of the Shoah, anti-Semitic attacks and slurs in use during the 20th
century, the current state of economic and political conflict between Israel
and Palestine, and each successive iteration of Shylock on stage (Bassi; Oz).
Interpretive communities, reading by overlaying the accumulation of the
past on the present text, bring new “museums” of Shylocks to bear as they
construct the Shylock of their moment (Kennedy, 196). As in Jay L. Halio’s
article on Shylock’s multiplicity of characters, within one figure being a
“singing [of] chords” rather than one-dimensioned monophonic lines, the
reader writes and hears chords of their own making as they engage the play
each successive time (Halio). These chords are built from cultural texts that
postdate Shylock’s original production but still manage to shape his “birth”
to new viewers in each (re)production. These cultural texts act as corrective
blueprints to the community’s response. Any additional text drawn upon in
the reading of the first shifts the reader’s perception of it. For example, using
the cultural text of the Shoah to reread Shylock as a fully fleshed and fully
persecuted victim is to “correct” and reconstruct readings of the past that
would place Shylock fully as a villain.
These blueprints to correct Shylock’s meaning within and without the
play are increasingly problematic the further given interpretive communities
stray from the original text, leaving minority communities more vulnerable
to hostile interpretive communities’ unjust readings and actions. For example,
in Nazi Germany, Reichskulturkammer censorship imposed limitations upon
both the text itself and, as a result, readers’ interactions and reactions to
Shylock’s world. In 1942, lines that sought to humanize Jews such as the
performance of “Hath not a Jew eyes?” (3.1.49) “fell to the Reich Dramaturg’s
blue pencil” and were cut from Heinrich Schlosser’s production of The
Merchant of Venice in Erfurt (Bonnell 147). This “sanitized version” became
standard throughout much of the rest of Germany during the war; it seems
118

Winter 2021

“a Jew could not be allowed to lay claim to humanity in Germany” (Bonnell
147). Similarly, in Hermann Kroepelin’s Merchant during the same period
in Berlin, Jessica was rewritten as Shylock’s “adopted” daughter who was
stolen away from her Christian parents at birth and has been longing to
return to her rightful place among the “Aryan” elite (Bonnell 144–45). Thus,
the majority interpretive community manipulates through “corrective”
cultural texts the body of text, and consequently, the body of Shylock. Further,
such an interpretation acted as oppressive propaganda for the minority
communities of the “Third Reich,” including the Jews of Berlin, Warsaw,
and Munich. When Shylock is persecuted as a result of his interpretation of
the law, and Portia and the Christian’s majority interpretation of the law is
allowed to run rampant upon his body and faith, such effects seem distanced
and, well, fictional. A fictional court lacking mechanisms of checked power
upon interpretive communities coming against others is impotent upon the
page; a real court lacking mechanisms of checked power upon interpretive
communities resulted in dreadful theory used to construct and validate
inhumane practice.
Curiously, for a text that seems to yield immense harvests for the virulent
anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, The Merchant of Venice did not lay claim to
many audiences during the “Third Reich” period. Although it was the third
most frequently performed Shakespeare play from September 1929 to January
1933, by August 1944 when theatres shut down, The Merchant had slipped to
ninth-most performed play, with a total of thirty-three performances from
February 1933 to August 1944 (Bonnell, 143–44). Critic Andrew Bonnell
attributes such a drastic decline in popularity to Shakespeare’s “endow[ing]
his Shylock with an ineradicable kernel of humanity . . . The play ultimately
proved harder for the propagandists of genocidal anti-Jewish ideology to
instrumentalize than . . . might be assumed” (174). As the stereotype is but the
accumulation of shared interpretive community memory synthesized into
recurring and homogenized figuration, the successful playing of Shylock as
a negative stereotype depends upon the buy-in of interpretive communities
to the shared memory.
Dennis Kennedy’s “memory machine” of theatre is useful here, as he
argues that theatre acts as a machine that constructs, deconstructs, and then
constructs again memories for its audience members (Kennedy). But rather
than providing the “memory machine” of Nazi Germany’s Merchant with
easily stereotypable fodder, Shakespeare’s original Shylock upon the page
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resists and subverts the machine and its interpretive communities. Shylock
resignified as a cold-hearted villain both on and off the stage is countered by
Shylock’s resistance to the interpretive community’s transactive reading. The
text remains firm that a Jew “hath eyes . . . [and] hands, organs, dimensions,
senses, affections, passions” (3.1.49–51).
The resilience of Shylock’s character suggests that the author is not dead
as the reader-response critical community necessitates she be, or that, at

the very least, the text as blueprint resists additional “texts” as correctives.
Thus, in transactional reader response, not all “texts” are equally valuable,
or more correctly, not all additional interpretive texts yield as great a
return upon interpretive community investment as others. While the text
that Shakespeare originally penned represents an investment with infinite
returns, the interpretive community stretches thin the line between profitable
reading and literary usury when they engage in the practice of making unjust
critical close readings—if unjust is using “texts” that manipulate Shylock
grotesquely beyond his original textual bearing—that unfairly enrich the
interpretive community in power while leaving the original text, character,
and representative minority interpretive community poor. Ultimately, at the
end of centuries of reading and rereading coupled with the accumulated,
overlaid memories of all “texts” deemed relevant internally by interpretive
communities in power, Shylock the character is left much as he is within
the play: poor, manipulated beyond his own form and expressed desires,
puppeted to say words he does not wish, without mercy from those who
have benefitted from his continual literary fall, and (sometimes) baptized
into movements to which he has no loyalty.
What to do, then, for regulating or governing external mechanisms for
interpretive communities? Wolfgang Iser asked of Fish’s work on interpretive
communities, “If there is no subjectivist element in reading, how on earth
does Professor Fish account for different interpretations of one and the same
text?” (Fish 1898). While critics continue to grapple with Iser’s question,
and warrantably so, I ask a further question of reader-response interpretive
communities and varying interpretations: accounting for different
interpretations of one and the same text as a given reality, how does one
mediate the resultant practices from varying and conflicting interpretations,
especially as they negatively affect minority communities? Regardless of
reading regulations within an interpretive community, is there such a thing
as a “just” reading without and among varying interpretive communities?
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Perhaps the question should be framed more pointedly: how do interpretive
communities read justly? Mercifully? As Portia says, perhaps it is “mercy
[that should] season justice” (4.1.192), in our reading of Shylock, and in our
interactions with differing interpretive communities. Whichever “quality”
we land upon in constructing the meaning of “just” or “merciful,” readerresponse criticism requires further discussion and careful thinking, for
much is at stake. We must also “consider this:/ That in the course of justice
none of us/ Should see salvation” (4.1.193–95). Hath not a reader-response
critic eyes? Perhaps the time has come to direct them towards the structural
inequalities extant among interpretive communities, to break down the
systems of oppression and damning interpretations that so harmed Shylock
and may, if we are not just and merciful, harm us.
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“Useful Delusions”
Tracing the Flying Africans in Ta-Nehisi
Coates’s The Water Dancer and Colson
Whitehead’s The Underground Railroad

Emily Stephens

And Toby sighed the ancient words that were a dark promise. He said them all

around to the others in the field under the whip, “ . . . buba yali . . . buba tambe . . . ”

There was a great outcry. The bent backs straighted up. Old and young who were

called slaves and could fly joined hands. Say like they would ring-sing. But they

didn’t shuffle in a circle. They didn’t sing. They rose on the air. They flew in a flock
that was black against the heavenly blue. Black crows or black shadows. It didn’t
matter, they went so high. Way above the plantation, way over the slavery land. Say

they flew away to Free-dom. (Hamilton 171)
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There

is a popular Black American folktale

about a tribe of Africans who, upon becoming enslaved in the American South,
rose up into the air and flew away. Some suggest that the legend’s origin is the
historical incident of Igbo Landing, where thousands of enslaved Nigerians
committed mass suicide by walking into a Georgia swamp together (Allison).
Others suggest that the legend finds its roots in stories of runaway slaves

who seemingly disappeared into the air and communicated their plans with
the code phrase: “Come fly away!” (Hamilton). Regardless of its origins, this
story, called the legend of the flying Africans, has been handed down from
generation to generation in Black communities as a testament of hope and
perseverance in the face of great suffering. The tale whispers to its listeners:
freedom is within your reach—keep striving.
For Black communities, the story of the flying Africans continues to
represent freedom from oppression and trauma. Recently, Black female
creators have reimagined the story in film, music, and literature. Daughters of
the Dust, a 1991 film directed by Julia Dash, narrates the lives of the residents
of Igbo landing. Beyoncé’s 2016 Grammy-winning album Lemonade, which
calls for the liberation of Black women, uses imagery of birds and the ocean
to reference the myth. Toni Morrison incorporates this myth into Song of
Solomon; her character, Milkman, confronts his family’s past, and in doing
so, gains the ability to fly. In Paule Marshall’s Praisesong for the Widow, the
protagonist Avey contemplates the incident at Igbo Landing as she embraces
her connection to both her ancestors and her African culture.
More recent Black fiction (interestingly written by male authors)
incorporates the story of the flying Africans by reimagining forms of the
fantastical escapes from slavery. Ta-Nehisi Coates, in his 2019 novel The Water
Dancer explains the tale of the flying Africans, imagining that the escaped
slaves did not literally fly but teleport. This gift, called “Conduction,” is
only possessed by a few, but it allows hundreds to walk into the Virginian
marshes and seemingly fly away. In the book, Hiram, who possesses the gift
of a perfect memory, learns to harness Conduction by accessing his buried
memories and uses the power to help others escape from slavery. Colson

Whitehead also narrates a magical escape from slavery in his 2016 book, The
Underground Railroad. However, instead of teleporting, Cora rides to freedom
on a literal underground railroad. Just as Hiram must access his buried
memories to learn to “fly,” Cora metaphorically descends into the darkness
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of trauma and rebirth in order to escape from slavery. While these novels

may not literally depict flight, they retell the story of the flying Africans by

reimagining the ways in which enslaved people may have disappeared from
slavery and ran toward freedom.

These reiterations of the story of the flying Africans all have commonalities.

In order to “fly,” the characters must embrace their pasts and trade them for
new stories of hope. In her song “All Night,” Beyoncé remarks, “I’ll trade

your broken wings for mine.” She suggests that she lets go of her past “wings”
that would not let her fly—the trauma from her husband’s infidelity—and
embraces her own power to fly. Morrison’s Milkman revisits his family’s

past. In doing so, he reaffirms his identity and is finally able to fly. Marshall’s

Avey lets her mind fly into the past in order to understand her identity. These

retellings present embracing and rewriting trauma as the key to flight. They
reinforce Whitehead’s claim that “sometimes a useful delusion is better than
a useful truth” (290). Reimagining and repurposing the past may be seen

as a delusion, but ultimately that delusion is critical to forging a future that
includes obtaining freedom and embracing identity.

These stories do not just contain insight into overcoming trauma—they

literally embody it. The legend of the flying Africans reclaims and repurposes

history for survivors of slavery and their descendants. Sophia Nahli Allison,

a writer for the New Yorker, states that “these stories [about the flying

Africans] became a truth that enabled survival . . . it continues to represent
black mobility towards liberation.” The stories become true as they create

meaning for Black communities. Reclaiming history and turning slavery into

a tale where the oppressed successfully escape oppression allows those who

suffer from the effects of trauma to find hope and freedom. They trade their

“broken wings” and fly.

When most critics discuss these adaptations of the story of the flying

Africans, they use the label “magical realism.” Jesús Benito, Ana Manzanas,
Begoña Simal, Daniel Bautista, and P. Gabrielle Foreman are just a few of
the critics who label Morrison and other Black American writers as magical

realists. Due to the number of critics who have associated Morrison with

magical realism, her novels now top a google search for examples of magical

realism. The term seems to be so commonly associated with Black American

literature that even the back cover of The Underground Railroad states that

Whitehead draws on elements of magical realism in the novel. The label
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“magical realism” has become normalized and unquestioned by both critics
and the general public.
While these novels do check the boxes of magical realist fiction, Morrison
has expressed discomfort with the label, stating, “if you could apply the word
magical then it dilutes the realism” (Davis). Echoing Morrison, I would even
assert that the label “magical realism” is a form of colonialism. In claiming
that the books are “magical realism,” outsiders of Black communities attempt

to dictate what the Black experience is. Black voices, for whom enchantment
and mystery are real and are an important part of their culture, have been
overpowered by other voices. I intend to amplify Black voices by reiterating
the claim that the label “magical realism” dilutes the real.
Additionally, Whitehead adds a unique contribution to the tradition of
the flying Africans; his term “useful delusions” argues that stories do not
have to be true, or historically accurate, from them to be useful (Whitehead
290). In fact, to embrace delusions is to defy the accepted reality. In other
words, by embracing delusions, Black communities push back against
other’s attempts to annihilate Black history. Black people can then rewrite
their trauma, giving them the wings and the hope they need in order to
overcome that trauma. In this essay, I will first examine how The Water
Dancer and The Underground Railroad are extensions of the tradition of the
flying Africans and how each novel uses that story to define trauma and
freedom. I will subsequently argue how, as “useful delusions,” these stories
embody more than just “magic realism”: they themselves are examples of
Black American authors rewriting history and healing the wounds of history
(Whitehead 290).

Tracing the Flying Africans

Ta-Nehisi Coates’ The Water Dancer invokes the story of the flying Africans
by explaining that they flew due to the power of teleportation. This solidifies
his place in a tradition of rewriting the narrative of slavery and trauma in
order to give the oppressed power. Hiram’s past is framed with a version
of Igbo’s Landing: his own grandmother, Santi Bess, led forty-eight slaves
into The River Goose and teleported them back to Africa. The presence of
this story among Hiram’s community mimics the presence of the tale of the
flying Africans. Hiram says it exists as “a mix of rumor and whisper,” passed
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on by word of mouth (Coates 92). And while Santi Bess does not literally fly
across the water to freedom, the elements of Conduction, the name for the
teleportation, mimic flight. In fact, Hiram, in attempting to outrun capture,
contemplates his need to unlock his still mysterious power, which he calls
“flight.” He concludes, “I was running, when what I needed was to fly. Not in
my mind, but in this world. I needed to lift up away from these low whites, as
I lifted away from Maynard and the river” (Coates 147). While he may not be
literally lifting up into the air as in the story of the flying Africans, he is able
to appear from place to place and carry himself away from the chains that
bind him. In this way, Hiram is Coates’ version of a “flying African.” Like
Morrison’s Milkman or Marshall’s Avey, Hiram is Coates’ modern inheritor
of the tradition of flight.
Cora’s escape in The Underground Railroad ties more ambiguously to
the story of the flying Africans. Because Whitehead does not mention Igbo
Landing or even flight, it may seem that The Underground Railroad does
not tie into the tradition of adapting the tale of the flying Africans. On the
surface, the two stories seem to be total opposites: the image of the enslaved
Black people disappearing into the blue sky emits sensations of liberty,
weightlessness, and hope, while Cora’s descent into the underground
suggests grittiness, confusion, and secrecy. As Caesar and Cora first descend
into the railway, “a sour smell [emanates] from below” (Whitehead 66).
There is no clean, unbridled air, unlike the sky that gave wings to the flying
Africans. As Caesar and Cora ride to freedom “there [is] only darkness, mile
after mile,” no sunshine, no blue sky (Whitehead 70). Although Cora admires
the tunnel for its architectural wonder, the tunnel is still subterranean,
literally the opposite of flying free into the sky. Similarly, the railroad does
not promise freedom, but instead carries Cora from one version of slavery
and oppression to another. While flight bears the enslaved Africans back to
Africa and back to freedom, the railroad seems to only to shuffle Cora around
on a horrid tour of American oppression. The lack of freedom and the literal
darkness of the underground railroad contrast it with the legendary escape
of the flying Africans.
However, the underground railroad bears more similarities to the flights
of the enslaved Africans than may initially appear, particularly in its mystery
and its ability to transport its passengers secretly and quickly. Lumbly, the
engineer who takes them down the first time, has no explanations for the
railroad’s existence. He admits mysteriously that “solving the problem of
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ventilation . . . took a bit of time,” and when Caesar asks how it was built,
he answers, “with their hands, how else?” (Whitehead 67). The mystery of
the railroad is just as pervasive as the mystery of flight; Whitehead offers no
explanation for the railroad, instead forcing the readers to accept its mystery.
The lack of explanation surrounding Cora’s escape is just as potent as the
tale of the flying Africans’ inexplicable depictions of flight. Similarly, the
railroad’s ability to quickly transport its passengers from location to location

mimics literal flight: Cora is able to travel almost seamlessly from station
to station. While the literal passengers of the Underground Railroad were
forced to flee into the swamps and woods and to run from house to house,
this mystical underground railroad transports its passengers as quickly
as though they were flying from station to station. Both the underground
railroad’s mysterious existence and its apparently seamless transportation of
its passengers allude to the tale, suggesting that Whitehead’s story inherits
the tradition of rewriting the tale of the flying Africans.

Unearthing Trauma

These novels similarly contribute to the recent tradition of the flying African
by agreeing with Morrison (and Beyoncé) that light and freedom cannot be
truly achieved without first facing past trauma. In The Water Dancer, Hiram
must unearth his buried memories of his mother in order to teleport. Harriet
Tubman, while teaching Hiram about Conduction, instructs that “the jump is
done by the power of the story,” by remembering “all of our loves and all of
our losses” (Coates 278). In order to “fly,” to move from place to place, Hiram
must dig up memories of loss that he had long since buried. Among the
numerous horrors of slavery, he “knew men who had held down their own
wives to be flogged” and “children who’d watched those men hold down
their mothers” but “worst of all [he] knew how the memory of such things
altered [them], how [they] could never escape it, how it became an awful
part of [them]” (Coates 384). Hiram learns that the trauma of slavery can
never truly be forgotten, as it becomes a part of those who suffered. However,
despite the horror of the memories, the only way that Hiram can “fly away”
to freedom is to open the “lockbox” in which he shut the memory of his
mother’s sale (Coates 384). Through the power of embracing the memory
of his mother, Hiram is able to teleport and fly to freedom. In other words,
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Coates agrees with recent adaptations of the flying Africans: he reiterates that
flight is achieved by embracing and accepting past sorrows, not by avoiding
them. Perhaps, Sophia’s final decision that they “are what [they] always
were . . . underground” carries that meaning (Coates 403). While Hiram can
fly, he can only access that power by ironically embracing the weight of his
trauma. Going “underground” with the weight is the only way to be free.
Unlike Hiram’s power of teleportation, the power of the underground

railroad does not literally function on the power of Cora’s repressed memories.
However, like Conduction, “flight” on the railroad is not an escape from
hardship, but a journey through it. As Cora uses the underground railroad
to flee slavery, she surfaces each time in places that introduce her to new
versions of hardship. Her train ride is a tour of America’s atrocities against
Black communities, from lynchings, to forced sterilizations and inhumane
medical experiments, to the slaughter of entire communities and the death of
Cora’s loved ones. When she surfaces, she is forced to face one question: “In
what sort of hell had the train let her off?” (Whitehead 155). Cora’s tour down
memory lane is not personal, like Hiram’s, but national. Each stop contains
moments in history or symbolic events, suggesting that Cora experiences
not her own trauma but the trauma of the nation. She is given the advice to
“look outside as you speed through, and you’ll find the true face of America”
(Whitehead 310). The underground railroad is a tour of the Black American
community’s hardships; Cora lives the trauma of oppression over and over
on her flight to the north.
After experiencing these hardships, Cora goes underground, seeking
to fly away on the railroad, just as Hiram is determined to fly away from
his captures; it is under the ground that she faces her past traumas. Each
experience brings about a new death: after each stop, she returns again to the
railroad and is symbolically entombed. While some of her descents below
the ground are more pleasant, fixed with lights and companionship, twice
she becomes trapped in the tunnel, as if literally buried in a grave. Under
the South Carolina station, Cora is trapped in the darkness and comes to the
conclusion that “years ago, she had stepped off the path of life” (Whitehead
147). She faces her trauma, understanding that she “was a stray in every
sense” and in doing so, faces metaphorical death (Whitehead 147). However,
this entombment under the earth doubles as a womb, as she is reborn when
she emerges from the tunnel. After she is trapped under the earth for the
final time in Ohio in the “ghost tunnel,” she realizes, “On one end there was
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who you were before you went underground, and on the other end a new
person steps out into the light” (Whitehead 310). After Cora’s symbolic death
is realized by coming to terms with her own trauma, she is reborn as a new
person. This cycle of death and rebirth through embracing the past mimics
Hiram’s need to embrace a new story each time he conducts, reiterating the
concept that in order to flee towards the promise of freedom, past trauma
must be confronted.

While Cora’s rebirth and Hiram’s teleportation may symbolize their
flights towards freedom, they are never truly guaranteed safety. In this
way, both Whitehead and Coates add to the current tradition of the flying
Africans by arguing that trauma is not overcome only once, but over and
over. Unlike the flying Africans (or Milkman, for that matter) who achieve
freedom as their bodies take flight, both Cora and Hiram’s freedom is always
in question. Even as The Underground Railroad ends, Cora reappears above
ground yet again, her future is still unclear. She lives by the “slave’s choice”:
“anywhere, anywhere but where you are escaping from” (Whitehead 311).
Her repeated suffering upon each cycle of rebirth suggests that her struggles
are not over at the book’s close. Similarly, Hiram does not flee north with
Sophia but chooses to remain in Virginia: “underground” (Coates 403).
Although he can go up North whenever he likes, he chooses to work in the
South as a member of the underground railroad, close to the dangers from
which he once ran. Furthermore, each use of teleportation requires a story
from the past: each time he wishes to flee, he must remember and embrace
his past. Coates and Whitehead, in making the nature of Cora and Hiram’s
remembrance of trauma cyclical, argue that in order to maintain hope for
freedom, trauma must be confronted not once but over and over.
But what exactly is the trauma that both Cora and Hiram—and each
modern rendition of the flying African—experience? Critic Eugene L. Arva,
in his book The Traumatic Imagination: Histories of Violence in Magical Realist
Fiction, addresses the trauma that enslaved people in the Caribbean and their
descendants face in his chapter “Surviving Slavery.” He asserts that their
trauma is caused by “an elusive sense of identity” due to displacement from
home and a lack of knowledge of ancestry (117). Although, in this case, Arva
speaks of enslaved people of the Caribbean who experienced a different
diaspora than the slaves of the American South, this loss of identity seems
to be the main cause of at least Cora and Hiram’s trauma. Both lose their
mothers at a young age and are not wholly embraced in their plantation’s
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community. Cora is banished to the Hob while Hiram’s status as the master’s

son elevates his rank and moves him from the fields to the house. Cora, as the

train arrives to whisk her from the South, embraces her identity as “a stray in
every sense. The last of her tribe” (Whitehead 147). Cora has no family, has

no community. Hiram similarly is disconnected from his family because the

memory of his mother “has been for so long tucked away, hidden away in a

fog” (Coates 394). This disconnect from community, from family, and from

ancestry perhaps causes the trauma that not only mars Hiram and Coates but
also the communities that were displaced due to slavery and colonization.

Although neither Cora nor Hiram is able to completely repair their

damaged families, they are able to come to terms with their past, and through

their acceptance of the past they are able to “fly away” toward the hope of

freedom. Arva likewise comes to the conclusion that keeping stories alive

heals communities and repairs the trauma associated with lack of identity.

In other words, the effort to keep stories alive is an effort to rewrite history
not in the words of the oppressors but the oppressed. Morrison argues in

her 1986 interview with Christina Davis, “the reclamation of the history

of black people in this country is paramount in this importance because .

. . the presence and the heartbeat of black people has been systematically
annihilated in many, many ways and the job of recovery is our own” (Davis

142). This history and thus the identity of Black people in the United States

has been overwritten, ignored, “annihilated”: Black people must reclaim
history and retell trauma in order to heal. Thus, stories of the past, such as

the stories and truths of Cora and Hiram, are the wings of the flying Africans,

connecting Black communities back to their roots and enabling them to
embrace the hope of identity and freedom.

Magical Realism and
“Useful Delusions”

These stories that heal trauma and give wings to the oppressed come in many
forms: fiction, reality, and a mix of the two. For example, in The Water Dancer,
Hiram embraces the truth about his mother; reality is his means of healing.
Cora, in contrast, does not know the truth about her mother; the story of her
mother’s escape is fictional. However, the story is still a means of healing
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and strength for Cora. Whitehead, in showing Cora’s repeated reliance on

an untrue story, suggests that stories do not need to be true in order for them
to hold power. Most critics label stories that adapt the flying Africans to be

fantasy: a delusion. They label novels such as The Underground Railroad and

The Water Dancer as magical realism because they contain elements that seem

to be magical. However, Whitehead suggests that stories, even fantasies,
hold power that effects real change in the lives of those who hear them.

Many critics, in discussing retellings of the story of the flying Africans,

use the label magical realism in order to analyze their novels.1 Others seem to

recognize the injustice of using the term; when discussing Black fiction, they

qualify their definition of magical realism.2 However, they still embrace the

term to define the genre, suggesting that the label is deeply rooted in critical
thought. Since these narratives reflect a real belief in the supernatural, some

authors3 have taken fault with the label. Notably, Morrison explained her

discomfort with the term in an interview with Christina Davis in 1989. She
said, “I was once under the impression that that label magical realism was

another one of those words that covered up what was going on . . . for literary

critics it just seemed to be a convenient way to skip again what was the truth”

(Davis 143-44). Morrison also stated, “my own use of enchantment simply
comes because that’s the way the world was for me and for the black people
I knew” (Davis 144). Belief in enchantment, in Black culture, is real. Stories

that other cultures might label as fantasy, delusion, or magical, are actually

reflections of reality. They are realism. To label these stories as magical is, like

Morrison stated, a way of “annihilating” Black history and strips the Black

community of their ability to recover from trauma through their stories.

Moreover, Whitehead contributes to the tradition of the flying Africans

through his invention of the term “useful delusions” (Whitehead 290).

He argues that whether the stories are true does not matter. Instead, their

usefulness to those who believe them is more important than whether they

are fact or fiction. Throughout the novel, Cora believes that her mother, Mabel,
escaped from slavery. This story gives her hope that she too can escape.

Although she denies that she is “a luck charm because Mabel got away” and
feels resentment towards her mother for leaving her, Cora contemplates

her mother’s freedom, wondering if she is a beggar on the street or a free

woman living in Canada (Whitehead 46). Although Mabel is not mentioned
frequently, the knowledge that she did get away sits in the back of both
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readers’ and characters’ minds as a promise that freedom is possible. The
story is a source of hope.

However, Whitehead reveals that that source of hope was not true but

fiction. In the novel’s final chapters, Whitehead reveals that Mabel died in

the swamp next to the plantation: she did not even make it a mile away. By

deceiving the readers up until the end, Whitehead creates a similar hope

in them, only to reveal that the hope was based on falsehood. Not only

do the readers experience the deception, but they realize, in a moment of
dramatic irony, that while Cora believes she is following her mother, she
is actually forging her own path to freedom. Since Cora believes that one

person escaped, she believes she can do it too. Although Mabel’s story is not

real, it still gives Cora the hope to make it real in her own life. It is a “useful

delusion”: it is untrue yet still has meaning in the lives of those who believe
it (Whitehead 290).

While the word “delusion” suggests that the story or belief is false, it

actually signifies believing in a narrative that is not dictated by the prominent

culture to be real. The Oxford English Dictionary defines delusions as “the

action of befooling with false impressions or beliefs; the fact or condition

of being cheated and led to believe what is false.” While it seems that this

definition is adamant that a delusion is believing something that is false,
another definition provided by Oxford Languages suggests otherwise. They

define delusions as “an idiosyncratic belief or impression that is firmly
maintained despite being contradicted by what is generally accepted as

reality or rational argument.” This definition holds a key difference: delusions

are not necessarily false but instead simply go against what is “generally

accepted” as reality. In other words, delusions defy the accepted narrative.

Whitehead mirrors this idea, illustrating that just because delusions are not
accepted as real, that does not mean they cannot be. As an example, he states

three delusions: “that we can escape slavery”; that “the negro deserved

a place of refuge”; and that America exists, since a country founded on

“murder, theft, and cruelty” “shouldn’t exist if there is any justice in the

world” (Whitehead 290-91). Although these are delusions, they are believed
in and made real. America should not exist, yet it does. Black communities

cannot find refuge, yet in some cases they do. Just because Mabel did not

escape the plantation does not mean that Cora cannot. In his definition of

“useful delusions,” Whitehead suggests that stories that defy the dominant
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narrative may be seen as delusions; however, they can be powerful because
they create hope, which leads to action and, ultimately, reality.

The Flying Africans and the
Power of Stories

“Truth was a changing display in a shop window, manipulated by hands
when you weren’t looking” notices Cora (Whitehead 119). White people
continue to manipulate the truth about Black experiences, just as the
museum Cora works in alters the history of slavery and Black oppression
like a shop window. “The presence and the heartbeat of black people has
been systematically annihilated in many, many ways,” argued Morrison
(Davis 142). Black stories have been persecuted and censored, demoted as
fantasy and omitted from history. Labeling Black authors as magical realists
similarly ignores the truth that they tell about their perceptions of reality. By
stripping away Black stories, white people have stripped away Black identity.
Then what is to be done? In the words of Morrison, Black voices must
be given the opportunity and platform to do “the job of recovery” which
is “their own” (Davis 142). They must be allowed to tell their own stories
and reclaim their own history. In Hamilton’s version of the flying Africans,
words are the true power that causes the Africans to fly. “Toby sighed the
ancient words that were a dark promise,” just as Hiram spoke the story of
his mother, and just as the story of the flying Africans is written, sung, acted,
and spoken (Hamilton 171). Stories, or in other words, delusions, have power.
The trauma that Black communities in the U.S. face as the inheritors of an
annihilated history can be overcome as they are given the space to reclaim
and retell their history and their stories. Then, they will be able to “rise on
the air” and “fly away to Free-dom” [sic] (Hamilton 171).

134

Winter 2021

Notes
1

Art Taylor, Robert Gringer, Daniel Bautista, Jesús Benito, Ana Manzanas, Begoña

Simal, Stephen M. Hart, and Wen-chin Ouyang are several of the critics who use the
term magical realism to define black authors’ works.
2

Eugene L. Arva, uses the term magical realism, although he admits that the magical

elements are “far from being reality” but still “signify the real” (Arva 185). P. Gabrielle
Foreman uses the term “amplified reality” to explain the effect of magical realism.
3

Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a Latin American writer commonly labeled as magical

realist, argued, “the sense of wonder and infinite strangeness which emerges from
much Latin American writing is a true reflection of the complex realities of Latin
American experience, not merely the product of feverish, literary imagination”
(Minta 37).
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Missing the Mark
Chaucer’s Man of Law’s Tale

Gabriella Schwartz

A

history of identifications wreaths the

conversations surrounding The Man of Law’s Tale. Characters are dissected
and pulled apart in a menagerie of analysis and evidence that attempts to
pull together the meaning of their representation. Within this menagerie, the
identification of a group of outliers who experience forms of discrimination
floats around the discourse. The Man of Law engages in this act of othering
in his narration of the Tale, categorizing women as exotic or dangerous
while following the titular character Custance in her travels across Geoffrey
Chaucer’s known world—from Rome to Syria to Northumberland. The
ramifications of this othering of women are often explored within the Tale
by literary critics, but rarely does this analysis bleed over into reality and its
harmful effects thereon. Performative language, introduced by J. L. Austin and
expanded upon by Jacques Derrida, allows literature to be viewed in terms
of the way it imprints back onto reality. As the name implies, performative
language is language that performs an action. Sentences are often seen as
relaying or describing information, but Austin makes the categorization that

Criterion

certain sentences, when said, are a type of action in themselves. He labels

these “performatives” (Austin 5–6). Austin’s performatives allow a glimpse
into what the Tale offers outside of itself, especially as it relates to the status

of othered women. Regardless, literary critics often view this discriminatory
othering as a necessary practice of the Tale, referring to it in terms of
positive othering rather than recognizing Chaucer’s work as a repetition

of false prejudices.

This view, “positive othering” takes the elements of othering found

within the Tale and introduces a new lens for looking at it—that is, seeing

the ways othering functions as a strategy for critique. Elizabeth Robertson,

for example, posits that “Constance’s apparently passive submissiveness is

more complex than it seems . . . She inspires extreme and often irrational

violence in others, but she herself is neither an instigator nor a perpetrator

of that violence” (161). Chaucer others Custance in terms of her passivity,
juxtaposed with violence in religion, thus creating a strong case for an

alternative nonviolent approach. The Tale, then, becomes a carefully hidden

critique on the inherent violence of religion during Chaucer’s time. In

similar hindsight, Keiko Hamaguchi writes, “Chaucer may have been trying

to change contemporary attitudes and to soften prejudices by representing

Custance sympathetically, as someone whose plight resembles that of real

foreign women in England” (439). Promoting this sense of sympathy may
be Chaucer’s way of portraying an indirect critique of xenophobic behaviors

by encouraging sympathy toward Custance’s plight as an outcast. Jill Mann,

also lending her voice to this discourse, claims that passivity is Custance’s

power over suffering—a means of conquering. In this light, the passive

role into which Custance is othered is not a means of subjecting her to men
by showcasing her differences from men; rather, “Woman’s subjection to

‘mannes governance’ thus becomes in this tale a paradigm of the human
condition. Woman’s ‘thraldom’ to man is replicated in man’s ‘thraldom’ to

God” (547). Each of these critics seem to engage with the logic that Chaucer
must utilize discriminatory othering as an effective strategy to critique

elements he introduces in the Tale. This logic twists discriminatory othering

so it may be viewed in terms of its positivity rather than its negativity;

however, these assertions come at the expense of the Tale’s lead female

character, introducing the contradiction of critiquing one discriminatory
system by reinstating another.
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In the following paper, I seek to rectify that contradiction by engaging
in a multilayered analysis, applying the lenses of intersectionality and
performative language to The Man of Law’s Tale. Previous critics have not
openly applied an intersectional lens, given that intersectionality as a term
is fairly new, but many seem to appeal to this sense of layered experience—
those social and political identifications that create interlocking forms of
oppression. Robertson refers to it as a type of “elvishness” in which Custance

is merely an esoteric system of interwoven differences that construct her
as a highly intangible being (178). Cord Whitaker also acknowledges that
the Tale engages in the act of othering through a matrix of religion, gender,
and class, but he does not outright use the intersectional term to define this
observable matrix (1). Patel’s definition of intersectionality, then, in addition
to a textual analysis of the Tale, will demonstrate the existing parallelism
between the women of the Tale and the twenty-first-century women in the
United Kingdom. The women in the Tale are categorized similarly to their
United Kingdom counterparts but are othered specifically into exotic and
dangerous categories. The concept of the performative will then be applied
to this intersectional analysis, revealing how the literature imprints onto
reality through the use of codified repetition. Patel indicates the means by
which reality imprints onto the Tale, and the performative indicates the
means by which the Tale imprints back onto reality. The two, when taken in
tandem, indicate the mechanisms that cement the work as not a critique of
the discrimination of intersectional women, but rather a cyclical perpetuation
of that discrimination.

Pragna Patel and
Intersectionality

In her United Nations presentation, Pragna Patel discusses the concept
of intersectionality and its urgent need to be implemented in discussions
related to equality. She describes intersectionality as “captur[ing] both the
structural and dynamic consequences of the interaction between two or
more forms of discrimination or systems of subordination” (Patel). The
term explains that discrimination does not only pertain to one instance
or one identification, but multiple. Purposefully categorizing women
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to ignore their intersectional status presents instances of forced identity
assimilation, replacing their complex identities with simplified and
contained substitutions. This behavior indicates how women are frequently
organized into categories that do not accurately represent their identities,
and yet they are expected to maintain such categorizations with quiet
acceptance. There are two instances in particular that Patel highlights in
her statement which I will also apply to the Tale.
The first example is that of Asian women who come to the United
Kingdom as foreign brides. In this capacity, many are subjected to forms of
domestic abuse. However, according to the ‘one year rule’ and other such
programs, they are denied the protection needed to escape such marriages.
Instead, they are required by law to remain in the marriage for at least one
year before they can seek divorce and remain in the country. These women
face deportation should the marriage be terminated earlier for whatever
reason (Patel). This matter, though most notably concerning gender in regard
to domestic abuse, is also a racial matter where it concerns immigration and
the risk of deportation. Such a junction creates the compounded nature of
intersectional discrimination. The women in these circumstances must don
a passive, quiet acceptance in response to their suffering, as there are no
means of escaping the present system they occupy—a system that ignores
the intersectional nature of their plight.
The second example Patel introduces is that of the challenges faced by
the multicultural model. This approach often categorizes multiple minority
communities into strictly homogenous cultures, disregarding the multitude
of identities, and therefore the multitude of intersectional situations, in
which minority individuals find themselves. Patel further recognizes that
those who come to power in these particular models are often self-appointed
men who have a set of expectations for the people they supposedly represent.
This expectation is one of religious and cultural conformity—more precisely,
conservative religious and cultural conformity (Patel). Again, just as is seen
with the example provided by Asian women, those who face the multicultural
model find themselves stripped of voice and assimilated into a homogenized
identity of quiet passivity in which they are to weather suffering while
another individual speaks for them. The multicultural model, however, also
reveals that this assimilation is composed of the religious and cultural ideals
the self-appointed leader has decided upon and is not representative of the
intersectional quality of the community they represent.
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Application of Patel to the
Tale

The womens’ identities in The Man of Law’s Tale bear a striking, albeit

unfortunate, resemblance to these aforementioned intersectional situations.

As the narrator, the Man of Law’s presence permeates the story. He becomes

a self-appointed ‘leader’ through his descriptive choices, categorizing the

women based on the way he perceives them. This is most apparent in his

narrative breaks—sections where the story halts in order for the Man of

Law to relay his thoughts. Among the first of these instances is Custance’s

departure from Rome to Syria in which she becomes the young bride of the
Sultan to assure his conversion to the Christian faith:
I trowe at Troye, whan Pirrus brak the wal
Or Ylion brende, at Thebes the cite,
N’at Rome for the harm thurgh Hannibal,
That Romayns hath venquisshed tymes thre,
Nas herd swich tendre weping for pitee
As in the chambre was for hir departing;
Bot forth she moot, where-so she wepe or singe. (Chaucer 288–294)

The Man of Law uses a litany of historical figures in comparison to Custance
as if to say that it is her inevitable fate to be taken away, much like it is the

inevitable fate of these historical figures to enact their historical events. But

associating these historical figures with Custance implies an innate sense of

heroism accompanying her solemn duty as a faithful servant to Christianity.
She will be remembered for her gallant deeds in the same way the figures she

has been placed beside are remembered for theirs—memorialized in the tears

of those who recognize her harrowing yet unavoidable journey. However,
this heroism is only reserved for Custance. In another narrative break, the

Man of Law exemplifies the villainy of the Sultaness after relaying her plan
to avoid conversion by overthrowing the Sultan and placing Custance on a

rudderless ship, sending her out to sea:
O sowdanesse, rote of iniquitee!
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Virago, thou Semyram the secounde!
O serpent under femininitee,
Lyke to the serpent depe in helle y-bounde! (358–361)

The Man of Law exposes the Sultaness’s negative qualities through this
narration even though the actions of both Custance and the Sultaness
demonstrate devotion to their respective religions; Custance agrees to marry
the Sultan on the condition that he converts to Christianity and the identity
that accompanies it, while the Sultaness rejects conversion to maintain her
Muslim identity and heritage. However, in each attempt to preserve her
religion, the Man of Law brands the Sultaness as a wicked creature while
he sees Custance as praiseworthy. The Sultaness, unlike Custance, does not
yield to the model of Christianity set forth by the Man of Law. In retaliation,
he slanders the very nature of her character. This same style of narrative
break used to express villainy emerges in another appearance for Donegild.
Like the Sultaness, Donegild refuses to yield to the Christian influence that
Custance’s character represents. Instead, she also attempts to dispose of
Custance by setting her adrift at sea. The Man of Law’s predicted response,
of course, is to describe her in terms of her villainy:
O Donegild, I ne have noon English Digne
Unto thy malice and thy tirannye,
And therefore to the feend I thee resigne.
Let him endyten of thy traitorye.
Fy, mannish, fy! (798–782)

These narrative breaks indicate that the Tale possesses instances of a selfappointed leader defining the identities of women for them, aligning with
the information the multicultural model divulges. As shown with Custance,
the Sultaness, and Donegild, there emerge two categorizations into which
the Man of Law organizes women based on these descriptions.
The first of these categorizations can be identified as the exotic other.
The exotic other is interpreted to be the highly desired, ideal form of the
other for the Man of Law. This is manifested in the heroines of the Tale:
good, righteous women. Custance is the prime example, distinguished
from men because of her submissiveness and passive acceptance to their
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active force upon her life: the Sultan “hath caught so gret pleasance / to
han hir [Custance’s] figure in his remembrance” (Chaucer 186–187), that he

demands Custance’s hand in marriage to fulfill his desire. In return, it is not
Custance herself who decides whether or not she will marry the Sultan, but

her father, who uses this opportunity to convert the Sultan and his people as,

“No Cristen prince wolde fayn / Wedden his child under oure lawes swete

/ That us were taught by mahoun, our prophete” (222–224). This behavior
is precisely what marks her as ideal or desirable to the Man of Law—her

willing acceptance to ‘ben under mannes governance” (287). The female,
in this case, transforms into something foreign through her passivity and
submissiveness, becoming highly contrasted against the male counterpart in

the process. But these qualities, rather than being seen as inherently negative,
instead create a desirable association with the woman, and her artificialized

foreignness is twisted into a type of exoticism. Thus, the exotic other is both

a foreign and ideal thing. But much like the multicultural model given by

Patel, Custance—and other exotic others—do not begin as such. They had
to be shaped.

One of Chaucer’s source materials for the Tale derives from Nicholas

Trevet’s Of the Noble Lady Constance. Although sharing the same central

character and story of Custance, they describe her in dissimilar ways.

Trevet’s Custance is intelligent, having been “. . . taught the Christian faith

and instructed by learned masters in the seven sciences, which are logic,

physics, morals, astronomy, geometry, music, and optics” (13–15). In contrast,
the Man of Law emphasizes that

In hir is heigh beautee without pryde
Yowth without grenehede or folye.
To alle hir werkes vertu is hir gyde.
Humblesse hath slayn in hir al tirannye,
She is mirour of alle curteisye.
Hir herte is verray chambre of holiness (Chaucer 162–167)

This new identity of beauty, youth, virtue, humility, courtesy, and holiness
imposed by the Man of Law disregards Trevet’s Custance’s intelligence,
indicating a deliberate choice to erase such characteristics—those
characteristics that would suggest Custance could think for herself.
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Hermengild follows in similar footsteps to Custance’s identity
reorganization. She is the exotic other who finds religious and culturallyinfused norms and conformities imposed upon her. A Pagan woman
who converts to Christianity, she transforms from “Dame Hermengild,
constablesse of that place” (Chaucer 539) into a “doghter of his [Jesus Christ’s]
chirche” (567). She symbolically accepts the identity Custance offers through
her conversion, disregarding her prior religious identity in favor of the new

religious identity associated with the exotic other’s ideal traits: beauty, youth,
virtue, humility, courtesy, and holiness. Hermengild subjects herself to not
only the will of God but also the predisposed identity of exotic others that
the Man of Law enforces through the guise of religion.
Sheila Delany rightly analyzes that these women are “to be seen not as
a woman at all but rather as an emblem,” or merely a conglomeration of
virtues (1). Delany notes this as a positive mold after which both men and
women are to model themselves, but her view fails to take into account that
this mold strips women of all identity except those characteristics the Man of
Law deigns to keep in his re-creation of what he believes is the ideal woman.
Delany is right only insofar as she refers to this series of characterizations
as a mold, but this mold is merely that of a newly organized, homogenized
identity, not necessarily something to model oneself after.
As foils to exotic others like Custance and Hermengild, the Sultaness
and Donegild instead become dangerous others: those women who refuse
assimilation into the predisposed models Patel describes and actively work
despite them. When faced with the possibility of having to forcibly convert
from Islam to Christianity, the Sultaness declares “The lyfe shal rather out of
my body sterte / than Makometes lawe out of myn herte!” (Chaucer 335–336).
This preference for death over breaking Mohammed’s Law sees her sending
Custance off on a rudderless boat, and it is from this boat that Custance
arrives in Northumberland. There, Donegild may not refuse assimilation on
account of her religion like the Sultaness, but she does refuse assimilation
on account of Custance herself, calling her “[s]o strange a creature” (700).
What incites her to action, however, is her son’s decision to marry Custance.
She views this as a “despit,” or an insult, believing “hir cursed herte brast
atwo” should she allow Custance—and what she represents—to remain
in Northumberland (699, 697). These women, the Sultaness and Donegild,
become the antithesis of the Man of Law’s idealized women. They are not
the heroines but the villains, highly resistant to assimilation and therefore
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dangerous others. Although the Sultaness refuses assimilation on account
of religion and Donegild on account of Custance’s character, both refusals
are tied to the nature of Custance. Both, in some way, reject the identity
Custance represents and reject being brought into it. This tension is largely
what causes these women to take on the villainous role against Custance to
protect their identities, only being able to do so through their manipulation
of power. This is a “mannish” behavior that becomes the second reason for

their identification as dangerous others.
Though the women in the Tale form a central part of the action, they
possess little in the means of being able to operate systems of power directly.
Men, on the other hand, are the only gendered individuals in the Tale who
wield legitimate power, connecting intent to action: the sultan’s desire to
“love hir whyl his lyf may dure” brings Custance to Syria. It is “by judgement
of Alla hastifly” that Custance is saved from trial, and it is God himself that
is the active force of power keeping Custance safe, as there is “No wight
but God” to save her during times of duress (Chaucer 189, 688, 476). Just
as Custance relies on these male figures, so does Hermengild who wields
what she refers to as “The wil of Crist” (566). She recognizes this power as
not her own, but as the name suggests, Christ’s. Furthermore, Hermengild
“wex affrayed” of this newfound power, aware of the possibility that should
she reveal herself to be Christian by relying on it, her Pagan husband might
have her slain (563). In these instances, Custance and Hermengild yield to
the male figures of the Tale in faith and fear, once again aligning themselves
under the status of exotic others in which they are passive creatures to men.
The Sultaness and Donegild, on the other hand, are well-associated
with their ability to engage in secrecy to actively manipulate power from
men. As dangerous others, they do not fit the model identified by Patel
and established by the Man of Law, weathering the happenings of life
with passivity or adhering to a self-proclaimed leader. Instead, they take
power for themselves. These women disrupt the paradigm, adding to their
“dangerous” status. Susan Schibanoff analyzes this situation in terms of
“rhetorical proximity,” in which the similarities between two supposedly
different people are seen as a means of promoting hostility between them
and not commonality (571). In the Tale, the Sultaness uses her son’s council
to overthrow him and to dispose of Custance at the same time. In response,
the Man of Law describes her as “Virago, thou Semyram the secounde! /
O serpent under femininitee. . .” (Chaucer 359–360). Virago, meaning a
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masculine or shrewish woman, and Semyram, referring to Queen Semiramis
of Assyria who was said to have gained royal power and legitimacy by
impersonating her son, draw masculine comparisons to the Sultaness as
she seizes power—something over which the Man of Law believes she is
not meant to have direct control. Likewise, Donegild engages in acts of
trickery to gain power. After hearing the news of Custance’s pregnancy, she
intercepts and forges letters meant for her son, Alla, to drive the two apart.

As a result, The Man of Law describes her with:
Unto thy malice and thy tirannye
...........................
Fy, mannish, fy!—O nay, by God, I lye—
Fy feendly spirit, for I dar wel telle,

Though thou heer walke, thy spirit is in helle! (779, 782–784)

Donegild gains power by forging her son’s letters, and the Man of Law
defines this action as tyranny. He marks her as a “mannish” or unwomanly
woman. Both the Sultaness and Donegild, in associating themselves with
types of power—though illegitimate—bring themselves in close alignment
to men, usurping power from them. In being so similarly associated through
an illegitimate power, the Sultaness and Donegild distance themselves from
the idealized, exotic others but come closer to men as they control and take
power. They break what it means to be a woman and are brought especially
close to what it means to be a man as a result. This proximity ascribes to them
the identity of extremely dangerous beings because they blur the carefully
constructed lines of categorized gender created by the Man of Law. They
directly threaten his established system and, by extension, the Man of
Law himself.

Suppression of the Other

These characteristics allow insight into the dangerous other’s composition.
Sheila Delany posits that “So unnatural are Donegild and the Sultaness that
they are addressed not simply as bad women, but as not truly women at all:
‘virago,’ ‘serpent under femininity,’ ‘feigned woman,’ ‘mannish,’ ‘feendly
spirit’” (68). These are women who are defined as not only dangerous but
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as not even existing as women because they do not identify themselves in
the way that the Man of Law has prescribed. They are not a collection of
goodly virtues, but rather a conglomeration of everything opposed to the
Man of Law’s depiction of women. Because of their deemed dangerous
nature, both the Sultaness and Donegild are killed during the course of the
story. They are forced into the silence of the grave because of the danger
they pose to the ideal.

The exotic other fares no better. As Patel illustrates with the examples
of Asian women and the multicultural model, these women are forced into
their own type of silence, and their suffering remains ignored. The Man of
Law describes Custance’s reactions as diluted and small throughout her own
story. When she is married off to the Sultan, the Man of Law only recounts
that she “[f]ul pale arist and dresseth hir to wende, / For wel she sheeth
there is non other end” (Chaucer 265–266). This behavior continues when
she receives the order that she and her son must leave Northumberland. The
Man of Law describes her with only “a deedly pale face” (822). But such
diction does not make an appearance in Trevet’s telling. When married to
the Sultan, Trevet’s Custance shares the weeping loss with the rest of her
people in Rome, but she does not don the pale face (Trevet 67–68). When she
must leave Northumberland with her son, Trevet’s Custance declares, “May
the day never come that the land should be destroyed because of me and
that because of me my dear friends should suffer death or harm”; but again,
there is no mention of the pale face (344–345). She goes neither silently nor
stoically as she is portrayed to have gone in The Man of Law’s Tale, where the
Man of Law has faded out the identity underneath Custance’s “pale face.”
Throughout Custance’s trials, this blank face is a reminder of the passive
ways in which she accepts and adheres to her suffering quietly. After all,
among Custance’s very first words are: “Wommen are born to thraldom
and penance” (Chaucer 287–288). This statement is precisely what the exotic
other comes to represent: the figure passively differentiated from men that is
most desirable because of that passivity and quiet acceptance. The emphasis
of those qualities as virtues implies that women are to be seen and not heard
according to the Man of Law. As mentioned by Patel, such characteristics
carry a harmful weight in which women weather unnecessary suffering.
Although Custance is the prime example of this, Hermengild comes to
represent these notions as well. Despite Hermengild’s assimilation, she is
offered no protection by her new identity. The Man of Law relays that “[t]
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his knight, thurgh Sathanas temptaciouns / Al softely is to the bed y-go, /
And kitte the throte of Hermengild atwo . . .” (Chaucer 598–600). It is the
deliberate action of cutting Hermengild’s throat, the very part of her that
allows her to speak and her last faculty of self-determination, that causes her
death. Even after adhering to the passive identity the Man of Law wishes,
Hermengild’s voice—the notion of her ability to speak for herself—is still
a risk to be controlled. Even while submitting and assimilating, there is no
respite for the exotic other.

Performative Language

This suppression of both the exotic and dangerous others is not exclusive
to the Tale. As shown by Patel, the reality of intersectional categorization is
found imprinted on the literature, but this same literature may imprint back
onto reality. Jacques Derrida broadened J. L. Austin’s theory of performatives
in his essay “Signature Event Context,” in which he highlighted the nature
of repetition in performatives. As Derrida puts it, “Could a performative
utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable
utterance, in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting,
launch a ship or marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable
model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation?’” (18). That
is to say, performatives are backed by codified repetitions in language that
create historical and social realities. For a performative to function, it must
be previously recognized or tied to some familiar phrasing or statement
curated by past repetition. In short, language is codified inasmuch as it can
be repeated and recognized from this repetition. A common example of this
phenomenon is the phrase, “I do,” often exchanged during the wedding vow.
The groom or bride may not necessarily complete the marriage vow if he or
she were to say something such as “Okay.” The situation requires the use of
the performative “I do” for the ceremony to be complete.
The existence of performative sentences implies that there are certain
types of utterances that do something. In this same way, literature may also
“do something” as it brings into reality the ideas and concepts it seeks to
discuss. A state of affairs emerges into existence through the very words
literature uses. Characters, ideas, and concepts form as a result of the
performative action of literature—it is engaged in the act of world-making
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through its language. Literature itself, then, has an active role in shaping the

world it comes into, bringing things into being. As the Man of Law weaves
his story, he quite literally engages in performance to tell this Tale to the

other pilgrims. And, for this performance—this Tale—to function, it must

rely on codified repetitions of the past. As The Man of Law’s Tale attempts to

bring into reality a critique of discriminatory othering by portraying such

discriminatory othering, it merely repeats the historical and social reality it
has built itself upon while simultaneously adding to that historical and social

reality by repeating it. That repetition fuses with the collective memory of

discrimination’s meaning, especially as it relates to the intersectional women
of the Tale. The Tale reminds itself that discriminatory othering exists while
also suspending the concept and looping it endlessly. This pattern begins

to inscribe harmful identities on real bodies—real women. They are either

passive items or disposable villains. But, again, this only works because of
the previous historical and social backing literature builds itself upon. As

a result, Derrida theorizes that “the utterance will never be through and

through present to itself and to its content” (18). The original intention of
the speaker can never be fully realized as, in some respects, they will be

overwritten by the historical and social backing that belies their work. If it

is true that Chaucer is merely providing a critique, the critique must stand
next to the historical and social backing it invokes. It is as much about the

intentionality of the work—how this intentionality is accomplished—in

addition to the underlying mechanisms of language that may, in fact, work
against Chaucer’s supposed critique.

Conclusion: Othering and
Performative Language

Many critics have been able to discover commentary that the Tale provides
on aspects of positive passivity, religious strength, and racial solidarity,
and this analysis is not meant to dissuade us from ever finding positive
elements in the Tale. In careful balance, however, it must also be noted that
the characters of the Tale, especially the women, are created in categorized
identities curated by the Man of Law. The consequences of such behavior
devastate intersectional female identities into exoticized or stigmatized
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simplicities. And as is seen through Patel’s words on intersectionality, such is
the unfortunate case for women existing outside the Tale and in reality today.
The Tale, then, is stuck in repeating past discrimination while reinstating it—
becoming part of that history itself. It constantly reminds us of what seems to
be an inescapable existence of suffering rather than suggesting an attainable
future free from discrimination. The Tale’s intention to critique—as illustrated
by Derrida—does not hold, especially when contrasted against the historical,
repetitive system it invokes for critique. If anything, the Tale is a reminder of
discrimination as a powerful history. This history exists, has existed, and will
exist. It is a concept that cannot be critiqued into nonexistence. But perhaps,
in light of this understanding, our behaviors can be adjusted. We exist in the
careful balance of being able to recognize discrimination as a history, but also
being able to act in spite of that history with the very words we use. As we
engage systems of discrimination it becomes important to always question:
are we truly critiquing, or are we just missing the mark?
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Aboriginal and
European Relationships
in Voss, A Fringe of
Leaves, and Riders in
the Chariot
in terms of Homi Bhabha’s Theories of
Hybridity, In-Betweenness, and Third Space

Deniz Cansiz

The Australian continent, which has been home

to the Indigenous people of the land for thousands of years, had been
falsely labelled as ‘terra nullius’ by the European explorers to justify their
colonial missions, even though they knew the land had native inhabitants.
The mission of the European settlers to establish a penal colony for
Britain concluded with them delegitimizing the validity of the Indigenous
population’s existence in Australia, resulting in a negative outcome for the
lives of the Indigenous people who had a very deep physical and spiritual
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connection to the land. After their thousands of years of autonomy in the
land, the Indigenous people were degraded to lesser roles in the land, having
to “conform to an identity created for them in advance of [the Europeans’]
entry into [the continent]” (Reynolds 69). The racial oppression faced by
the Indigenous people of Australia was a result of the ideas brought by the
Europeans, like the binary oppositions with which they divided the world
into two, as their idea of the perfect and civilized white society needed the
concept of an uncivilized and backward society to oppose it. Patrick White, as
an Australian author whose interests lie in the spiritual state and the need of
a national identity of White Australia, focuses on the dichotomy between the
Indigenous inhabitants of Australia and the European settlers, as the binary
oppositions between the two cultures and their relationships are in the core of
Australian history. White, through his analysis of the fictionalized struggles
and experiences of characters in his works The Fringe of Leaves, Voss, and
Riders in the Chariot, creates a medium for the reader to understand the similar
and different aspects of Aboriginal and European cultures. Additionally, as
a postcolonial Australian writer, by rendering the interchanges between two
different cultures possible, he lets the reader psychologically and genetically
examine hybrid figures that are a reality of colonial Australia. This study
will, through the theories of Homi K. Bhabha, investigate the process in
which hybrid figures are created in colonised nations while examining the
effects of hybridity and in-betweenness on the psyche of both Aboriginal and
European characters in the selected works of Patrick White.

Theoretical Framework

The concept of hybridity coined by the postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha
occupies a very important place in the postcolonial discourse. It could be
argued that hybridity is an inevitable consequence of the colonial practices as
it is born out of the interactions of the colonised and the coloniser. The hybrid
people, as figures who carry the cultural or genetic materials from both sides
of the colonial spectrum, could be said to be creating an opposition to the
binary thinking as they do not fit into the essentialist thoughts. Bhabha, in
his work The Location of Culture, defines hybridity as:
[A] sign of productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces, and fixities;

it is the name for strategic reversal of the process of domination through
156

Winter 2021
disavowal (that is, the production of discriminatory identities that secure

the ‘pure’ and original identity of authority). Hybridity is the revaluation of

the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory
identity effects (159).

Cultural hybridity as a theory exists to describe the effects that being situated
in conditions of colonial antagonism and binary opposition have over the

construction process of cultures and identities of societies, and it is taken
from literary and cultural theory (182). Hybridity, according to Bhabha, is

“celebrated and privileged as a kind of superior cultural intelligence owing
to the advantage of in-betweenness, the straddling of cultures, and the

consequent ability to negotiate the difference” in the postcolonial discourse

(158). As hybrid identities emerge from the interrelations of the coloniser and

the colonised, their existence, owing to the fact that they carry the cultures of
two different societies, forms a strong antithesis against essentialist cultural
identity. As Fuss states, “the belief in invariable and fixed properties which

define the ‘whatness of a given entity’ is exactly what Bhabha’s theory of
hybridity opposes” (XI). Bhabha accepts hybridity as a form of being that has

been situated in an in-between space, where the “cutting edge of translation

and negotiation” is set in, which he calls the third space (Bhabha 269,

Rutherford 210). So, what Bhabha defines as the third space is a metaphysical

space where newly formed cultures born out of the cultural transactions of

two different cultures blur the limitations set by the established culture and
identity based on the categorisation and the binary oppositions of the colonial

centre. He explains his theory of third space in an interview as follows:

For me, the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two

original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me

is the ‘Third Space,’ which enables other positions to emerge. This third

space displaces the histories that constitute it and sets up new structures of

authority (Rutherford 211).

According to Bhabha, this hybrid third space is an ambivalent site where

cultural meanings and representations have no “primordial unity or fixity,”
and it can be said that Patrick White, in his works, physically shapes out
this ambivalent third space in the form of the Australian desert, where

the autonomy of both the Aboriginal Australians and Europeans do not

persist (55).
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There have been other writers inspired by Homi K. Bhaba’s arguments
regarding hybrid identities that emerge in colonial and postcolonial societies.
These writers, like Bhabha himself argues in his works, discuss this third
space as a middle ground between two opposing cultures. A postcolonial
writer, Law, discusses in her work that third space is important in cultures
as an in-between space that works to negotiate the hegemonic practices
and the dualistic colonial binary thinking (109). Another postcolonial writer,
Papastergiadis, defines the hybrid identities that are positioned within this
third space as a “lubricant” between two cultures as they can transverse both
cultures with counter-hegemonic actions, destroying the binary thinking of
the colonial systems, and work as a bridge between two different cultures and
races (261). As a continent that has been home to the Aboriginal Australians
for thousands of years, the arrival of the European people proved to be a
destabilising factor for both the ancient traditions of the Aboriginal people
and the European identity on this new and harsh land. So, analysing the
interactions of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal characters in Patrick White’s
works might, for that reason, unearth the process in which the hybrid figures
are created and the general effects of hybridity and being situated in an
in-between third space over the psyche of a nation, as well as of individuals
from different cultures. In the rest of the article, by using Bhabha’s theories
of hybridity and third space as a critical lens, this paper will examine the
intercultural relations and its results.

Hybridity in Voss, A Fringe
of Leaves, and Riders in
the Chariot

Although the binary oppositions were set by the colonizers to perpetuate
their colonial dominance in the lands they claimed, the results may turn
out in a way they might not have anticipated. Homi K Bhabha, in his work
The Location of Culture, talks about his theory, which is directly related to the
lives of people whose racial identities are formed in societies where there are
clashes between a coloniser and a colonised group. As a result of this clash
between two societies, hybrid identities that carry the cultural values and
biological characteristics of the two opposing groups emerge. So, the idea of
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a fixed identity that has been at the core of colonial discourse is challenged.
Patrick White focuses his writing on the effects of being a member of a colonial
society over individuals as a writer whose fiction usually discusses the state
of the Australian psyche at a critical time in the history of the continent when
it was trying to establish itself as an independent country in the political
world, rather than a part of the British commonwealth. Although there was a
concern for establishing Australia itself as an independent nation, there was

also a concern for establishing a unique Australian culture in an environment
where there was still a clash of cultures. Therefore, the importance of
examining both the Indigenous and European characters’ experiences and
relationships together to have a better understanding of the emergence of
new cultures from two existing cultures cannot be denied.
Patrick White, in his works Voss and A Fringe of Leaves, creates a narrative
where he relocates the European outsiders in changing physical and
psychological states, especially by their relocation in the Australian desert.
The vast and empty desert of Australia is a place that could be considered
to be a neutral space that enables the negotiation between European and
Indigenous characters. These characters who have been relocated, through
their interactions with the Indigenous people, have a change of consciousness.
Johan Ulrich Voss and Ellen Roxburgh, the protagonists of Voss and A Fringe
of Leaves respectively, undergo a complete transformation of mind. They turn
into hybrid figures who grow a better understanding of the otherized people
in their cultures through their sufferings and experiences in the untamed
landscape of Australia, which could be interpreted as Patrick White’s physical
projection of the metaphysical third space between the European world of
understanding where they belong and the Aboriginal world they have been
thrown into. Unlike Voss and A Fringe of Leaves where the white European
protagonists travel into the Black world, intentionally or unintentionally, The
Riders in the Chariot focuses on the story of a half Indigenous, half European
person who has already been displaced into the whitened and Europeanized
world because, as a part of the ‘stolen generation’ of Australia, Alf Dubbo
has already been taken away from his Indigenous tribe and his ties with his
Indigenous roots. Just like the other characters, Voss and Roxburgh, who
suffer in the Indigenous world, Alf Dubbo, in Riders in the Chariot, suffers
as a half-Black person at the hands of the white people who adopt him. He
gets abused and exploited in the white world under the guise of benevolence,
paralleling the benevolent guise of the colonizing European.
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In the first two novels, Patrick White dives deep into colonial Australian
history, but in the third novel, Riders in the Chariot, he discusses and criticizes
the society of contemporary Australia. In Riders in the Chariot, the dominance
of white identity has already been established in the continent, and while
White examines the socially and spiritually hybridised characters in Voss
and A Fringe of Leaves, with Alf Dubbo of Riders in the Chariot, he examines
a biologically hybrid character that challenges the binary oppositions better

than the cultural hybridity. The blackness of the half-Black Dubbo, in a land
that was once the home of the Indigenous people but now dominated by
European culture, causes him to be alienated from the white-dominant society.
As his blackness alienates him from the white-dominant society, the fact that
he has been taken away from his Indigenous tribe at a young age means
that he can never go back to his tribe as a person who has not been through
the initiation process of the Indigenous people. In the whitened world he is
alienated to, with his memories of his childhood in an Indigenous tribe with
his Indigenous mother, he is in a state of in-betweenness. Healy talks about
Dubbo in his work as such:
In the beginning, he is himself a torn creature, caught between the

imposed abstractions of Mr. Calderon’s Christ and the rich but discrete
memories of youth in an Aboriginal community (201).

Patrick White, through the character of Alf Dubbo, who is biologically
a hybrid of White and Black societies, fictionalizes the struggles of the
unfortunate members of Australia’s ‘lost generation.’ As a part of the ‘lost
generation,’ Dubbo’s experiences of feeling like he does not belong in
any place are also depicted throughout the novel, directly showing the
experiences of a person who is in a state of hybridity. Dubbo is depicted as
a person who has “always been at war” (437). His war is waged against his
own hybrid nature that attracts the racist attitudes of the society along with
his feeling of alienation from both the White and the Black world. Dubbo is
torn between his Indigenous roots and his life in the white-dominated world
where he does not feel welcomed. In one part of the novel, Dubbo reflects on
his hybrid nature and the complexities it brings to his life as follows:
His mind was another matter because even he could not calculate how it

might behave, or what it might become once it was set free. In the meantime,

it would keep jumping and struggling, like a fish left behind in a pool—or

two fish, since the white people, his guardians had dropped another in (437).
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This quote directly shows the struggle and confusion of Dubbo about his own

identity. As it has already been stated in the theoretical framework section

of this work, hybridity is celebrated for its ability and power to reverse the

discriminatory effects caused by ideas of fixed racial identities formed in
colonial settings. Although this power is good in one sense, after seeing the
psychological state of the half-caste Alf Dubbo, it cannot be denied that the
same binary oppositions that the hybrid figures’ existence disrupts also

cause them to feel a cultural and existential cringe, owing to the fact that
their non-binary existence does not fit into the binary thinking of the world.

Throughout his life, although he is half white, he shows a resistance to

the pressures of white culture that try to destroy and disregard his Black
side. In the novel, Dubbo has a black tin box in which he puts everything

meaningful in his life:

Everything he did, any fruit of his own meaningful relationship with

life, he would lock up in a tin box, which grew dented and scratched as it
travelled with him from job to job, or lay back and secret underneath his

bed, while he played the part of the factory-hand or station roustabout.

Nobody would have thought of opening that box. Most people respected
the moroseness of its owner, and a few were even scared of Dubbo (427).

The black tin box, hidden under his bed and “dented and scratched,” could

be seen as a physical representation of his Indigenous self, hidden away and

harmed. Although he resists the white culture, the only thing he gets from

the white world is his skill in painting that he acquires from one of his white

guardian families, but even when he is made to paint the figure of Jesus

Christ, he immediately portrays him as a darker man, contributing a part
of his Aboriginal spirit into his art. Despite the fact that he hides his hurt

Indigenous side in the white-dominated world, his dual existence affects his
life in every way.

Even though they do not face the same kind of racism Dubbo faces, just

like Dubbo, Johan Ulrich Voss and Ellen Roxburgh are also alienated in their

white-dominated societies. Although Voss is German, he is seen as an outsider
by the white aristocratic society of Australia, with people commenting that he

is a peculiar person who has no place in the colonial Sydney society. Just like

him, Mrs. Roxburgh too has been otherized and alienated by the aristocratic

British society and has been called a British ‘savage’ on many occasions. Long
before her hybrid identity comes out during her time with the Indigenous
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people, her marriage with the aristocrat Austin Roxburgh transforms her
from a farm girl from Cornwall to a ‘proper’ lady. Her origins as a farm girl
distance her from the British and Sydney society, and another character in
the novel, Miss Scrimshaw talks about Ellen’s home, Cornwall as “a remote
country . . . of dark people'' and says “I cannot remember ever having been
on intimate terms with any individual of Cornish blood. All my family were
fair” (16). So, even from the start, these two non-Aboriginal characters could

be argued to be closer to the otherized Indigenous people than they are to the
Centre, the aristocratic class of Sydney. Voss even thinks of the Indigenous
people as “his people',” seeing himself as a part of their society and looks at
the land and the people in a different way than the traditional colonizer figure
would do (250). This state of being in between two cultures creates a space
for these characters to empathise with the Indigenous people, owing to the
fact that, although in different contexts, they go through similar experiences.
It cannot be denied that in the history of colonialism, the figure of the
explorer has been a very important one. Although the figure of explorer,
especially in colonial societies, has been connotated with heroism, when
this figure is analysed through a postcolonial perspective, it may be viewed
as an invader whose actions are merely for further dominion and power of
Europe, although he has been masked with heroic intentions. So, Patrick
White’s use of the figure of an explorer in Voss is quite ironic, and important,
as the protagonist of the novel in the end, through the course of the novel,
turns from a simple explorer who is only there for colonial purposes to a
figure that has become closer to the Indigene. White cites the journals of the
Prussian explorer Ludwig Leichhardt as his basis for Voss.
Another apparent resemblance between the journals of Leichardt and
the process of hybridisation in the fictional works studied in this work is
the power of sharing food as a way of forming connections in societies. In
Ludwig Leichhardt’s journals, there are many examples of white people
eating food like lizards, snakes, and other creatures that they would not
have normally consume in their ‘civilized’ world, in order to survive. In Voss,
when the titular character, in the climactic moment of the novel where the
transformation of Johan Ulrich Voss has been completed, has the witchetty
grub placed on his tongue, he, in a way, becomes one with the Indigene.
When the journals of Leichhardt are examined, it is impossible not to notice
the racial differences that divide the two groups, the Indigenous people
and the European explorers, become increasingly weaker and the lines that
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separate the Black and White groups get blurrier, as during their expedition
into the desert, they are all equally subjected to the mercy of the desert
and nature, and this causes them to be on equal grounds. In the journals,
Leichhardt and his group get lost on one occasion, and they eat lizards. The
food, which the white man would not have ever considered feeding on in
normal circumstances or in his normal environment, suddenly becomes
essential for his survival in the desert. It cannot be disregarded that the act

of sharing food is a form of bonding in human communication, and Ellen
Roxburgh’s assimilation into the Indigenous society is also constantly shown
to the reader through the motif of food in A Fringe of Leaves.
An important argument of colonial Britain for a long time was the myth
of the cannibal native. They would use this myth to justify their imperial
and colonial actions to bring ‘salvation and culture’ to the people whom
they deemed as ‘savages.’ At one point of the novel, Ellen participates in the
cannibalistic ritual of the Indigenous tribe, and it is again a climactic point
for her process of hybridization and transformation into a half-Indigene.
In this section, Patrick White clearly separates the practice of cannibalism
performed by White and Black people in the novel, with the Indigenous
people’s practice of it being a form of ritual cannibalism that is not a natural
or persistent part of their diet; instead, it is the white people who are shown
as the ones who indulge in a form of cannibalistic behaviour that is simply
the “abomination of human behaviour” as said by Ellen in the novel (299).
This reversal of the myth of the cannibal native again provides the reader
with a question of who the savage and who the civilized is and who decides
on the identity of the two.
Ellen’s process of hybridization also goes on with her involvement in
the female rituals of the tribe. Her identity as a Cornish farm girl who has
later been transformed into an English lady is again highlighted through her
being reminded of her rituals in the farm while she is attending the tribal
rituals. When her past and present states have been examined, one can state
without a doubt that Ellen’s life as a farm girl before her transformation
into a British lady is closer to the Indigenous way of life than to her life in
the aristocratic British society. Although she is an outsider, Ellen even fully
participates in the corroboree, a celebration of the Indigenous tribes, and at
that moment, she sees “the sudden vision of Mr. Roxburgh,” as if, in the form
of her late husband, the ghost of her European colonial identity is calling her
back from the process in which she is becoming more like the Indigene, but it
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is not enough to prevent her from taking part in the ritual (311). Later, when
she is talking to the Commandant, in response to his question, “Did you take
part in their corroboree?” she answers, “Oh yes, I joined in, because I was
one of them” (399). For the Commandant, whose mind works in a binary
system that has fixed expectations of races, the notion of a lady of a highclass society taking part in the ‘primitive’ rituals of the Indigenous people
is out of the question, but Ellen forms an opposition to the binary thinking

and forms or even turns into a bridge between the European and Indigenous
world. Ellen is even physically transformed to resemble the Indigenous
people. She is totally stripped of her clothes, with her skin blackened and her
hair completely chopped away, and in her time with the Indigenous tribe,
she leaves her European clothes and looks and physically becomes someone
closer to the Indigene.
Patrick White, through the experiences of the convict figures as well
as Voss and Mrs. Roxburgh, shows the reader how an otherized European
person is closer to the Indigenous people. Both Ellen and Voss draw parallels
to their homelands when they first go into the inner parts of Australia, where
the Indigenes live. Even before he goes into the wilderness and his process
of change begins, Voss reprimands the local people because of their rejection
of the native landscape saying, “A pity you huddle […] your landscape is of
great subtlety” (12). And his words suggest that the change from a foreigner
to Indigene has already started as he says, “I am at home. It is like the poorer
parts of Germany. It could be Mark Brandenburg” (12). There is also a parallel
drawn between the convicts and the Indigenous people in the novels. In Voss,
through the character of Judd the convict, whose rejection from his home in
imperial Britain and the fact that he gets sent away to Australia as a convict
positions him as an outcast in the colonial world that has been constructed by
the Europeans. Judd states in the novel if a person lives and suffers in a place
for long enough, that person never leaves it for good, as their spirit will still
be there (539). What this convict, Judd, suggests in this part of the novel is
simply the summary of the hybridization process that Voss goes through in
the novel. The white convict figure in A Fringe of Leaves, Jack Chance, is also
seen as an Indigenous person in the tribe. The readers see that Jack Chance
has mastered the language of the Indigenous tribe he is living with and has
also absorbed their culture and seems to be speaking his native language
again with great effort in one part of the novel. He is so alienated to the
society he was banished from so much that he says that “men are unnatural
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and unjust” (309). He views the colonial society that banished him as unjust

people, rejecting his chance to go back.

Towards the end of Voss, at the moment of his death, the titular

characters’ blood flows directly into the land, making him merge with the

Australian land physically after his spiritual connection and hybridization
has been completed. After Voss’ death, Judd says, “His dreams fled into the

air, his blood ran out upon the dry earth, which drank it up immediately”

(480). This comment of Judd, the convict, on this event adds more to this

connection. He later says, “Voss left his mark on the country. The blacks

talk about him to this day. He is still there. He is there in the country, and

always will be” (538). Thus, the explorer figure, merely an instrument of
the colonising powers, turns into a hybrid of Indigenous and European

cultures. It shows the transformative possibilities of the European from
simply an invader who threatens the lives of the Indigenous people into

a hybrid. This process of hybridization not only affects the white people,
but also the Indigenous people who interact with them. In Voss, Jackie,

the Aboriginal guide of the expedition, who gradually masters English,
interprets the meaning of the burial platforms and the important parts of
his Indigenous culture to the European group. He explains the significance

of the serpent in his culture to Voss:

“Snake”, Jackie explained, “Father, my father, all blackfeller.” [ . . . ]

“Kangaroo,” said the boy. “Old man,” he smiled, touching certain parts. [ . . .

] “What are they?” These appeared to be an assembly of tortuous skeletons,

or bundles of bones and blowing feathers [ . . . ]. “Men gone away all dead,”
the boy explained. “All over.” He waved his arm. “By rock, by tree. No

more men,” [ . . . ]. “Now I understand,” said Voss gravely. He did. To his

fingertips. He felt immensely happy” (336).

By using the white people’s language, Jackie helps them better understand
his own culture and becomes a bridge between two cultures, just like a hybrid
is expected to do, and as Papastergiadis states in his work, he becomes a
“lubricant” between the Europeans, and the Indigenous culture (261). This
everlasting effect of the encounter between the Black and White does not
momentarily change the Aboriginal boy Jackie, but he gets completely
changed as a result of this cultural encounter. After Jackie kills Voss, he
immediately runs away from his tribe too. After his escape, he wanders
naked and alone in the desert. In his time alone in the desert, he is haunted
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by the knowledge he got through this process: “He was slowly becoming
possessed of the secrets of the country” (511). What he sees but remains
unable to express is the possibility of a shared culture and life in Australia
for both the Black and White cultures.
So he did not tell Dugald much beyond some uninteresting facts

concerning the mutiny of the white man. All else he kept to himself. For it is

not possible to communicate lucidly with men after the communion of souls,

and the fur of the white souls had brushed the moist skin of the aboriginal
boy as he shuddered in the briga-low scrub (511).

Just as Voss, with his blood spilling into the land, becomes a part of the land
and gives a part of himself into the continent, the Aboriginal boy Jackie
is forever stained by whiteness. With the cultural exchange he has been
through throughout the novel, he too becomes a hybrid, just like Voss, and
although Ellen returns to the ‘civilized’ world at the end of A Fringe of Leaves,
it is apparent that she will not return to England, but will remain in Sydney,
and it is suggested that she will remain there as the wife of Mr. Jevons, as a
new kind of European person, whose white culture has been changed a little
bit through her encounter with the Black people. Finally, Alf Dubbo, forever
stuck in-between the European culture and the Indigenous Australian
culture stays as a symbol of a multicultural Australia.

Conclusion

Homi K. Bhabha’s theories of hybridity, in-betweenness, and third space
are still able to articulate the inevitable consequences of the intercultural
relations in colonised societies. Suggesting that literary works subjectively
fictionalise the actual or imagined histories and experiences of a given period
and place in the world, this study analyses the relationships of Black and
White characters, as well as the process that leads to and the consequences of
hybridity in colonial Australia through a close reading of Voss, Riders in the
Chariot, and A Fringe of Leaves by Patrick White and reinforces the arguments
of Bhabha regarding hybridity and its effects in the deconstruction of the
binary oppositions that divide Black and White nations. The Indigenous and
European characters in the novels, as in the case of Ellen Roxburgh, Johan
Ulrich Voss, Dugald, Jackie, Jack Chance, and Alf Dubbo, have a change
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of psyche through their experiences with different ontological models and
cultures. So, the idea of a fixed identity that has been at the core of colonial
discourse that has been perpetuated through the binary oppositions
between cultures have been undermined by the white characters who show
themselves to be closer to the Indigenous people in many respects, even
the agent of colonial powers, a European explorer being turned into a halfIndigene spiritually shows the impossibility of any fixed racial identity.
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